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1 Introduction 
1.1 Infinite Regress in Procedural Choice 
Imagine a group of individuals faces a collective choice problem from the set of alternatives 𝑋 
without an ex ante agreement on the procedure that will be used to aggregate their preferences. 
As Nurmi (1992) points out, different voting procedures can result in different outcomes even if 
we fix each individual’s preferences over 𝑋. Nurmi provides an example that shows plurality, 
runoff, amendment, Borda count, and approval voting each result in different outcomes for a 
given preference profile. Even when we restrict our attention to scoring rules only, Saari (1992) 
shows that if there are ten alternatives, millions of different rankings of 𝑋 can be achieved by 
the choice of scoring rule. In fact, many researchers have verified such possibilities based on 
real election data such as those from the 1968 (Roderick, 1979) and the 1992 (Brams & Merrill, 
1994) U.S. presidential elections. These observations demonstrate that the choice of procedure 
is no less important than the choice of 𝑋.  
In social choice theory, there are many axiomatic studies of voting rules, such as May's 
(1952) characterization of majority rule, based on the premise that a good rule is one that 
satisfies normative and/or intuitive criteria such as Condorcet’s criterion, unanimity, etc. 
However, many negative results, the best known of which are Arrow’s and Gibbard and 
Satterthwaite’s, suggest that there is no perfect voting rule. On the other hand, there is another 
point of view that a good rule is one that is favored by the group of individuals themselves, even 
though such a procedure might fail to satisfy the normative axioms that social choice 
researchers esteem. Dietrich (2005) formally defines this view as Procedural Autonomy (PA). It 
demands that the procedure by which the society aggregates voters’ procedural judgments 
should be entirely determined by the procedural judgments, i.e. their (true) preferences over the 
set of possible procedures, within the group. However, taking PA literally we could face an 
infinite regress problem as follows. When a society faces a decision-making problem, 𝑋, PA 
demands that the rule to aggregate the society members’ opinions over 𝑋 must be determined 
by their opinions over such rules. This means the society faces a new decision-making problem: 
how to choose the rules to choose 𝑋. Using PA again, it follows that the society needs to 
aggregate its members’ opinions over the rules to choose the rule to choose 𝑋. This process can 
go on ad infinitum unless there is an ex ante agreement at some meta level, because no 
procedure is legitimate before it is selected by the meta rule to choose such procedures—this is 
the infinite regress problem in procedural choice1.  
 The objective of this research is to find a rational way to stop and solve this infinite 
                                                         
1 Similar regress problems have appeared in many academic disciplines. For instance, the epistemic 
regress problem, i.e., a belief B1 must by justified by belief B2 but B2 must be also justified by belief B3, 
and so on, is a classic problem in epistemology (See, Steup, 2006).  
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regress problem; I propose a new concept—weak/strong convergence—as the solution. The 
objective is stated in detail in section 1.2, with reference to relevant literature. Section 1.2 also 
introduces the basic concept of convergence. Section 1.3 provides a more formal introduction 
with some preliminary results demonstrating the basic difficulties with procedural choice. 
Chapter 2 gives a rigorous definition of the weak/strong convergence concept and shows some 
initial results. In Chapter 3, I discuss the design possibilities for menus of voting rules following 
a convergence approach. 
In the convergence model (and most of the related literature referred to in section 1.2), 
the society—the set of individuals who have the right to vote—is supposed to be fixed a priori. 
There are, however, some cases where this implicit assumption is not appropriate. In Section 
1.3, I introduce the classic boundary problem, or how to determine the “society” itself and I 
briefly sketch its expression as an aggregation problem. Chapter 4 includes the arguments 
related to the strategic aspect of such aggregation procedures. Concluding remarks are given in 
Chapter 5.  
 
1.2 Related Literature 
The infinite regress problem of procedural choice is a classic problem that Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962) referred to, arguing the importance of unanimity of consent at the constitutional 
level. Rae (1969) also studies individuals’ procedural judgments in terms of minimizing the 
expected frequency of losing in the future. Lagunoff (1992) argues for a possible solution to the 
infinite regress problem, showing that a society can reach a Pareto-optimal outcome by 
repeatedly dropping the unsuitable mechanisms that fail to satisfy his “Free Choice” condition, 
which rules out such mechanisms that make some agent locked in to an equilibrium outcome.  
Recently, a sequence of studies examined the procedural choice problem based on so-
called fixed point approach (Barbera & Jackson, 2004; Koray, 2000; Koray & Slinko, 2006; 
Kultti & Paavo, 2009). Intuitively, a social choice function (SCF) is called self-selective if it 
chooses itself from among other rival SCFs (Koray, 2000). If procedural choice is to be made 
using the existing procedure (e.g., the amendment procedure of the Constitution of Japan) self-
selectivity is a powerful tool for detecting stable states. Barbera and Jackson (2004) considered 
the process of constitutional design, where one alternative is the status quo, and studied the class 
of voting rules that choose themselves (i.e., self-stable voting rules). Kultti and Paavo (2009) 
extended the notion of stability so that the model incorporates higher-level meta procedures. 
There are, however, some impossibilities on the design of self-selective procedure. Koray 
(2000) shows that for unanimous and neutral SCFs, the (universal) self-selectivity is logically 
equivalent to dictatorship, in the proof of which Koray shows the logical relationship with 
Arrow’s impossibility result. Subsequently, Koray and Slinko (2006) characterized the class of 
5 
 
dictatorship and anti-dictatorship using a weaker requirement of self-selectivity.  
 While these researchers considered single voting rules, the notion of stability was later 
extended to apply to menus of voting rules. Houy (2004) states that a menu of social choice 
rules (SCRs) satisfies the condition of first-level stability if, for all preference profiles over the 
voting rules, the menu includes one and only one SCR that chooses itself. Houy then shows the 
negative result that no menu of SCRs can satisfy first-level stability and two more intuitive 
conditions (this result is discussed further in Chapter 3). On the other hand, Diss, Louichi, 
Merlin, and Smaoui (2012) and Diss and Merlin (2010) studied the actual probability that a 
menu of SCRs is stable (i.e., there is at least one SCR that chooses itself) under the Impartial 
Culture (IC) and Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) models, respectively. Their results show 
that when the population is (infinitely) large, the probability that the set of {plurality (P), Borda 
(B), anti-plurality (A)} is stable is 84.49% in the IC model and 84.10% in the IAC model.  
These studies show the difficulty of determining the most legitimate procedure based 
on voters’ own procedural judgments. The difficulty exists even when a society chooses the 
procedure from among three popular voting rules (e.g., P, B, and A). The objective of this study 
is to eliminate these difficulties, specifically, 1) to provide a procedural choice method that can 
determine the unique legitimate outcome without failure and 2) to enable choice from a set of 
familiar voting procedures, such as the set: {P, B, A}. To achieve this objective, I propose a new 
approach based on the concept of weak/strong convergence. Using two examples below, I 
outline the idea of convergence. The examples also indicate why we need the concept of 
convergence instead of the previous concept of stability (e.g., of a menu of voting rules). In the 
following examples, let 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} be a set of mutually exclusive alternatives (social states) 
and 𝐹 = {𝑃, 𝐵, 𝐴} be a set of admissible SCRs.  
 
Example 1: The Menu is Stable but the Outcome is not Uniquely Determined 
Suppose 𝑛 = 42 with the following preferences:  
- 9 voters’ preferences are 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝑃,𝐵, 𝐴, (i.e., among the alternatives they 
prefer 𝑎 to 𝑏 and 𝑏 to 𝑐, while among voting rules, they prefer 𝑃 to 𝐵 and 𝐵 to 
𝐴)  
- 11 voters’ preferences are 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑏 and 𝑃, 𝐴, 𝐵,  
- 17 voters’ preferences are 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑎 and 𝐵, 𝐴, 𝑃,  
- 1 voter’s preference is 𝑐, 𝑎, 𝑏 and 𝐴, 𝑃, 𝐵, and 
- 4 voters’ preference is 𝑐, 𝑏, 𝑎 and 𝐴,𝐵, 𝑃.  
(The reader might wonder about the plausibility of such preferences with regard to 𝑋 and 𝐹, 
however, I will formally show in Chapter 2 that this profile is possible with the assumption of 
consequentialism.) 
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Let 𝐿0 and 𝐿1 be the combination of such preferences (the preference profile) 
regarding 𝑋 and 𝐹, respectively. Once 𝐿0 and 𝐿1 are given, the reader can easily check that 
each procedure chooses itself among 𝐹, i.e. 𝑃(𝐿1) = 𝑃, 𝐵(𝐿1) = 𝐵, and 𝐴(𝐿1) = 𝐴. The 
menu is clearly stable at 𝐿1 in Diss and Merlin's (2010) sense. However, there arises a new 
problem: which of the self-selecting procedures should be used when each of them results in a 
different outcome?  
 
Example 2: The Menu is not Stable but the Outcome is Uniquely Determined 
Suppose 𝑛 = 14 and the individuals have the following preferences:  
- 4 voters’ preferences are 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝑃,𝐵, 𝐴, 
- 6 voters’ preferences are 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝐵, 𝑃, 𝐴, and 
- 4 voters’ preferences are 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑎 and 𝐴, 𝑃, 𝐵. 
In this case, no voting rule chooses itself. So, the menu 𝐹 is not stable at this preference profile 
regarding 𝐹. However, each 𝑃,𝐵, 𝐴—when used as a rule to choose the rule to choose from 𝑋 
—results in the same outcome (see Figure 1). In such a case, the failure of stability seems less 
problematic—the ultimate outcome is the same no matter which of the rules to choose the rule 
is selected. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a regress convergence 
𝐹1 denotes the set of voting rules for the choice of alternatives and 𝐹2 denotes the set of 
voting rules for the choice of 𝐹1. 
 
These examples show that the stability of a menu does not indicate its ability to determine 
a unique outcome. Indeed, Example 2 shows the possibility that each procedure may ultimately 
reach the same outcome at some meta level even though the judgments of the procedures do not 
coincide and no procedure chooses itself. The phenomenon of every procedure ultimately 
reaching the same outcome is what I name convergence. The formal definition and technical 
results are presented in Chapters 2 and 3.  
I conclude this section with some technical clarifications based on my literature review. In 
the formulation of procedural choice, the timing of the procedural choice is a key assumption. In 
the literature, there are two types of assumption with respect to this timing: type 0, when there is 
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no specific agenda such as Rawls’ veil of ignorance (Barbera & Jackson, 2004; Houy, 2004; 
Rae, 1969), and type 1, when a society is facing a specific agenda (Koray, 2000; Koray & 
Slinko, 2006; Lagunoff, 1992). This dissertation makes the latter assumption, because it seems 
more suited to the assumption of PA that voters’ procedural judgments can and may differ for 
different agendas.  
Another important assumption in the model is what type of procedural judgments are 
allowed. Roughly speaking, in studies assuming a type 0 situation, voters’ procedural judgments 
are evaluated in terms of the expected payoff or probability of being in the losing side in the 
future events. In contrast, in most of the studies assuming a type 1 situation, each individual is 
assumed to hold a consequential procedural preference: they are assumed to evaluate meta-level 
procedures according to their outcomes (consequentialism). Although the consequentialism 
assumption is easy to deal with, other types of meta-preferences are also considered in related 
literature. For example, Nurmi (2015) argues the preference over the criteria of voting rules 
such as Condorcet winner criterion, monotonicity, etc. From the deliberating point of view, List 
(2007) argues the possibility that votes agree on the conceptualization of the decision problem. 
In the next section, I give a formal mathematical introduction to the procedural choice problem 
and show the basic impossibility arising when we consider any type of meta-preference. This 
negative result motivates the analysis in Chapters 2 and 3, which gives a solution concept under 
a consequential society.  
 
1.3 Preliminary Formal Discussion2 
In this section, I provide a formal introduction to the procedural choice problem and show the 
basic difficulty with procedural choice that motivates the analysis in the next chapters. I 
formulate a procedural choice rule (PCR), which is the rule for aggregating voters’ procedural 
judgments and is technically close to the decision rule studied in Dietrich (2005). I introduce 
several new axioms, which I argue are necessary for the process of choosing voting procedures 
without an ex ante agreement, and show an impossibility.  
 
1.3.1 Notation 
Let 𝑁 = {1,2,… , 𝑛} denote a society with at least two individuals, 𝑛 ≥ 2 , that is to make a 
collective decision. Let 𝑋 denote the set of decision alternatives, whose cardinality is 2 ≤ |𝑋| <
∞. The society is supposed to make an endogenous decision over 𝑋 without an agreement on 
the procedure to aggregate their preferences.  
                                                         
2 Main results of this subsection are originally published in the following: Takahiro Suzuki and Masahide 
Horita, "How to Order the Alternatives, Rules, and the Rules to Choose Rules: When the Endogenous 
Procedural Choice Regresses". Outlooks and Insights on Group Decision and Negotiation. Springer 
International Publishing, 2015. p.47-59. 
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A binary relation 𝑅 over a non-empty set 𝐴 is defined as a subset of 𝐴×𝐴. As usual, for 
𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐴, I often write 𝑎𝑅𝑏 instead of (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑅. For a binary relation 𝑅 on 𝐴,  
- 𝑅 is reflexive if 𝑎𝑅𝑎 for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴. 
 - 𝑅 is transitive if, for all 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑎𝑅𝑏 and 𝑏𝑅𝑐 implies 𝑎𝑅𝑐.  
 - 𝑅 is complete if, for all 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐴, 𝑎𝑅𝑏 or 𝑏𝑅𝑎 holds.  
 - 𝑅 is anti-symmetric if, for all 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐴, [𝑎𝑅𝑏 & 𝑏𝑅𝑎] implies 𝑎 = 𝑏.  
 - 𝑅 is a weak order if it is reflexive, transitive, and complete.  
 - 𝑅 is a linear order if it is an anti-symmetric weak order.  
Let 𝒲(𝐴) and ℒ(𝐴) be the set of all weak orders and linear orders over 𝐴, respectively. Let 
𝑃(𝑅) and 𝐼(𝑅) respectively denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of binary relation 𝑅, 
i.e.:  
𝑃(𝑅) ≔ {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐴×𝐴│(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑅 and (𝑏, 𝑎) ∉ 𝑅}. 
𝐼(𝑅) ≔ {(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐴×𝐴│(𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝑅 and (𝑏, 𝑎) ∈ 𝑅}. 
Given a binary relation 𝑅 over 𝐴 and a nonempty subset 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐴 , I denote by 𝐺(𝑅, 𝐵) the 
greatest elements of 𝐵 relative to 𝑅, i.e., 𝐺(𝑅, 𝐵) ≔ {𝑥 ∈ 𝐵│𝑥𝑅𝑦 for all 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋}. 
 A preference profile over a nonempty set 𝐴  is an 𝑛 -tuple of weak orders 𝑅 =
(𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑛) ∈ 𝒲(𝐴)
𝑛 , where the 𝑖th element 𝑅𝑖 represents individual 𝑖 ’s preference. A 
social choice function (SCF) 𝑓  over 𝐴  is a function that assigns an alternative to each 
preference profile over 𝐴 , such that 𝑓：𝒲(𝐴)𝑛 → 𝐴 . Let ℕ = {1,2,3, … } denote the set of 
positive integers. I define a sequence 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … of sets of SCFs as compatible if:  
(1) 𝐹0 = 𝑋, and 
(2) ∀𝑘 ∈ ℕ, 𝐹𝑘 is a set of SCFs over 𝐹𝑘−1.  
Given such a compatible sequence, I define an element of 𝐹𝑘 as a level-𝑘 SCF (or level-𝑘 
procedure, interchangeably). In words, a level-𝑘 SCF is a rule [to choose the rule] ((𝑘 − 1) 
times) to choose an alternative. Note that there are many compatible sequences.  
 
Example 3: Universal Domain 
For all 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, let 𝐹𝑘 be the set of all SCFs over 𝐹𝑘−1. It is easy to see that, defined in this way, 
the sequence 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … is compatible.  
 
According to Dietrich (2005), Universal Domain (UD) is an assumption that the society considers 
all level-1 procedures. The sequence in Example 3 is a straight extension of UD because it also 
considers any meta-level procedures. In the following argument, I call such 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … the 
UD-sequence.  
Given a compatible sequence 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, …, I assume that each individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 has a 
preference order 𝑅𝑖
𝑘 ∈ 𝒲(𝐹𝑘)  for all 𝑘 ∈ ℕ . A level- 𝑘  preference profile 𝑅𝑘 =
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(𝑅1
𝑘, 𝑅2
𝑘 , … , 𝑅𝑛
𝑘)  is a preference profile over 𝐹𝑘 . Integrating the level- 𝑘  (𝑘 = 0,1,… , 𝐿) 
preference profile 𝑅0, 𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝐿, I call 𝑅 = (𝑅0, 𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝐿) a level-𝐿 meta-profile.  
 
Definition 1. Procedural Choice Rule 
Let 𝐿 ∈ ℕ  and 𝐷 ⊆ 𝒲(𝑋)𝑛×𝒲(𝐹1)𝑛×⋯×𝒲(𝐹𝐿)𝑛 . A level-𝐿  PCR 𝐸  of domain 𝐷  is 
defined as a function assigning a level-𝐿 social meta preference 𝐸 = (𝐸0, 𝐸1, 𝐸2, … , 𝐸𝐿) to each 
level-𝐿 meta-profile, i.e., 𝐸: 𝐷 → 𝒲(𝑋)𝑛×𝒲(𝐹1)𝑛⋯×𝒲(𝐹𝐿)𝑛.  
 
A PCR expresses a way of determining a society’s collective judgments over the meta-level 
procedures. Given a meta-profile, i.e., each individual’s procedural judgment, the PCR returns 
the collective procedural judgment of the society. Unlike usual social welfare functions, a PCR 
considers people’s procedural judgments. Note that the PCR is an extension of the concept of the 
decision rule in Dietrich (2005), which is a correspondence assigning a subset of 𝑋 for each 
level- 1  meta-profile given the individuals’ procedural judgments 3 . I define the Universal 
Preference Domain (UPD), ?̅?, as:  
?̅? ≔ 𝒲(𝑋)𝑛×𝒲(𝐹1)×⋯×𝒲(𝐹𝐿)𝑛. 
 
Example 4: Dictatorial PCR 
Take an individual, called a dictator, 𝑖∗ ∈ 𝑁 and define a dictatorial PCR 𝐸𝑑  as for all level-𝐿 
meta-profile 𝑅,  
∀𝑘 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝐿}, ∀𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘, 𝑓𝐸𝑑
𝑘(𝑅)𝑔 ⇔ 𝑓𝑅𝑖∗
𝑘𝑔. 
 
This is a PCR that judges each element in 𝐹𝑘 according to the will of the dictator. A possible 
problem concerning the dictatorial PCR is that if the dictator 𝑖∗ ’s meta-preference is not 
consistent, the PCR itself must also fail to be consistent.  
 
Definition 2: Inter-Level Consistency (ILC) 
A level-𝐿 PCR of domain 𝐷 satisfies the axiom of Inter-Level Consistency (ILC) if, and only if, 
for all 𝑅 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑘 ∈ {1, … , 𝐿} and 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘, [𝑓𝐸𝑘𝑔 ⇔ 𝑓(𝑅𝑘−1)𝐸𝑘−1𝑔(𝑅𝑘−1)]. 
 
This consistency property rules out inconsistent social meta-preferences such as those that 
evaluate SCF 𝑓 as being at least as good as SCF 𝑔, even though 𝑓’s outcome is not as good as 
𝑔’s. Behind the axiom of ILC lies the idea that procedural judgments must be made for the very 
decision-making problem that the society faces. It is not that the society determines a universally 
                                                         
3 Note that, technically speaking, the decision rule is more than a level-1 PCR, because Dietrich (2005) does not 
restrict his attention to weak order preferences. Dietrich’s argument is made without specifying the messages on 𝑋.  
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desirable procedure that can be applied to any possible agenda or decision-making process. The 
model allows for an individual who esteems a supermajority rule for amendments to the nation’s 
constitution while that same individual supports the simple majority rule for ordinary legislation.  
 
The next axiom demands that a better rule must result in a better outcome, and a better outcome 
must be supported by a better rule.  
 
Definition 3: Arbitrary Focus (AF) 
A level-𝐿 PCR 𝐸 of domain 𝐷 satisfies the axiom of Arbitrary Focus (AF) if, for all 𝑗 =
0,1, … , 𝐿 − 1 , 𝑅 = (𝑅0, 𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝐿) , and 𝑅′ = (𝑅′
0
, 𝑅′
1
, … , 𝑅′
𝐿
) ∈ 𝐷 , if 𝑅𝜇 = 𝑅′
𝜇
  for all 
𝜇 ≥ 𝑗, then 𝐸𝑗(𝑅) = 𝐸𝑗(𝑅′).  
 
AF states that the level-𝑗 social meta-preference is entirely determined by the level-𝑗 or higher 
level meta-profile. For all 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑗 , AF demands that the collective decision over 𝑓 and 𝑔 is 
determined by the rule to evaluate them, not by their outcomes. To put it differently, AF assumes 
that the choice from 𝐹𝑘 can be treated independently of the original choice problem 𝑋.  
 
1.3.2 Results and Discussion 
Before stating the impossibility theorem concerning the design of PCR, I will introduce the 
technical condition for a connected sequence.  
 
Definition 4: Connected Sequence of Sets of Procedures 
𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, …  is called a connected sequence (CON-sequence, hereafter) if it satisfies the 
condition that for all 𝑘 ∈ ℕ and 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘 there exist 𝑝 ∈ ℕ and ℎ0, ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑝 ∈ 𝐹
𝑘 such 
that for some 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑝 ∈ 𝐷,  
ℎ𝑞−1(𝑅𝑞) = ℎ𝑞(𝑅𝑞) for all 𝑞 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑝}. 
 
Although this definition looks technical, it is not very demanding. Assuming UPD (i.e., allowing 
all logically possible meta-profiles) and supposing also that each 𝐹𝑘 is the set of unanimous 
SCFs where for all level-(𝑘 − 1) SCF 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑘−1, if everyone ranks 𝑓 as superior to any other 
level-(𝑘 − 1) SCF, then the level-𝑘 SCF chooses 𝑓. We can verify that the sequence is a CON-
sequence when 𝑝 = 1 because all the level-𝑘 procedures yield the same outcome at this profile. 
It is also verified that the UD-sequence is an example of a CON-sequence under UPD. 
 
Now, I state the impossibility result. Let 𝐸𝐼   be the indifferent PCR such that for all 𝑘 ∈
11 
 
{0,1,2, … , 𝐿}, 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘, and 𝑅 ∈ 𝐷, it follows that 𝑓𝐼 (𝐸𝑘(𝑅))𝑔. In other words, this is a PCR 
that judges any two elements of any level as indifferent.  
 
Theorem 1 
Under any CON-sequence 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … and UPD, a PCR satisfies ILC and AF if and only if it 
is 𝐸𝐼 .  
 
Proof of Theorem 1. 
The ‘if’ part is straightforward. Let me show the ‘only if’ part. Let 𝐸 be a level-𝐿 PCR. Take 
any 𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐿} and 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘. Take also 𝑅 = (𝑅0, 𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝐿) ∈ 𝐷.  
Because 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … is assumed to be connected, there exist level-(𝑘 − 1) profiles 
𝑅1, 𝑅2, … , 𝑅𝑝 ∈ 𝐷
𝑘 and ℎ0(= 𝑓), ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑝(= 𝑔) ∈ 𝐹
𝑘 such that ℎ𝑞−1(𝑅𝑞) = ℎ𝑞(𝑅𝑞) for all 
𝑞 = 1,2, … , 𝑝. Suppose to the contrary that 𝑓𝑃(𝐸𝑘)𝑔. Then, it follows that (ℎ𝑞−1, ℎ𝑞) ∉ 𝐼(𝐸
𝑘) 
for some 𝑞 = 1,2,… , 𝑝  [otherwise, that is if (ℎ0, ℎ1), (ℎ1, ℎ2), … , (ℎ𝑝−1, ℎ𝑝) ∈ 𝐼(𝐸
𝑘) , the 
transitivity of 𝐸𝑘 requires (ℎ0, ℎ𝑝) ∈ 𝐼(𝐸
𝑘), and this is contradictory with regard to 𝑓𝑃(𝐸𝑘)𝑔]. 
Now, let 𝑅′ ∈ 𝐷  be a meta-profile obtained from 𝑅  by substituting 𝑅𝑞  for 𝑅
𝑘 . Because 
𝑓(𝑅𝑞) = 𝑔(𝑅𝑞), ILC demands that 𝑓𝐼(𝐸
𝑘)𝑔. This contradicts 𝑓𝑃(𝐸𝑘)𝑔. ■ 
 
The theorem states that there is no PCR (the way a society ranks each alternative, rule, the rule to 
choose rules, and so on) that satisfies ILC and AF without being degenerate. In addition to ILC 
and AF, I imposed two assumptions, UPD and CON-sequence. For interpretation of the theorem, 
let me add some notes on these assumptions.  
The first comment is on CON-sequence. I already noted that the UD-sequence is a CON-
sequence. So, it follows that Theorem 1 holds even if we substitute UD-sequence for CON-
sequence. Recall that the UD-sequence represents a situation where a given society does not have 
any agreement about the (meta-level) rules. Once the procedural choice is entirely entrusted to a 
society, it is irrational to drop several SCFs beforehand: even the notorious dictatorship might be 
selected, for example, in the situation where all the group members favor it. In other cases, 
however, the procedural choice is made among a restricted number of SCFs, say {plurality, Borda 
count, anti-plurality}.  
The second comment is on UPD. The next result says what happens if the allowed meta-
profile is restricted.  
 
Definition 5 
Let 𝑘 ∈ {1,2, … , 𝐿} , 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑘 , and 𝑅 = (𝑅0, 𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝐿) ∈ 𝐷 . I define the class of 𝑓  at 𝑅 , 
12 
 
denoted 𝐶𝑓[𝑅], as follows:  
- For 𝑘 = 1, 𝐶𝑓[𝑅] = 𝑓(𝑅
0).  
- For 𝑘 ≥ 2, 𝐶𝑓[𝑅] = 𝐶𝑓(𝑅𝑘−1)[𝑅].  
 
Definition 6 
Let 𝑅 ∈ 𝐷. I call 𝑖’s level-𝐿 meta-preference 𝑅𝑖 = (𝑅𝑖
0, 𝑅𝑖
1, … , 𝑅𝑖
𝐿) extremely consequential if, 
for all 𝑘 ∈ ℕ and 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘, 𝐶𝑓[𝑅]𝑅𝑖
0𝐶𝑔[𝑅] ⇔ 𝑓𝑅𝑖
𝑘𝑔.  
 
In general, ILC is such a strong condition that 𝐸1, 𝐸2, … is unique with respect to 𝐸0. I say a 
PCR 𝐸 is derived from a social welfare function (SWF) ℎ on 𝑋 if  
1) for all 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹1, 𝑓𝐸1𝑔 ⇔ 𝑓(𝑅0)ℎ(𝑅0)𝑔(𝑅0), and 
2) for all 𝑘 ≥ 2 and 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘, 𝑓𝐸𝑘𝑔 ⇔ 𝐶𝑓[𝑅]ℎ(𝑅
0)𝐶𝑔[𝑅]. 
Then, it is easy to verify the following (I omit the proof).  
 
Lemma 1 
A level-𝐿 PCR 𝐸 of domain 𝐷 ⊆ ?̅? satisfies ILC if and only if it is derived from a SWF ℎ on 
𝑋.  
 
Let 𝐷𝐶∗ ⊆ 𝒲(𝑋)×𝒲(𝐹
1)×⋯×𝒲(𝐹𝐿) be the set of all extremely consequential meta-profiles. 
We have the following:  
 
Theorem 2 
Take UD-sequence 𝐹0, 𝐹1, 𝐹2, …  and 𝐿 ∈ ℕ . Let 𝐷 = 𝐷0×𝐷1×…×𝐷𝑘 , where 𝜙 ≠ 𝐷𝑘 ⊆
𝒲(𝐹𝑘) for all 𝑘 = 0,1,2,… , 𝐿.  
(1) If 𝐷 = 𝐷𝐶∗, there exists a PCR that satisfies ILC and AF.  
(2) If 𝐷 ∩ (?̅? ∖ 𝐷𝐶∗) ≠ 𝜙, there is no PCR that satisfies ILC and AF.  
 
Proof of Theorem 2 
Proof of (1). It is straightforward to check that a PCR derived from some SWF ℎ on 𝑋 satisfies 
the two axioms.  
 
Proof of (2). Suppose 𝑅𝑖 with respect to 𝑅 = (𝑅1, … , 𝑅𝑛) ∈ 𝐷 ∩ (?̅? ∖ 𝐷𝐶∗) is not extremely 
consequential. Let 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝐿} be the smallest level at which the condition collapses. Then, 
we have 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹𝑘 such that 𝐶𝑓[𝑅]𝑅𝑖
0𝐶𝑔[𝑅] but not 𝑓𝑅𝑖
𝑘𝑔 . 𝑅𝑖
𝑘 is assumed to be complete, 
and so we have 𝑔𝑃(𝑅𝑖
𝑘)𝑓.  
(a) If 𝑅′
𝑘−1
∈ 𝒲(𝐹𝑘−1)
𝑛
 exists such that 𝑓(𝑅′
𝑘−1
) = 𝑔(𝑅′
𝑘−1
) , let 𝑅′ ∈ 𝐷 be a 
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meta-profile obtained from 𝑅 by substituting 𝑅′
𝑘−1
 for 𝑅𝑘−1. AF demands that 𝐸𝑘 = 𝐸′
𝑘
. So, 
we have 𝑔𝑃(𝐸′
𝑘
)𝑓. However, ILC demands 𝑔𝐼(𝐸′
𝑘
)𝑓. Contradiction.  
(b) Consider the other case, i.e., there is no 𝑅′
𝑘−1
∈ 𝒲(𝐹𝑘−1)
𝑛
 such that 𝑓(𝑅′
𝑘−1
) =
𝑔(𝑅′
𝑘−1
) . Because we consider a UD-sequence, there exist ℎ ∈ 𝐹𝑘  such that ℎ(𝑅𝑘−1) =
𝑓(𝑅𝑘−1) and ℎ(𝑅′
𝑘−1
) = 𝑔(𝑅′
𝑘−1
) for all 𝑅′
𝑘−1
∈ 𝐷𝑘−1. With the argument in (a), we have 
that 𝑓𝐼(𝐸𝑘)ℎ and ℎ𝐼(𝐸𝑘)𝑔. With the transitivity of 𝐸𝑘, we have 𝑓𝐼(𝐸𝑘)ℎ. ■ 
 
Under UD-sequence, Theorem 2 states the necessary and sufficient condition for a PCL satisfying 
ILC and AF to exist. It says that it matters whether there exists an individual that is not extremely 
consequential.  
 To conclude, the present section outlines a preliminary model of procedural choice. 
While Theorem 1 states the basic impossibility faced when any type of meta-preference is 
considered (as well as some axioms of PCRs), Theorem 2 shows that the impossibility disappears 
when a society made up of consequential individuals is considered. Based on these observations, 
Chapters 2 and 3 address the situation where a consequential society has a restricted number of 
voting procedures.  
 
1.4 Determination of the Society 
To begin the last part of this introduction, I consider a pre-step of the procedural choice considered 
above. Although most of the research referred to in Section 1.1 and the analysis in Section 1.3 
assume that the society has been defined prior to the voting step, there are some cases where there 
is ambiguity in the definition of which individuals have the right to vote. Indeed, the boundary 
problem—who should be eligible to take part in which decision-making processes (Arrhenius, 
2005; Dahl, 1991)—is a classical problem in political science. While a number of solutions have 
been proposed, Schumpeter (1942) argues that it is the people involved who should determine 
who is entitled to participate in the democratic process: 
Observe: it is not relevant whether we, the observers, admit the validity of those 
reasons or of the practical rules by which they are made to exclude portions of the 
population; all that matters is that the society in question admits it. (Schumpeter, 1942, 
p. 244).  
In Chapter 4, I consider the boundary problem as an aggregation problem, in other words, to 
determine or define a given society based on individuals’ views on who is (or should be) 
included in the society and who is not (or should not be). Formally speaking, let ?̅? be the set of 
potential individuals where each 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? is assumed to have an opinion 𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? about who he 
or she thinks should be included in the society. Seen as an aggregation problem, one can 
describe the boundary problem as the need to determine the aggregator, hereafter called the 
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nomination rule, 𝜑, that maps each profile (𝑁1, 𝑁2, … ,𝑁𝑛) into 𝜑(𝑁1, 𝑁2, … , 𝑁𝑛) ⊆ ?̅?.  
Holzman and Moulin (2010, 2013) made axiomatic studies of such nomination rules 
from a technical perspective, using the determination of prize winners as an example. This 
model is different from an ordinary social choice problem in that each individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? is a 
candidate as well as a voter. Therefore, if they are selfish in the sense that they care greatly or 
only about whether they are themselves selected, certain types of strategic voting can occur: a 
rational voter 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? might present a misrepresentation of his or her opinion as 𝑁?̃? instead of 
presenting his or her true opinion 𝑁𝑖 so that 𝑖 can win. Indeed, approval voting (AV), often 
noted for its strategy-proofness (Endriss 2013), is nonetheless shown to be fragile to this kind of 
manipulation. Holzman and Moulin (2013) proposed an axiom of impartiality (IMP), which 
demands that the nomination rule be robust against such manipulations.  
 At the same time, however, Holzman and Moulin (2013) show that the constant rule, 
which selects the same individual no matter what the ballots are, is the unique nomination 
function that satisfies the both IMP and the Anonymous Ballots axiom (AB), which corresponds 
with the usual anonymity condition. Their result is based on the assumption that each 𝑁𝑖 is a 
singleton—each person is supposed to submit another person’s name (the person who they think 
deserves the prize), and that the prize winner 𝜑(𝑁1, 𝑁2, … ,𝑁𝑛) is only one person. In other 
words, they think of the nomination rule 𝜑 as a function from the domain 
{(𝑁1, 𝑁2 , … ,𝑁𝑛)│𝑁𝑖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?} to codomain ?̅?. In their subsequent work, 
Tamura (2015) and Tamura and Ohseto (2014) considered nomination correspondence (i.e., 
allowing multiple winners) and show that the impossibility shown in Holzman and Moulin 
(2013) can be relieved. Other domains and codomains have also been studied: the domain of 
approval ballots 𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? (Alon et al. 2011), the codomain of ?̅? ∪ {𝜙} (Mackenzie 2015)
4, etc.  
 Although a variety of studies have considered the design possibility of impartial 
nomination rules under each domain-codomain pair, there seems no systematic study of the 
comparisons between popular pairs. In Chapter 4, I aim to answer the question of which 
domain-codomain pairs perform well in terms of design possibility by the comparative study of 
each domain-codomain pair. As Dietrich (2005) argues, some axioms (anonymity, neutrality, 
and monotonicity) are considered to be essential under PA. Chapter 4 is also designed to find 
impartial nomination rules satisfying these axioms. In Chapter 4, I first show the common 
structure that an impartial and anonymous nomination rule has under various domain-codomain 
pairs (Lemma 7). Later, the design possibility under each domain-codomain setting will be 
discussed.  
 Finally, I introduce literature that relates to the nomination rules. The framework of 
                                                         
4 While some of them (Alon et al. 2011; Holzman and Moulin 2013) also consider nondeterministic rules (i.e., the 
codomain is the set of probability distributions over ?̅?), I restrict my attention to deterministic rules only throughout 
the chapter.  
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nomination rules is very similar to the endogenous choice of representative committees (Brams, 
Kilgour, & Sanver, 2007; Kilgour, Brams, & Sanver, 2006). Indeed, Brams et al. (2007) studied 
the aggregation of approval ballots, where each of the ballots is the set of individuals who the 
voter thinks should be on the committee. They proposed the Minimax procedure based on the 
minimization of the Humming distance from the voters’ ballots. For strategic aspects of 
endogenous choice, Amorós (2009, 2011) considered a strategy-proof mechanism in the slightly 
different context that there exists a unique person who everyone thinks is the best person to be 
chosen.  
 In the nomination rule, each individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? is assumed to submit 𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅?. 
Technically speaking, such 𝑁𝑖 can be regarded as 𝑖’s (presented) dichotomous preference over 
?̅?. In general, a preference relation on a certain set of alternatives is called dichotomous if it has 
at most two indifferent classes, usually interpreted as the acceptable class and the unacceptable 
class. The study of approval voting (AV) in this preference domain has resulted in a lot of 
concern (Vorsatz, 2008; Vorsatz, 2007; Sato, 2014). As I noted above, however, AV is not 
impartial. Therefore, a natural question is how can the mechanism of AV be modified to satisfy 
impartiality without losing its preferable properties such as anonymity and neutrality? My 
comparative study of various rules described in Chapter 4 provides an answer to this question.  
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2 Regress Convergence5 
2.1 Intuition of Regress Convergence 
In this chapter, I formulate a phenomenon—weak/strong convergence (of a preference profile)— 
where the regress argument is supposed to naturally disappear within finite steps. Intuitively speaking, 
convergence is a phenomenon where every voting rule in the menu ultimately provides the same 
outcome6. The aim of this chapter is to show how and how often this phenomenon occurs.  
I will first explain the basic idea using an example. Suppose a society of 14 individuals 
must choose one of three candidates—𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐—and there is an ex ante agreement on the set, F, of 
potential voting rules, where 𝐹 = {plurality (𝑃), Borda (𝐵), anti − plurality (𝐴)} . When the 
preference profile on the set of candidates 𝑋  is given as 𝐿1−10
0 : 𝑎𝑏𝑐 , and 𝐿11−14
0 : 𝑏𝑐𝑎  (i.e., 
individuals 1,2,… ,10 prefer 𝑎 to 𝑏 and 𝑏 to 𝑐 ; individuals 11, 12, 13, and 14 prefer 𝑏 to 𝑐 
and 𝑐 to 𝑎), the three voting rules 𝑃, 𝐵, and 𝐴 yield {𝑎}, {𝑎}, and {𝑏}, respectively. Suppose now 
that the same society votes on which rule in 𝐹 to use. If everyone is consequential (i.e., preferring 
those rules that yield their own preferred results) and is required to submit a linear order, it is 
understood that the first 10 individuals submit either "𝑃𝐵𝐴" or "𝐵𝑃𝐴, " and the remaining four 
individuals submit "𝐴𝑃𝐵" or "𝐴𝐵𝑃". If they submit as: 𝐿1−4
1 : 𝑃𝐵𝐴, 𝐿5−10
1 : 𝐵𝑃𝐴, and 𝐿11−14
1 :𝐴𝑃𝐵, 
then applying the same three voting rules to this profile (𝐿1
1 , 𝐿2
1 … , 𝐿14
1 ), 𝑃 yields {𝐵} while 𝐵 and 
𝐴 yield {𝑃} (see Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a regress convergence 
𝐹1 denotes the set of voting rules for the choice of candidates and 𝐹2 denotes the set of 
voting rules for the choice of 𝐹1.  
 
Note that each 𝑃2, 𝐵2, and 𝐴2 (the rule to choose the rule) ultimately reaches the same outcome {𝑎}. 
                                                         
5 Main results of this section are originally published in the following: Takahiro Suzuki and Masahide 
Horita (2017), “Plurality, Borda count, or anti-plurality: regress convergence phenomenon in the 
procedural choice”. Bajwa, D., Koeszegi, S. T., and Vetschera, R. (eds) Group Decision and Negotiation. 
Theory, Empirical Evidence, and Application: 16th International Conference, GDN 2016, Bellingham, 
WA, USA, June 20-24, 2016, Revised Selected Papers, LNBIP Vol.274, 43-56. 
6 Saari & Tataru (1999) argue in their introduction that “Except in extreme cases such as where the voters are in total 
agreement, or where all procedures give a common outcome, it is debatable how to determine the ‘true wishes’ of the 
voters.” Clearly, the intuition of regress convergence lies in these latter “extreme cases” where all procedures (rules) 
produce the same (ultimate) outcome, although our results show that the phenomenon can occur relatively frequently 
in some familiar menus. 
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Thus, no matter which rule in 𝐹2, 𝐹3, … is selected, the ultimate outcome is the same. Thus, further 
regress has no meaning for the determination of the ultimate outcome. In general, a profile 𝐿0 is said 
to weakly converge to 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑋 if such a (sequence of) consequential profile(s) exists and any higher-
level meta rules ultimately result in the same 𝐶.  
 The current chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 shows basic notation. In Section 2.3, 
I show the formal definition of convergence. Section 2.4 states the probability model and the basic 
technique of the probability calculation. In Section 2.5, I show theoretical results.  
 
2.2 Basic Notation 
Let 𝑁 = {1,2,… , 𝑛} be a society of 𝑛 individuals, where 2 ≤ 𝑛 < +∞ . For any nonempty and 
finite set 𝐴, ℒ(𝐴) denotes the set of all linear orders over 𝐴. A preference profile over 𝐴 is an 𝑛-
tuple of linear orders (𝐿1, 𝐿2, … , 𝐿𝑛) ∈ ℒ(𝐴)
𝑛, where the 𝑖th element 𝐿𝑖 is interpreted as individual 
𝑖’s preference. For any nonempty and finite set of alternatives 𝐴, a social choice rule (SCR) 𝑓 maps 
the preference profile 𝐿 = (𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑛) ∈ ℒ(𝐴)
𝑛 into a nonempty subset of 𝐴, i.e. 𝜙 ≠ 𝑓(𝐿;𝐴) ⊆ 𝐴. 
A SCR 𝑓 is called a social choice function (SCF) if it is always singleton-valued. When 𝑓 is a SCF, 
with a slight abuse of notation, I write 𝑓(𝐿) = 𝑥 instead of 𝑓(𝐿) = {𝑥}.  
Let 𝐴 and 𝐵 be any nonempty and finite sets with the same cardinalities, 0 < |𝐴| =
|𝐵| < ∞ (𝐴 and 𝐵 can be identical). For any preference profile 𝐿 = (𝐿1, 𝐿2, … , 𝐿𝑛) ∈ ℒ(𝐴)
𝑛 and 
a bijection 𝜎: 𝐵 → 𝐴, I define a (permuted) preference profile 𝐿𝜎 = (𝐿1
𝜎, 𝐿2
𝜎 , … , 𝐿𝑛
𝜎) ∈ ℒ(𝐵)𝑛 on 𝐵 
as follows: for all 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁,  
𝑎𝐿𝑖
𝜎𝑏 ⇔ 𝜎(𝑎)𝐿𝑖𝜎(𝑏). 
I say a SCR is neutral if, for any finite nonempty sets 𝐴 and 𝐵 with |𝐴| = |𝐵|, alternative 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵, 
bijection 𝜎: 𝐵 → 𝐴, and profile 𝐿 ∈ ℒ(𝐴)𝑛,  
𝜎(𝑏) ∈ 𝑓(𝐿; 𝐴) ⇔ 𝑎 ∈ 𝑓(𝐿𝜎; 𝐵). 
This axiom demands that the outcome of the SCR must not depend on the names of the alternatives. 
Following are brief descriptions of several SCRs7 that are well-known in social choice theory. Note 
that all of them are neutral.  
 
(1) Scoring Rules (Positional Rules) 
A scoring rule 𝑓 is characterized with the combination of vectors [𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚]𝑚≥3. For a given 
set 𝐴 with |𝐴| = 𝑚 ≥ 2 and a preference profile 𝐿 ∈ ℒ(𝐴)𝑛, 𝑓 assigns to each alternative 𝑠𝑗
𝑚 
points (𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑚) if it is ranked at the 𝑗th position in one’s preference, where we assume that 
1 = 𝑠1
𝑚 ≥ 𝑠2
𝑚 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑠𝑚
𝑚 = 0 for each 𝑚 ≥ 28. The choice set 𝑓(⋅) is defined as the set of options 
                                                         
7 Nurmi (2002) gives a more detailed description of these voting rules, including their axiomatic properties and the 
related paradox.  
8 As Saari (2012) and many other authors point out, without loss of generality we can standardize arbitrary scoring 
rules into this form.  
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with the highest scores. For example, plurality, denoted 𝑓𝑃, has the score assignment [1,0,0]𝑚=3 
and [1,0,0,0]𝑚=4, Borda count, denoted 𝑓𝐵, has [1, 1 2⁄ , 0]𝑚=3 and [1, 2 3⁄ , 1 3⁄ , 0]𝑚=4, and 
anti-plurality, denoted 𝑓𝐴, has [1,1,0]𝑚=3 and [1,1,1,0]𝑚=4. In general, Borda count
9 assigns 
𝑠𝑗
𝑚 =
𝑚−𝑗
𝑚−1
 for each 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚. For 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, a SCR 𝑓 is called a 𝑘-approval voting 𝐸𝑘 if it is a 
scoring rule with the assignment [𝑠1
𝑚, 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚]𝑚≥3, where if 𝑚 > 𝑘, then  
𝑠𝑗
𝑚 = {
1 if 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘
0 otherwise.
 
In words, a 𝑘-approval voting rule 𝐸𝑘 assigns 1 point to the 1
st, 2nd,… , 𝑘th ranked alternatives 
and zero points to the others. Note that we do not specify how 𝐸𝑘 works if there are equal to or less 
than 𝑘 alternatives. Therefore, technically speaking, 𝐸𝑘 just specifies the class of scoring rules.  
 
(2) Sequential Positional Rules 
The sequential positional rules have multiple rounds to determine the winners. From the first to the 
(𝑚 − 2) round, the score of each remaining alternative is calculated and the alternative with the 
lowest score is eliminated. In the (𝑚 − 1) round (note that exactly two alternatives remain now), 
the winning alternative is determined by the majority rule. For the score calculation in each round, 
Hare's system 𝑓𝐻 uses the plurality rule and Coomb's procedure 𝑓𝐶 uses the anti-plurality rule. 
Nanson’s procedure is defined in a similar way. In each round, it eliminates all the candidates whose 
Borda score (the scores of candidates evaluated by Borda count) do not surpass the average Borda 
score.  
 
(3) Maximin Rule (𝑓𝑀) 
The Maximin score of alternative 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋 is defined as min
𝑦∈𝑋
|{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖𝑦}|. Then, 𝑓𝑀 chooses the 
alternative(s) with the highest scores.  
 
(4) Black's Rule (𝑓𝐵𝑙) 
Black’s rule chooses the Condorcet winner, if it exists. Otherwise, it chooses the Borda winner. 
 
2.3 Definition of Convergence 
To help the reader understand the formal definition of convergence that follows, I will first outline the 
hypothetical situation. Assume that a society faces a decision requiring a choice from a set of 
                                                         
9 Note that my model normalizes the score assignment. In common use, Borda count assigns (𝑚 − 𝑗) points for the 
alternative ranked at the 𝑗th position (when there are 𝑚 options). Dividing the assignments by the constant 
(𝑚 − 1), my 𝑠𝑗
𝑚 =
𝑚−𝑗
𝑚−1
 is obtained.  
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alternatives 𝑋 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑀} , where 3 ≤ 𝑀 < +∞ and that they have in mind a menu 𝐹 =
{𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑚} (2 ≤ 𝑚 < +∞) of possible SCRs (throughout Chapters 2 and 3, I use the letter 𝐹 as a 
menu of SCRs only). For instance, they agree on the use of either the plurality, Borda count, or anti-
plurality rule but there is no agreement on which of them should be used for the current agenda. At the 
first level, the society applies each SCR in 𝐹1 (upper script expresses the argument level) to the 
collected preference profile 𝐿0 over 𝑋. If every SCR gives the same outcome (convergence), the 
regress stops. Otherwise, the society tries to vote on 𝐹1. Then, the society applies each SCR in 𝐹2 to 
the collected preference profile 𝐿1  over 𝐹1 . If every SCR gives essentially the same outcome 
(convergence), the regress stops. Otherwise, the society tries to vote on 𝐹2. The process can go on ad 
infinitum unless the society finds a convergence.  
 
Definition 7: Level10  
The level-1 issue is the choice of 𝑋 using each 𝑓𝑗 ∈ 𝐹. In this context, each 𝑓𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚) is 
called a level-1 SCR and denoted 𝑓𝑗
1 and the level-1 menu is denoted 𝐹1 = {𝑓1
1,… , 𝑓𝑚
1}. For any 
integer 𝑘 ≥ 2, the level-𝑘 issue is the choice of 𝐹𝑘−1 using 𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑚. In this context, each 
𝑓𝑗 (𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚) is called a level-𝑘 SCR and denoted 𝑓𝑗
𝑘 and the level-𝑘 menu is denoted 𝐹𝑘 =
{𝑓1
𝑘, 𝑓2
𝑘,… , 𝑓𝑚
𝑘}.  
 
Definition 8: Class  
- For any level-1 SCR 𝑓1 ∈ 𝐹1 , its class at a level-0 preference profile 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 , denoted 
𝐶𝑓1[𝐿
0], is defined as 𝐶𝑓1[𝐿
0] = 𝑓1(𝐿0). 
- For any level-𝑘(≥ 2)  SCR 𝑓𝑘 ∈ ℱ𝑘 , its class at a level-0,1,2, … , (𝑘 − 1)  preference profile 
𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1, denoted  𝐶𝑓𝑘[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1], is defined as  
𝐶𝑓𝑘[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] ≔ ⋃ 𝐶𝑔𝑘−1[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−2]
𝑔𝑘−1∈𝑓𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1)
. 
 
Remark. Let ~ be a binary relation over 𝐹𝑘 such that for all 𝑓𝑘, 𝑔𝑘 ∈ 𝐹𝑘,  
𝑓𝑘~𝑔𝑘 ⇔ 𝐶𝑓𝑘 = 𝐶𝑔𝑘 . 
Then it is clear that ~ makes an equivalence relation and each equivalence class is made up of the 
rules with the same class. It is in this sense that I use the term “class” here.  
 
Intuitively, the class of 𝑓𝑘 ∈ ℱ𝑘 represents the ultimate outcome that 𝑓𝑘 derives into 𝑋. When the 
sequence 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1  is obvious in the context, I write simply as 𝐶𝑓𝑘  instead of 
𝐶𝑓𝑘[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1].  
                                                         
10 In this article, I suppose that the society uses the fixed set of SCRs, 𝑓1, … , 𝑓𝑚 for any level. The distinction 
between 𝑓𝑗
1 and 𝑓𝑗
2 by the superscripts is made based on the supposed agenda. 
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Example 5 
Let 𝑓1, 𝑓2 ∈ 𝐹. Let 𝐿
0 and 𝐿1 be profiles over 𝑋 and 𝐹1, respectively. Suppose 𝑓1
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥} ⊆
𝑋, 𝑓2
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥, 𝑦} ⊆ 𝑋, and 𝑓1
2(𝐿1) = {𝑓1
1, 𝑓2
1}. Then, the class of 𝑓1
1 at 𝐿0 is {𝑥} while the class 
of 𝑓1
2 at (𝐿0, 𝐿1) is {𝑥, 𝑦}. These are denoted as follows.  
𝐶𝑓11[𝐿
0] = {𝑥} 
𝐶𝑓12[𝐿
0, 𝐿1] = {𝑥, 𝑦}. 
 
Definition 9: Preference Extension System 
For each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, I define 𝑒𝑖: ℒ(𝑋) → ℒ(𝔓(𝑋) ∖ {𝜙}) as a preference extension system if it satisfies 
the following:  
1) for each 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑋 and 𝐿𝑖
0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋), if (𝑎, 𝑏) ∈ 𝐿𝑖
0, then {𝑎}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑏}.  
2) for any set 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋 and 𝑏 ∈ 𝑋 ∖ 𝐴 such that 𝑏𝐿𝑖
0𝑎 for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴, 𝐴 ∪ {𝑏}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0)𝐴.  
 
In words, 𝑒𝑖 maps each 𝐿𝑖 ∈ ℒ(𝑋) to a linear order preference over the power set of 𝑋 (without the 
empty set). Condition 1 is known in the literature as the Extension Rule (e.g. Barbera, Bossert, & 
Pattanaik, 2004). Almost all the well-known preference extension systems satisfy this condition. 
Condition 2 says that if better alternative 𝑏 is added to 𝐴, the new set 𝐴 ∪ {𝑏} is evaluated as better 
than 𝐴. This condition is also often referred to in the literature (see, e.g., Gardenfors, 1976; Kannai & 
Peleg, 1984). Note that there are many preference extension systems that satisfy these two conditions. 
Throughout this dissertation, I do not specify what kind of 𝑒𝑖 each individual has, except when I give 
a specific example. This guarantees the generality of the following argument.  
 
Definition 10: Consequentially Induced Preference/Profile  
For any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, and 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 , 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ(𝐹1)𝑛, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 ∈ ℒ(𝐹𝑘−1)𝑛, I define 𝑅𝑖
𝑘 ∈ 𝒲(𝐹𝑘) 
as the 𝑖’s level-𝑘 consequentially-induced weak order preference if, for each 𝑓𝑘, 𝑔𝑘 ∈ 𝐹𝑘,  
(𝑓𝑘, 𝑔𝑘) ∈ 𝐿𝑖
𝑘 ⇔ (𝐶[𝑓𝑘: 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1], 𝐶[𝑔𝑘: 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1]) ∈ 𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0). 
A linear order 𝐿𝑖
𝑘 ∈ ℒ(𝐹𝑘) is called an 𝑖’s level-𝑘 linear order preference or consequentially induced 
preference (hereafter, level-𝑘 CI preference) if it is compatible with the 𝑖’s level-𝑘 consequentially-
induced weak order preference. I say 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛, 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ(𝐹1)𝑛, …, 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ(𝐹𝑘)𝑛 as a sequence of 
CI profiles till level-𝑘 if 𝐿𝑗  (𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑘) is a CI profile with respect to the previous-level profiles 
𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑗−1. I denote by ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] the set of all level-𝑘 CI profiles with respect to a given 
sequence 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 of CI profiles till level (𝑘 − 1).  
 
When 𝑘 = 1  and 𝐹  is made up of SCFs only, the CI preference is nothing but the “induced 
preference” used in the study of self-selective SCRs (Koray, 2000). In this sense, the CI preference is 
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a generalization of the induced preference so that we can deal with higher levels and SCRs, i.e. 
correspondences instead of functions.  
 
Definition 11: Weak Convergence  
A level-0 preference profile 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 is said to weakly converge to 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑋 if and only if 𝑘 ∈ ℕ 
and a sequence of CI profiles till level (𝑘 − 1) 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 exist such that each 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝐹𝑘 has the 
same class, i.e., 𝐶[𝑓𝑘: 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = 𝐶 for all 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝐹𝑘.  
 
Remark. Whether a profile 𝐿0 weakly converges or not depends on what kind of menu 𝐹 the society 
considers, and so it is more precise to say “𝐿0 weakly converges with respect to the menu 𝐹.” In the 
subsequent argument, however, the menu 𝐹 is explicit from the context. So, we simply say it as “𝐿0 
weakly converges to 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑋”.  
 
Remark. In the definition of weak convergence, I do not specify individuals’ preference extension 
systems {𝑒𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁. Strictly speaking, a profile 𝐿
0 is defined as weakly converging to 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑋 if and 
only if, for combinations of all preference extension systems {𝑒𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁, the required sequence of CI 
profiles exists. This point will be exemplified later (see Example 11).  
 
Note that once a profile 𝐿0 weakly converges to 𝐶 at level 𝑘, the class of any rule of level 𝑘′ > 𝑘 
is also 𝐶. Thus, further regress is thought to be meaningless. Following are some examples of the 
notions introduced in this section.  
 
Example 6: Weak Convergence (The Example Introduced in Section 2.1) 
Let 𝑛 = 14 , 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} , and 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴} . Suppose the preference profile 𝐿
0 =
(𝐿1
0 , 𝐿2
0 , … , 𝐿14
0 ) is 𝐿1−10
0 : 𝑎𝑏𝑐, and 𝐿11−14
0 : 𝑏𝑐𝑎. Then, 𝑓𝑃(𝐿
0) = 𝑓𝐵(𝐿
0) = 𝑎 and 𝑓𝐴(𝐿
0) = 𝑏, and 
so the CI preference is  
ℒ𝑖[𝐿
0] = {𝑓𝑃𝑓𝐵𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐵𝑓𝑃𝑓𝐴} for all 𝑖 = 1,2,… ,10 
ℒ𝑖[𝐿
0] = {𝑓𝐴𝑓𝑃𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴𝑓𝐵𝑓𝐴} for all 𝑖 = 11,12,13,14. 
Let 𝐿1−4
1 :𝑃𝐵𝐴 , 𝐿5−10
1 : 𝐵𝑃𝐴 , and 𝐿11−14
1 : 𝐴𝑃𝐵 . Now, 𝐿1 = (𝐿1
1 , 𝐿2
1 , … , 𝐿14
1 ) defined in this way is 
actually in ℒ[𝐿0]. It follows that 𝐶[𝑓𝑃
2; 𝐿0, 𝐿1] = 𝐶[𝑓𝐵
2; 𝐿0, 𝐿1] = 𝐶[𝑓𝐴
2; 𝐿0, 𝐿1] = {𝑎}. This means 𝐿0 
weakly converges to {𝑎}.  
 
Example 7: Singleton Menu 
I assumed |𝐹| ≥ 2 in the beginning of this section. This is because if |𝐹| = 1, then the society has 
no other options but to choose the unique procedure, and hence there is no need of procedural choice. 
The above sequence of definitions, however, applies even for |𝐹| = 1. So, only in several examples 
22 
 
throughout the chapter, I refer to such singleton menus. Suppose 𝐹 = {𝑓}, where 𝑓 is an arbitrary 
SCR. It is clear that for any set of alternatives 𝑋 and for any preference profile 𝐿 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 , 𝐿 
weakly converges to 𝑓(𝐿) ⊆ 𝑋.  
 
Example 8: Menu of two SCRs 
Let 𝑓, 𝑔 be any (distinct) neutral SCFs and let 𝐹 = {𝑓, 𝑔}. For all 𝐿 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛, if 𝑎 = 𝑓(𝐿) = 𝑔(𝐿), 
it follows that 𝐿 strongly converges to 𝑎. If 𝑎 = 𝑓(𝐿) ≠ 𝑔(𝐿) = 𝑏, then the level-1 CI profile is 
uniquely determined because 𝑎𝐿𝑖
0𝑏 ⇔ 𝑓𝐿𝑖
1𝑔  for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁  by the extension rule. If 𝑓2(𝐿1) =
𝑔2(𝐿1), it follows that 𝐿0 weakly converges. Otherwise, 𝐿0 never (weakly) converges, because it is 
easy to see that for all 𝑘 ≥ 2 , level- 𝑘  CI profile 𝐿𝑘  is unique and 𝑓𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) = 𝑓𝑘−1  and 
𝑔𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) = 𝑔𝑘−1 (see Proposition 1).  
 
As a generalization of Example 8, I define a class of profiles called trivial deadlock, where 
convergence never occurs.  
 
Definition 12: Trivial Deadlock 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑚} be the menu of SCRs. A preference profile 𝐿
0 is said to be in a trivial 
deadlock if:  
1) each 𝑓1
1(𝐿0), 𝑓2
1(𝐿0),… , 𝑓𝑚
1(𝐿0) is a distinct singleton, and  
2) each 𝑓1
2(𝐿1), 𝑓2
2(𝐿1),… , 𝑓𝑚
2(𝐿1) is also a distinct singleton for all 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ1[𝐿0].  
 
From a technical perspective, the intuition behind this trivial deadlock comes from the following:  
 
Proposition 1: Trivial Deadlock Fails to Converge11 
Let 𝐹 be a menu of neutral SCRs. If 𝐿0 is in a trivial deadlock, then 𝐿0 does not (weakly) converge.  
 
(From now on, all proofs of lemmas, propositions, and theorems are shown in the Appendix, unless 
otherwise noted.) 
 
Remark. When |𝑋| = |𝐹|, the condition 2) in the definition of trivial deadlock is unnecessary because 
1) directly implies 2). This can be easily shown, as can the proof of Proposition 1.  
 
Example 9: Trivial Deadlock 
Suppose 𝑛 = 42, 𝑋 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3}, and 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}. Let 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛6 be the number of voters 
                                                         
11 Note that this proposition does not hold if |𝐹| = 1, for in such a case it follows that trivial deadlock implies weak 
convergence.  
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whose preferences are 𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3, 𝑥1𝑥3𝑥2, 𝑥2𝑥1𝑥3, 𝑥2𝑥3𝑥1, 𝑥3𝑥1𝑥2, 𝑥3𝑥2𝑥1, respectively. If 
(𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛6) = (9,11,0,17,1,4), such profile is in a trivial deadlock. Because of Proposition 1, we 
know that this profile never weakly converges. The figure below shows the regress structure.  
 
 
Figure 3. A graph image of trivial deadlock 
 
The proposition tells us that (weak) convergence and trivial deadlock are mutually exclusive as long 
as we consider neutral SCRs only. Also, as we saw in Example 9, once a profile turns out to be in 
trivial deadlock, the ‘structure’ (i.e., which higher-level rule chooses which rule) does not change at 
all, no matter how high a level is considered. Hence, considering further regress under trivial deadlock 
has little effective meaning (although, of course, it does not yield weak convergence). Finally, I note 
that trivial deadlock is, in this sense, the polar opposite of weak convergence. There are, of course, 
some profiles that are not in trivial deadlock, but do not weakly converge either.  
 
Example 10 
Let 𝑛 = 17, 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, and 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐷}, where 𝑓𝐷: [1,0.75,0]. Suppose that two individuals 
have level-0 preference 𝑎𝑏𝑐, three have 𝑎𝑐𝑏, five have 𝑏𝑎𝑐, two have 𝑏𝑐𝑎, three have 𝑐𝑎𝑏, and 
two have 𝑐𝑏𝑎 . Then, it is easy to inductively verify that for all 𝑘 ≥ 2 and for all CI sequence 
𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1, the class of 𝑓𝑃
𝑘 is {𝑎} while the classes of 𝑓𝐷
𝑘 and 𝑓𝐴
𝑘 are both {𝑏}.  
 
Example 11 
Let 𝑛 = 1700, 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, and 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}. Assume the profile 𝐿
1 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 is as follows:  
𝐿𝑖
0: 𝑎𝑏𝑐 if 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 400 (Ⅰ)
𝐿𝑖
0: 𝑎𝑐𝑏 if 401 ≤ i ≤ 500 (Ⅱ)
𝐿𝑖
0: 𝑏𝑎𝑐 if 501 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 800 (Ⅲ)
𝐿𝑖
0: 𝑏𝑐𝑎 if 801 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 1000 (Ⅳ)
𝐿𝑖
0: 𝑐𝑎𝑏 if 1001 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 1400 (Ⅴ)
𝐿𝑖
0: 𝑐𝑏𝑎 if 1401 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 1700 (Ⅵ).
 
At this profile 𝐿0, we have 𝑓𝑃
1(𝐿0) = {𝑐}, 𝑓𝐵
1(𝐿0) = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}, and 𝑓𝐴
1(𝐿0) = {𝑎, 𝑏}. As denoted, we 
designate the voters whose level-0 preference is 𝑎𝑏𝑐, 𝑎𝑐𝑏, 𝑏𝑎𝑐, 𝑏𝑐𝑎, 𝑐𝑎𝑏, 𝑐𝑏𝑎 as type Ⅰ,Ⅱ,Ⅲ,Ⅳ,
Ⅴ,Ⅵ , respectively. By the definition of CI preference, type Ⅰ  and type Ⅲ  voters’ level-1 
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preference must be 𝑓𝐴
1, 𝑓𝐵
1, 𝑓𝑃
1  and type Ⅴ  and type Ⅵ  voters’ level-1  preference must be 
𝑓𝑃
1, 𝑓𝐵
1, 𝑓𝐴
1. On the other hand, type Ⅱ and type Ⅳ voters’ level-1 preference is indeterminate. I 
now show that the possibility of weak convergence depends on what kind of preference extension 
systems {𝑒𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁 the voters have. Suppose:  
－ All the type Ⅱ voters and 35 voters of type Ⅳ have 
{𝑎, 𝑏}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑐}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}. 
This implies that their level-1 CI preference is 𝑓𝐴
1, 𝑓𝐵
1, 𝑓𝑃
1.  
－ 105 voters of type Ⅳ have  
{𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑐}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑎, 𝑏}. 
This implies that their level-1 CI preference is 𝑓𝐵
1, 𝑓𝑃
1, 𝑓𝐴
1.  
－ The other 60 voters of type Ⅳ have  
{𝑐}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑎, 𝑏}. 
This implies that their level-1 CI preference is 𝑓𝑃
1, 𝑓𝐵
1, 𝑓𝐴
1.  
 
The reader can easily check that there exists a preference extension system that is compatible with 
these preferences. At this level-1 CI preference profile 𝐿1, we have that 𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) = {𝑓𝐴
1}, 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿2) =
{𝑓𝑃
1}, and 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1) = {𝑓𝐵
1}. The proof that we cannot find weak convergence12 in the subsequent levels 
for this profile is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. The profile 𝐿0 is not in trivial deadlock, and 
so this example shows the existence of a profile that is neither weakly convergent nor in trivial 
deadlock.  
 
2.4 Probability Model 
The examples in the previous section show that the possibility of weak/strong convergence largely 
depends on the menu 𝐹. To state this formally, we need to determine the probability model. In social 
choice theory, there are two major probability models—the Impartial Culture (IC) model and the 
Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) model. Because of its simplicity, I assume IAC unless otherwise 
noted. I briefly introduce them here for the reader’s convenience.  
IC assumes that each voter independently chooses, with equal likelihood, one of the linear orders 
over 𝑋 . Therefore, each profile 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 occurs with the equal probability 1 (|𝑋|!)𝑛⁄  . On the 
other hand, IAC assumes that every voting situation, a combination of the numbers of individuals who 
each have a specific linear order, occurs with equal likelihood. Hence, each (𝑛1, … , 𝑛𝑚!), where 𝑛𝑗  
represents the number of individuals who have the 𝑗𝑡ℎ linear order, occurs with the equal probability 
1/𝑛+𝑚!−1𝐶𝑛. In either model, it is well known that the probability that a certain scoring rule yields a 
                                                         
12 On the other hand, if all the type Ⅱ and Ⅳ voters have a level-1 preference of 𝑓𝐴
1, 𝑓𝐵
1, 𝑓𝑃
1, it is also easy to 
verify that 𝐿0 weakly converges to {𝑎, 𝑏}. Thus, whether the profile can weakly converge depends on the preference 
extension systems {𝑒𝑖}𝑖∈𝑁.  
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tied outcome is negligible as 𝑛 → ∞13 (Marchant, 2001, Pritchard and Wilson, 2007, Pritchard and 
Wilson, 2009, and Diss and Merlin, 2010). This fact allows us to restrict our attention to those profiles 
where each rule in the menu yields only a singleton, when we restrict our attention to a large society. 
For convenience in the subsequent argument, I give a similar statement and its elementary proof as a 
lemma.  
 
Lemma 2 
Take any distinct 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 . Let 𝑃(𝛼) be the probability that exactly 𝑛𝛼 voters prefer 𝑥 to 𝑦 . 
Under either IC or IAC models and for all 𝛼 ∈ [0,1], 𝑃(𝛼) → 0 as 𝑛 → ∞.  
 
2.5 Menu of Three Scoring Rules 
From this point on, I show my theoretical results. In this section, I show the fundamental result 
concerning the weak convergence of a menu of three scoring rules.  
  
Lemma 3 
Let 𝑛 ≥ 𝑚  and 𝐹 = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝑝, ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝑞}  (𝑝 ≥ 𝑞 ≥ 0)  be the menu of scoring SCRs, 
where 𝑚 = 𝑝 + 𝑞 ≥ 3 . For any sequence 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1  of CI profiles to level (𝑘 − 1)  and 
alternatives 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋, suppose the class of each level-𝑘 SCR is:  
𝐶𝑔𝑗𝑘
[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = {𝑥} for all 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑝. 
𝐶ℎ𝑗𝑘
[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = {𝑦} for all 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑞. 
If |{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦}| > |{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝐿𝑖
0𝑥}|, then 𝐿0 weakly converges to {𝑥}.  
 
The lemma considers the case where every level-𝑘 rule results in either {𝑥} or {𝑦}. It says that if at 
least half of the rules result in {𝑥} and more than half of the people prefer 𝑥 to 𝑦, then the original 
profile weakly converges to {𝑥}. Hence, the lemma indicates a specific case of weak convergence. 
Note that the lemma tells only about the possibility of weak convergence and it is still possible that 
the same profile weakly converges to {𝑦}  at the same time. The uniqueness of the convergent 
outcome will be argued later in relation with the notion of strong convergence in section 2.6.  
 
Lemma 4 
Let 𝑛 ≥ 𝑚, 𝑚 = 3 or 4, and 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 such that |{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦}| ≠
𝑛
2
. If the menu of SCRs is 𝐹 =
{𝐸1, 𝐸2, … , 𝐸𝑚−1, 𝑓𝐵} and the class of each level-𝑘 SCR is either {𝑥} or {𝑦} for a given sequence 
of CI profiles 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1, then 𝐿0 weakly converges.  
 
                                                         
13 For a relatively small 𝑛, the probabilities of tied outcomes when using well-known scoring rules, such as plurality 
and Borda count, are studied by Gillet (1977; 1980) and Marchant (2001). 
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These lemmas both give sufficient conditions for weak convergence. In Lemma 3, no condition is 
placed on the menu 𝐹, but the condition that more than half the people prefer 𝑥 to 𝑦 is imposed on 
the preference profile. Lemma 4, on the other hand, considers the specific menu 𝐹 that is made up of 
𝑘-approval voting and Borda count only and placed little condition on the preference profile. As noted 
in section 2.4, an event such as: 
|{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦}| =
𝑛
2
 
is unlikely as 𝑛 → ∞. Therefore, Lemma 4 almost always holds in the case of a large society with 
such a menu.  
 
Lemma 5 Let 𝑚 = 3 and 𝐹𝑘 = {𝑔1
𝑘, 𝑔2
𝑘, 𝑔3
𝑘}, where 𝑔𝑗
𝑘: [1, 𝑠𝑗 , 0]. Assume  𝐶𝑔1𝑘 = 𝐶𝑔2𝑘 = {𝑥} and 
𝐶𝑔3𝑘 = {𝑦}. Then, there exists 𝐿
𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] such that |𝑠𝑗(𝑔1
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘) − 𝑠𝑗(𝑔2
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘)| ≤ 1 for 
all 𝑗 = 1,2,3, where 𝑠𝑗( ) denotes the score evaluated by 𝑔𝑗
𝑘+1.  
 
Theorem 3 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3}  be a menu of SCRs containing three scoring rules, where 𝑓𝑗: [1, 𝑠𝑗 , 0] 
(𝑗 = 1,2,3), 1 ≥ 𝑠1 > 𝑠2 > 𝑠3 ≥ 0, and  
 𝑠3 ≥ 1 2⁄  or [𝑠3 < 1 2⁄  and 𝑠2 ≤
1 + 𝑠3
2 − 𝑠3
]. (1)    
Under either IC or IAC, we have 
𝑝𝑊𝐶 + 𝑝𝐷 → 1 as 𝑛 → ∞. 
Here, 𝑝𝑊𝐶 denotes the probability of occurrence of those profiles that weakly converge and 𝑝𝐷 
denotes the probability of occurrence of those profiles that are in trivial deadlock.  
 
It is worth noting that if 𝐹  contains {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵}  or {𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴} , equation (1) automatically holds 
irrespective of the third scoring rule. For instance, if a large consequential society admits the menu 
𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃 , 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}, the theorem states that there are asymptotically only two possibilities: they face a 
trivial deadlock or they are endowed with the ability to find weak convergence. In either case, my 
argument in section 2.3 indicates that further regress has little or no meaning. However, before 
declaring that the infinite regress is solved, the probabilities 𝑝𝑊𝐶 and 𝑝𝐷must be estimated. This is 
because trivial deadlock is simply a case where the regress structure does not change at all and, thus, 
trivial deadlock does not provide a specific answer. The actual calculation of 𝑝𝑊𝐶 and 𝑝𝐷 can be 
done using the technique presented by Diss et al. (2012) and Diss and Merlin (2010).  
 
Corollary 1 
Let |𝑋| = 3, 𝑛 → ∞, and 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}. Under IC, 𝑝𝑊𝐶 is 98.2%. Under IAC, 𝑝𝑊𝐶 is 98.8%.  
27 
 
 
This result shows for the menu 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵 , 𝑓𝐴} that the probability of weak convergence is much 
larger than that of stability. This fact implies that such a society can solve the infinite regress with 
quite high probability (98.2% under IC and 98.8% under IAC). 
 
2.6 Strong Convergence 
Recall that 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋) is, by definition, said to weakly converge if at least one consequential sequence 
of (subsequent) profiles 𝐿1, 𝐿2, … exists14 that adjusts the rules’ ultimate judgments at a certain level. 
The existence of such 𝐿1, 𝐿2, … guarantees that we can stop the apparent infinite regress arguments 
through finite steps of regress. One might, however, be concerned that the same 𝐿0 might weakly 
converge to a distinct 𝐶 and 𝐶′ by the choice of sequence. Indeed, the following example shows 
that such multiplicity can actually occur.  
 
Example 12 
Let 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐} and 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3(= 𝑓𝑃)}, where 𝑓1: [1,
137
589
, 0] , 𝑓2: [1,
68
2945
, 0] , 𝑓3: [1,0,0].  
Consider 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 such that 1 voter: 𝑎𝑏𝑐 , 87 voters: 𝑎𝑐𝑏 , 88 voters: 𝑏𝑎𝑐 , 1 voter: 𝑏𝑐𝑎 , 
22  voters: 𝑐𝑎𝑏 , and 1  voter: 𝑐𝑏𝑎  (𝑛 = 200 ). Now, we have that 𝑓1(𝐿
0) = 𝑓2(𝐿
0) = {𝑎}  and 
𝑓3(𝐿
0) = {𝑏}. It is easy to check that there exist 𝐿1, ?̃?1 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0] such that  
𝑓1
2(𝐿1), 𝑓2
2(𝐿1), 𝑓3
2(𝐿1) ⊆ {𝑓1
1, 𝑓2
1} but 𝑓1
2(?̃?1), 𝑓2
2(?̃?1), 𝑓3
2(?̃?1) ⊆ {𝑓3
1}.  
 
To avoid this issue, I define the notion of strong convergence, which completely avoids multiplicity.  
 
Definition 13: Strong Convergence 
A level-0 preference profile 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 is said to strongly converge to 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑋 if and only if it 
weakly converges to 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑋 and it does not weakly converge to any other set 𝐶′ ≠ 𝐶.  
 
It is clear from the definition that strong convergence is logically stronger than weak convergence and 
that multiplicity entirely disappears once a profile is shown to strongly converge. The next result shows 
the frequency of strong convergence for the menu {𝑓𝑃 , 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}.   
                                                         
14 Technically speaking, we can find the similar use of a compatible linear order in Koray (2000) and Koray and 
Slinko (2006). They define a social choice function (SCF) 𝑓 as self-selective at 𝐿0 relative to the menu of SCFs 𝐹1 
if and only if there is a consequentially induced 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ(𝐹1)𝑛 such that 𝑓2(𝐿1) = 𝑓1. If we impose that the rule 
chooses itself for all compatible linear orders, as Koray and Slinko (2006; p.9) state, “it leads to a vacuous concept.” 
The same applies to regress convergence.  
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Theorem 4 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}. Under either IC or IAC, we have  
𝑝𝑆𝐶 + 𝑝𝐷 → 1 as 𝑛 → ∞. 
 
As a direct corollary of Theorem 3, we already know that a large society with the menu {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴} 
has asymptotically only two cases—weak convergence or trivial deadlock. Theorem 4, however, states 
that the two cases are actually strong convergence or trivial deadlock. To this point, I have mainly 
restricted attention to large societies, i.e., 𝑛 → ∞ . But strong convergence can also be found in 
relatively small societies, as follows.  
 
Example 13 
The profile I gave in Example 6 strongly converges to {𝑎} as can be demonstrated with a slight 
modification to the proof of Theorem 4. 
 
Example 14 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓, 𝑔}, where 𝑓 and 𝑔 are any (distinct) SCRs. If 𝑓(𝐿0) = 𝑔(𝐿0) = 𝐶, then 𝐿0 strongly 
converges to 𝐶.  
 
Finally, I deal with the choice of SCFs (i.e., not a correspondence but a function) and provide SCRs 
with neutral tie-breaking systems. Specifically, for any SCR 𝑓𝑌, I denote by 𝑓𝑌∗ the SCF that breaks 
ties in favor of 𝑖𝑌 ∈ 𝑁, named the tie breaker of 𝑓𝑌. Note that different SCRs can have different tie 
breakers (for example, the plurality tie breaker 𝑖𝑃 = 1 and the Borda count tie breaker 𝑖𝐵 = 2). Then, 
Theorem 4 can be revised for a relatively small 𝑛. 
 
Theorem 5 
Assume 𝑛 ≥ 3 is odd, |𝑋| = 3, and the menu of SCFs is {𝑓𝑃∗ , 𝑓𝑋∗ , 𝑓𝐴∗}, where 𝑓𝑋 is either Borda 
count, Black’s rule, Copeland’s method, or the Hare system. Then, any level-0 profile 𝐿0 strongly 
converges unless it is in a trivial deadlock.  
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3 Convergent Menus of SCRs 
In Chapter 2, we saw basic results for the concepts of weak and strong convergence. Specifically, I 
showed that a large society with the menu {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴} has asymptotically only two possibilities: 
strong convergence or trivial deadlock. While the probability of the former is quite high when |𝑋| =
3, we cannot deny that trivial deadlock can also occur with small but positive probability, with which 
the society’s attempt to determine the appropriate rule ends in vain. In this chapter, I search for menus 
with which a society can avoid such failure. I assume the IAC model throughout this chapter.  
 
3.1 Convergent Property of a Menu 
First, I formally state the axiom of menus that demands that the society can always find a convergence.  
 
Definition 14: Convergent Property 
(1) If every 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 weakly/strongly converges, I say that the menu 𝐹 satisfies the weak/strong 
convergent property.  
(2) Let 𝑝𝑊𝐶 (𝑝𝑆𝐶)  be the probability that those level-0  preference profiles occur that weakly 
(strongly) converge. If 𝑝𝑊𝐶 → 1 (𝑝𝑆𝐶 → 1) as 𝑛 → ∞, I say that 𝐹 satisfies the asymptotic weak 
(strong) convergent property.  
 
Clearly, the strong convergent property is logically the strongest of the four axioms and the asymptotic 
weak convergent property is the weakest. The logical relationship between them is shown below.  
 
 
Let us see some examples concerning these axioms.  
 
Example 15: Singleton Menu 
If 𝐹 = {𝑓} (a singleton menu), any profile 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 strongly converges to 𝑓(𝐿0). Hence, any 
singleton menu satisfies the strong convergent property.  
 
Example 16: Menus of two Neutral SCFs 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓, 𝑔}  be a menu of two neutral SCFs and |𝑋| = 2 . If 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛  exists such that 
𝑓(𝐿0) ≠ 𝑔(𝐿0), then 𝐹 fails to satisfy the weak convergent property because we can verify that such 
a profile 𝐿0 causes a trivial deadlock and hence, it never weakly converges.  
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I previously introduced eight familiar SCRs—plurality, Borda, anti-plurality, Hare, Nanson, Coomb, 
Maximin, and Black—in section 2.2. If we construct a menu of three SCRs from these eight SCRs, 
there are  
(
8
3
) = 56 
different menus. Our next result shows that these 56 menus also have the properties shown in  
Theorem 3 for a triplet of scoring rules. For the convenience of the proof, let ℱ be the set of these 
eight SCRs: 
ℱ = {𝑓𝑃 , 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐻, 𝑓𝑁 , 𝑓𝐶 , 𝑓𝑀, 𝑓𝐵𝑙}. 
 
Lemma 6 
Suppose 𝑛 is sufficiently large. Let 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋 and |𝐹| = 3, where 𝐹 ⊆ ℱ. Let 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 be a 
sequence of CI profiles to level (𝑘 − 1), where 𝑘 ∈ ℕ. Suppose  
{𝐶𝑓[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1]│𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑘} = {{𝑥}, {𝑦}}. 
If  
#{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} > #{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝐿𝑖
0𝑥}, 
then 𝐿0 weakly converges to 𝑥. 
 
Theorem 6 
Of the 56 menus of SCRs, the following ten menus of SCRs satisfy the asymptotic weak 
convergent property, i.e., 𝑝𝑊𝐶 → 1 as 𝑛 → ∞,  
{𝑓𝑃 , 𝑓𝑁 , 𝑓𝑀}, {𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝑁 , 𝑓𝑀}, {𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐻, 𝑓𝐵𝑙}, {𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝑁 , 𝑓𝑀}, {𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝑁, 𝑓𝐵𝑙} 
{𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐶 , 𝑓𝐵𝑙}, {𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝑀, 𝑓𝐵𝑙}, {𝑓𝐻, 𝑓𝑁 , 𝑓𝑀}, {𝑓𝑁, 𝑓𝐶 , 𝑓𝑀}, {𝑓𝑁, 𝑓𝑀, 𝑓𝐵𝑙} 
 
The theorem shows a basic possibility concerning the asymptotically weak convergent property. It can 
be confirmed using familiar SCRs. Note that the menus not cited in the theorem do not have the 
asymptotically weak convergent property. Using the barvinok computer software implemented by 
Verdoolaege et al. (2004), we can calculate the asymptotic probability of trivial deadlock (see 
Appendix, 0).  
 
3.2 Strongly Convergent Menus 
In the previous section, we saw that many menus of familiar SCRs provide weak convergence with 
high probability. The next result shows that we can even construct a menu that satisfies the strong 
convergent property.  
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Definition 15: Difference 
A menu 𝐹 of SCRs satisfies the criterion of difference if, for all 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹 and for any set 𝑋 of 
alternatives with |𝑋| ≥ 3, there exists a profile 𝐿 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 such that 𝑓(𝐿) ≠ 𝑔(𝐿).  
 
This axiom is introduced by Houy (2004) and is quite a weak condition: it demands only that 𝐹 
should not include more than two identical SCRs. Houy (2004) shows that there is no set 𝐹 that 
satisfies neutrality (i.e., each 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 is neutral), difference, and strong first-level stability (i.e., exactly 
one self-selective SCR exists at every 𝐿 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 ). Our first result shows that the impossibility 
disappears if we substitute strong first-level stability for strong convergent property.  
 
Theorem 7: Strong Convergent Menu 
A set 𝐹 of neutral SCRs exists that satisfies both the condition of difference and the strong 
convergent property.  
 
3.3 Convergent Expansion 
In sections 3.1 and 3.2, I showed that several menus, such as {Borda,Hare,Black} or the menu used 
in the proof of Theorem 7, satisfy the convergent property. A straightforward conclusion from these 
results is that a (large) society can solve infinite regress once they accept those menus. However, if a 
society has already accepted a menu, such as {plurality, Borda, anti − plurality} , which fails to 
satisfy the convergent property, it may be, for some reason, difficult to replace this with the technical 
menu introduced in Theorem 7. This section considers how the convergent property may be given to 
such menus.  
Let us define chair rule 𝜑. Take an individual 𝑖∗ ∈ 𝑁 designated as the chair:  
𝜑(𝐿) ≔ {
𝑓𝐵(𝐿) if 𝑓𝑃(𝐿) ≠ 𝑓𝐵𝑜(𝐿) and (𝑓𝑃(𝐿), 𝑓𝐵(𝐿)) ∈ 𝑒𝑖∗(𝐿𝑖∗)
𝑓𝑃(𝐿) otherwise.
 
In words, 𝜑 is a SCR in which the chair 𝑖∗ chooses the outcome among 𝑓𝑃(⋅) and 𝑓𝐵𝑜(⋅) 
according to his or her own preference. Surprisingly, we have the following:  
 
Theorem 8 
The menu {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵𝑜, 𝑓𝐴, 𝜑} satisfies the asymptotically weak convergent property.  
 
Definition 16 
Let 𝐹  be a menu of SCRs. 𝐺 ⊇ 𝐹  is defined as an asymptotically-convergent expansion (AC 
expansion) of 𝐹 if the menu 𝐺 has the asymptotically weak convergent property.  
 
With this, we can write Theorem 8 as:  
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𝐺 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵𝑜, 𝑓𝐴, 𝜑} is an AC expansion of 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃 , 𝑓𝐵𝑜, 𝑓𝐴}.  
 
Definition 17  
For a scoring rule 𝑓: [𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚]𝑚≥3 , its assignment function 𝑓̅
𝑚: [1,𝑚] → [0,1]  (on 𝑚 
alternatives) is defined as follows: for all 𝑗 ∈ {1,2,… ,𝑚 − 1}, 
𝑓̅𝑚│[𝑗,𝑗+1](𝑥) ≔ (𝑠𝑗+1
𝑚 − 𝑠𝑗
𝑚)(𝑥 − 𝑗) + 𝑠𝑗
𝑚 . 
 
In other words, an assignment function is obtained in two steps. First, plot 𝑚  points 
(1, 𝑠1
𝑚), (2, 𝑠2
𝑚),… , (𝑚, 𝑠𝑚
𝑚) and second, connect each point to the ones next to it. If the number of 
alternatives are obvious in the context, we often write the assignment function without its upper script 
letters, for example, 𝑓 ̅ instead of 𝑓̅𝑚.  
 
Definition 18: Concave Function 
Let 𝐼 ⊆ ℝ be an interval. A function 𝑓: 𝐼 → ℝ is said to be concave if, for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐼, and 𝑡 ∈ [0,1],  
 𝑡𝑓(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑡)𝑓(𝑦) ≤ 𝑓(𝑡𝑥 + (1 − 𝑡)𝑦). (2)    
 
Definition 19: Concave Scoring Rule 
A scoring rule 𝑓 is said to be concave if its assignment functions {𝑓̅𝑚}
𝑚≥3
 are all concave. I denote 
by 𝒞 the set of all concave scoring rules and by 𝒞𝑚 the set of all score assignments [𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚] 
whose assignment function is concave.  
 
Example 17 
Borda count 𝑓𝐵 and anti-plurality 𝑓𝐴 are both concave, while plurality is not.  
 
Proposition 2 
Let 𝑓: [𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚]𝑚≥3 be a concave scoring rule. For all 𝑚 ≥ 3 and 1 < 𝑎 < 𝑚 , we have 
𝑓?̅?
𝑚
(𝑥) ≤ 𝑓̅𝑚(𝑥) ≤ 1. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
It is sufficient to show that 𝑓?̅?
𝑚
(𝑥) ≤ 𝑓̅𝑚(𝑥)  for all 𝑥 = 1,2,… ,𝑚 . If 𝑥 = 1  or 𝑥 = 𝑚 , the 
statement holds trivially because the definition of a scoring rule demands that 𝑓̅𝑚(1) = 𝑓?̅?
𝑚
(1) = 1 
and 𝑓̅𝑚(𝑚) = 𝑓?̅?
𝑚
(𝑚) = 0 . Let 𝑥 = 2,3, … ,𝑚 − 1 . Substituting 𝑥 = 1 , 𝑦 = 𝑚 , and 𝑡 =
(𝑚 − 𝑥) (𝑚 − 1)⁄  in the equation of Definition 18, we get the proposition. ■ 
 
The following two propositions can similarly be obtained from Definition 18. 
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Proposition 3 
Let 𝑓: [𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚]𝑚≥3 be a concave scoring rule. For all 𝑚 ≥ 3 and 1 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 < 𝑚, we have  
(1) 𝐿1,𝑏(𝑎) ≤ 𝑓̅
𝑚(𝑎) ≤ min{1, 𝐿𝑏,𝑚(𝑎)}, and 
(2) 𝐿𝑎,𝑚(𝑏) ≤ 𝑓̅
𝑚(𝑏) ≤ 𝐿1,𝑎(𝑏). 
where 𝐿𝑝,𝑞  (for distinct 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ {1,2,… ,𝑚} ) expresses the equation of the straight line passing 
through (𝑝, 𝑠𝑝
𝑚) and (𝑞, 𝑠𝑞
𝑚), i.e.:  
𝐿𝑝,𝑞(𝑥) ≔
𝑠𝑞
𝑚 − 𝑠𝑝
𝑚
𝑞 − 𝑝
(𝑥 − 𝑝) + 𝑠𝑝
𝑚 . 
 
Proposition 4 
Let 𝑓: [𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚]𝑚≥3 be a concave scoring rule. For all 𝑚 ≥ 3 and 1 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 < 𝑚, we have  
(1) If 1 < 𝑐 < 𝑎, 𝐿1,𝑎(𝑐) ≤ 𝑓̅
𝑚(𝑐) ≤ min{1, 𝐿𝑎,𝑏(𝑐)}, 
(2) If 𝑎 < 𝑐 < 𝑏, 𝐿𝑎𝑏(𝑐) ≤ 𝑓̅
𝑚(𝑐) ≤ min{𝐿1,𝑎(𝑐), 𝐿𝑏,𝑚(𝑐)}, and 
(3) If 𝑏 < 𝑐 < 𝑚, 𝐿𝑏𝑚(𝑐) ≤ 𝑓̅
𝑚(𝑐) ≤ 𝐿𝑎𝑏(𝑐).  
where 𝐿𝑝,𝑞 (for distinct 𝑝, 𝑞 ∈ {1,2,… ,𝑚}) expresses the equation of straight line passing through 
(𝑝, 𝑠𝑝
𝑚) and (𝑞, 𝑠𝑞
𝑚).  
 
Theorem 9 
Assume IAC. Let 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑀} be a menu of 𝑀 ≥ 3 concave scoring rules. Then, there exists 
𝐺 ⊇ 𝐹 that has the asymptotically weak convergent property.  
 
Theorem 9 says that for any menu 𝐹 of any finite size, if 𝐹 is made up of concave scoring rules only, 
we can expand it to 𝐺 ⊇ 𝐹 so that this 𝐺 has the weak convergent property. Thus, a large society 
can avoid the risk of trivial deadlock without abandoning the concave scoring rules in the status quo. 
As a straightforward result from the theorem, I will introduce two specific classes of concave scoring 
rules.  
 
Corollary 2: Polynomial Concave Scoring Rule 
The polynomial concave scoring rule 𝑝𝛼 (with parameter 𝛼 ≥ 1) is defined as a scoring rule such 
that, for all 𝑚 ≥ 3,  
𝑠𝑥
𝑚 = 1 − (
𝑥 − 1
𝑚− 1
)
𝛼
. 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑝𝛼1 , 𝑝𝛼2 , … , 𝑝𝛼𝜉} , where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝜉 ∈ [1,+∞) are distinct real numbers. Then there 
exists 𝐺 ⊇ 𝐹 that has the asymptotically weak convergent property.  
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Just as in the proof of Corollary 2, we have also the following.  
 
Corollary 3: Exponential Concave Scoring Rule 
The exponential concave scoring rule 𝑒𝛼 (with parameter 0 < 𝛼 < 1) is defined as a scoring rule 
such that, for all 𝑚 ≥ 3,  
𝑠𝑥
𝑚 =
𝛼𝑥 − 𝛼𝑚
𝛼 − 𝛼𝑚
. 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑒𝛼1 , 𝑒𝛼2 , … , 𝑒𝛼𝜉} , where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝜉 ∈ [1,+∞)  are distinct real numbers. Then there 
exists 𝐺 ⊇ 𝐹 that has the asymptotically weak convergent property. 
 
Example 18: Polynomial Concave Scoring Rule 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑓𝐴} be the menu of concave scoring rules. Note that 𝑝1 is identical to Borda 
count. Suppose 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑} . Let 𝑛1, 𝑛2, 𝑛3, … , 𝑛24  be the number of voters whose level-0 
preference is 𝑎𝑏𝑐𝑑, 𝑎𝑏𝑑𝑐, 𝑎𝑐𝑏𝑑, … , 𝑑𝑐𝑏𝑎 (lexicographic order), respectively. Suppose the level-0 
preference profile 𝐿0 satisfies  
(𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛24) = (119,60,61,61,83,61,61,95,61,67,61,61, 
        65,130,61,61,61,61,61,61,61,147,61,61). 
Then it is easily verified that 𝐿0 is in trivial deadlock. However, when we expand ?̃? = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑓𝐴} 
in the way shown in the proof of Theorem 9 (𝜇 = 10 and 𝑟 = 10) and suppose 44 rules choose {𝑎}, 
44 rules choose {𝑏}, 44 rules choose {𝑐}, and 55 rules choose {𝑑} at 𝐿0, then, if we construct 
level-1 CI profile 𝐿1 in the way shown in the same proof, it follows that every level-2 has class {𝑑}. 
This means a weak convergence to {𝑑} . Although such resolution of trivial deadlock is not what 
Theorem 9 says, this indicates that the expansion of a given menu can be used to solve the trivial 
deadlock in some cases.  
 
3.4 A Historical Example 
Abraham Lincoln (1809‒1865), the 16th President of the United States, was elected in 1860. The 
election, historically known as the impetus for the outbreak of the Civil War, is quite interesting from 
the perspective of social choice theory. There were four candidates running: Abraham Lincoln 
(Republican Party), John C. Breckinridge (Southern Democratic Party), John Bell (Constitutional 
Union Party), and Stephen A. Douglas (Northern Democratic Party). Each of them received a 
significant number of ballots. Indeed, some researchers argue that if the citizens’ preference profiles 
had been aggregated using other voting procedures, the result might have been different (Riker, 1982; 
Tabarrok & Spector, 1999). In this section, we use this example to illustrate the notion of convergence.  
 Although we cannot know the complete preference profile of the citizens at that time, Riker 
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(1982) and Tabarrok and Spector (1999) give estimations. Riker (1982) estimates the full preference 
ranking for each state himself (Riker’s profile) while Tabarrok and Spector (1999, p.274) “carried out 
a survey among a number of historians, all of whom had written on the election of 1860 or more 
generally on the politics of the pre-civil war era.” Their estimation, the Mean Historian Profile, is 
made by taking the average of the 13 entire profiles estimated by the historians. For the convenience 
of the reader, I cite their results in the tables below.  
 
Table 1. Riker’s Profile (Ballots) 
LDRB 0 RLDB 0 
LDBR 450000 RLBD 0 
LRDB 0 RDLB 104000 
LRBD 0 RDBL 329000 
LBDR 1414000 RBLD 0 
LBRD 0 RBDL 413000 
DLRB 83000 BLDR 270000 
DLBR 318000 BLRD 0 
DRLB 173000 BDLR 114000 
DRBL 489000 BDRL 28000 
DBLR 319000 BRLD 31000 
DBRL 0 BRDL 146000 
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Table 2. Mean Historian Profile (%) 
LDRB 0 RLDB 0 
LDBR 21.17 RLBD 0 
LRDB 0 RDLB 0.13 
LRBD 0 RDBL 6.87 
LBDR 18.61 RBLD 0 
LBRD 0 RBDL 11.19 
DLRB 0.11 BLDR 1.7 
DLBR 8.04 BLRD 0 
DRLB 0.22 BDLR 4.48 
DRBL 4.87 BDRL 3.81 
DBLR 8.59 BRLD 0.04 
DBRL 7.53 BRDL 2.56 
 
Based on these estimated profiles, they showed that different procedures (e.g., plurality and anti-
plurality) yield different outputs. I now demonstrate how these discrepancies can be resolved through 
the notion of weak/strong convergence. Let 𝐿𝑅
0  and 𝐿𝑀
0  be Riker’s profile and the Mean Historian 
Profile over 𝑋 = {Lincoln (𝐿),Douglas (𝐷),Bell (𝐵), Breckinridge (𝑅)}, respectively.  
 
(1) Strong Convergence in Riker’s Profile.  
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴}. For this profile, it follows that 𝑓𝑃
1(𝐿𝑅
0 ) = {𝐿} while 𝑓𝐵
1(𝐿𝑅
0 ) = 𝑓𝐴
1(𝐿𝑅
0 ) = {𝐷} 
(see Figure 4). Just as in the proof of Theorem 8, we can see that 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝐷}.  
 
Figure 4. Strong convergence in Riker’s profile 
 
(2) Trivial Deadlock in Riker’s Profile.  
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝑋, 𝑓𝐴}, where 𝑓𝑋 is a slight change of 𝑓𝐵 such that  
𝑓𝑋: [1,
1
2
, 0] , [1,1,
1
3
, 0]. 
It is easy to check that 𝐿0 is in trivial deadlock (see Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Trivial deadlock in Riker’s profile 
 
(3) Strong convergence in the Mean Historian Profile.  
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐴} again. Just as in (1), we can verify that 𝐿𝑀
0  strongly converges to {𝐷}.  
 
(1), (2), and (3) provide a good example of how procedural choice can be made using the notion 
of convergence. In (1) and (3), 𝐿𝑅
0  and 𝐿𝑀
0  both strongly converges not to Lincoln (𝐿) but to 
Douglas (𝐷). Part of the reason for this result is that Douglas wins over Lincoln using the simple 
majority rule under the both profiles. I do not claim that Douglas should have been the winner. In 
terms of convergence theory, whether a specific candidate (e.g., Douglas) should be elected depends 
on what kind of menu the society accepts. For example, if the U.S. citizens at that time thought that 
𝑓𝑃 was the unique appropriate procedure, i.e., 𝐹 = {𝑓𝑃} , the convergence clearly shows that the 
winner should have been Lincoln, because both profiles strongly converges to {𝐿}. The procedural 
choice based on convergence depends on which procedures are on the menu.  
 
3.5 Discussion 
In Chapters 2 and 3, I investigated the notion of weak/strong convergence. A preference profile 𝐿0 
over the set of alternatives 𝑋 is said to (weakly/strongly) converge if every rule to choose the rule to 
… to choose the rule to choose from 𝑋 derives the same subset 𝐶 of 𝑋. In Chapter 2, the results 
showed that a large society with three “familiar” SCRs can find convergence with relatively high 
probability when there are three alternatives. Specifically, the probability of weak convergence marks 
100% (as 𝑛 → ∞) for ten menus (Theorem 6). In Chapter 3, we focused on the question of under 
which menus of SCRs a (large) society can always find convergence. When little or no condition is 
placed on menus, Theorem 7 shows the existence of a menu satisfying the strongest property, i.e., the 
strong convergent property. On the other hand, I also showed that if 𝐹 is made up of concave scoring 
rules, there is an AC-expansion 𝐺 ⊇ 𝐹 (Theorem 9). This result enables a large society to acquire the 
asymptotic convergent property without abandoning the SCRs that they have already accepted. To 
conclude the chapter, I will add several comments on these results.  
The first comment is on the calculation of probability. Throughout Chapters 2 and 3, the 
argument originates from the set of alternatives 𝑋, and I assume that the probability model of voters’ 
preferences over 𝑋 follows either the IC or IAC model. Therefore, the probability of convergence or 
of trivial deadlock can differ once the number of alternatives changes. There is, however, a slightly 
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different use of the IC or IAC model: to assume that people’s preferences over the menu 𝐹 follow 
one of these models. In this alternative interpretation15, the choice from menu 𝐹 should correspond 
with “the set of alternatives 𝑋”. If we do not use the original set of alternatives explicitly, in this way, 
we can determine the probability of convergence without depending on the number of original 
alternatives, because we can regard Theorem 6 as a purely general case.  
 The second comment is on the definition of weak convergence. I defined a profile as weakly 
convergent if there exists a sequence of CI profiles that satisfy the required condition. Theoretically, 
CI preference is a generalization of the “induced preference” used by Koray (2000). Koray defines a 
voting rule to be self-selective if there exists an induced preference profile that satisfies a couple of 
conditions. As Koray and Slinko (2006; p.6) argued, if we substitute the italic part in the last sentence 
into “for all induced preference profiles”, the notion of self-selectivity turns out to be degenerate, and 
so too does the notion of convergence. In this sense, our notion of convergence is theoretically close 
to the notion of self-selectivity or self-stability: I note, however, that they are independent of each 
other. More specifically, Diss et al. (2012) and Diss and Merlin (2010) define a menu of SCRs as stable 
if there exists at least one self-selecting SCR for all preference profiles. What I claim here is that the 
two statements “a menu is stable” and “a menu weakly converges” are independent. To show this, it 
is sufficient to give two examples. The first is a profile that is stable and not weakly convergent; such 
a profile was shown in the introduction of trivial deadlock (see Example 9). The second example is a 
profile that is not stable and is weakly convergent, as shown in Figure 1 (page 6). The reader can see 
that no (level-1 and level-2) SCR chooses itself in the figure.  
 The last and concluding comment is on the meta-level profiles. The notion of convergence 
is, by definition, based on the implicit assumption that voters’ meta-preferences are consequential. If 
everyone is (supposed to be) consequential, the convergence notion performs relatively well to resolve 
the infinite regress of procedural choice, just by manipulating the indifferent class in consequentially 
induced weak preference profiles. However, the notion does not work well if there exist some voters 
whose meta-level preferences are not consequential. For example, suppose a voter, Mr. 𝑍, prefers 
Douglas to Lincoln and prefers plurality to anti-plurality. Such a voter is not consequential because 
plurality chooses Lincoln while anti-plurality chooses Douglas (section 3.4). But the point is a little 
more demanding. To reject the theory of convergence, there must be a voter whose meta-preference is 
not consequential, regardless of how high a level is considered. If Mr. 𝑍 prefers any level-𝑘 ≥ 2 rule 
(i.e., a rule in 𝐹𝑘) that ultimately chooses level-1 plurality, then we can regard him as consequential 
                                                         
15 Indeed, Diss et al. (2012) accepts this interpretation. They assume that the probability distribution over of the 
preference profile over the rules should follow IAC model. Nevertheless, I assumed that voters’ preference profile 
over 𝑋 follows IC or IAC. The reason is my personal idea that the procedural choice should be made for the very 
agenda that the society faces. It could be that a man does not care whether his wife decides dictatorially which 
restaurant to go for lunch but at the same time the man hates the use of dictatorship to determine whether the Diet 
abolishes a national law. One’s procedural judgment can vary according to the agenda. Therefore, our theory treats 𝑋 
explicitly.  
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from level-2 . If every 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 is consequential at some finite level 𝑘𝑖 ∈ ℕ , then the convergence 
phenomenon will work, for we can say that everyone is consequential from the level 𝑘∗ ≔
max{𝑘1, 𝑘2, … , 𝑘𝑛} and hence the theory works once we regard 𝑋 as 𝐹
𝑘∗. Once this translation is 
done, my series of theorems works to provide the convergence for a society. Thus, whether the notion 
of convergence can work depends on whether some individuals are not consequential at any level. For 
instance, whether there is an individual who prefers plurality at any level, even though level-10 
plurality might choose level-9 anti-plurality. To determine what kind of meta-preference (for infinite 
number of levels) can be an interesting future topic.  
 
  
40 
 
4 Determine the Society 
In the study of convergence in the previous chapters, the society 𝑁 is assumed to be given. In 
other words, an ex ante agreement is assumed to exist as to who has voting rights and who does 
not. While this implicit assumption is commonly used in the literature referred to in the previous 
chapter, the determination of 𝑁 can sometimes be quite controversial, especially when it is not 
clear who belongs to the set of individuals affected by the decision. In such a case, a voting rule 
is needed to aggregate individuals’ opinions on who should be included in 𝑁 . This chapter 
focuses on the strategic aspect of such an aggregation procedure.  
Consider that a set of individuals ?̅? = {1,2,… , 𝑛}, where 𝑛 ≥ 2, assigns some (honorable) 
positions among them based on their mutual evaluations. I assume that everyone is selfish, in the sense 
that they want to win the honor for themselves. These situations differ from an ordinary social choice 
problem because each individual is a candidate as well as a voter, and therefore, specific kinds of 
strategic voting may occur. A basic interpretation of the word positions in the context of this 
dissertation is (a person who has) the right to vote. However, the subsequent argument is not specific 
to this context. Indeed, there are many other decision-making situations that have a similar structure, 
such as the awarding of prizes at an academic conference, a leadership contest within a political party, 
and the selection of representatives within a group.  
For these situations, Holzman and Moulin (2013) proposed an axiomatic framework of 
nomination rules and the axiom of Impartiality (IMP). A nomination rule is a rule for choosing the set 
of winners through the aggregation of individuals’ ballots that state who should receive the honorable 
positions. Under many familiar nomination rules such as approval voting (AV), a rational voter might 
manipulate his or her ballot in order to improve their own chance of winning. Consider, for instance, 
a society of four individuals: 1, 2, 3, and 4. They choose the prize winner(s) from among themselves 
by AV, where everyone is obliged to approve others and is not allowed to self-approve or abstain. 
Suppose individual 1 approves 2, 2 approves 3, 3 approves 4, and 4 approves 3. In this case, 
AV declares victory for individual 3 , because he or she receives the highest score (two points). 
However, if individual 4  approved 1  instead, AV would declare victory for the entire set of 
individuals (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 4) because everyone’s score would be the same. Thus, individual 4 
would be better off by manipulating his or her ballot16. A nomination rule is called impartial if everyone 
can approve of anyone without fearing that the vote might spoil his or her own chance of winning. The 
example shows that AV is not impartial, despite its widely accepted robustness against strategic 
manipulation.  
                                                         
16 This possibility of manipulation still exists even if the method of AV uses a deterministic tie-breaking rule to 
restrict the set of winners to singletons only. Suppose individual A wins when A approves B, B approves C, C 
approves D, and D approves A. In this case, individual A has an opportunity to manipulate at the following ballot 
profile: A approves C, B approves C, C approves D, and D approves A. Individual A would be better off 
approving B instead.  
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 Described technically, Holzman and Moulin (2013) study the nomination function—where 
exactly one person wins—and propose several impossibility theorems. The combination of IMP and 
Anonymous Ballots (AB), an axiom that demands that each individual be treated equally as a voter, 
show one of the most striking impossibilities: the constant rule is the only nomination rule that satisfies 
both of these two axioms. Among subsequent axiomatic studies, Tamura and Ohseto's (2014) is the 
closest to my study. They showed that by considering nomination correspondences (i.e., allowing 
multiple winners), the impossibilities can be relieved. However, they faced another impossibility 
concerning IMP, AB, and Positive Unanimity (PU). 
 In general, the framework of a nomination rule is determined by two sets: (1) the domain 
(i.e., the admissible set of ballot profiles), and (2) the codomain (i.e., the admissible set of sets of 
winners). I refer to this pair as the setting of the nomination rule. As Tamura and Ohseto (2014) show, 
the extent of design possibility for normative nomination rules can differ among these settings. This 
strand of research motivates me to consider other popular settings and to find further escape routes 
from the impossibilities. The comparative study of different settings is also motivated from an 
empirical point of view. Consider, for example, nominations for the best paper award in some 
academic societies, or for the position of president of a country. In such cases, the number of winners 
is supposed to be restricted to one or at least bounded from above. By considering various domains 
with the number of winners fixed (to one), we can provide an escape route from the Holzman and 
Moulin impossibility.  
In a technical sense, I consider four types of ballot domain:  
 
1) All voters can approve as many other individuals as they like and neither self-approval 
nor abstention is allowed. 
2) All voters can approve as many individuals as they like and abstention is not allowed.  
3) All voters can approve as many individuals as they like and self-approval is not allowed. 
4) All voters must approve a fixed number of others (self-approval is not allowed). 
 
 In Holzman and Moulin (2013), Tamura and Ohseto (2014), and Tamura (2015), each 
individual was allowed to approve another individual. Their framework is a special case of my ballot 
profile domain 4). This ballot profile domain was also studied in relation to AV (e.g., Peters, Roy, & 
Storcken, 2012).  
As for codomains, I consider three types: 
a) The number of winners is fixed. 
b) The number of winners is bounded by a maximum of some fixed number. 
c) The number of winners is bounded by a minimum of some fixed number. 
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 By considering every combination of the domains (i.e., 1–4) and codomains (i.e., a–d), we 
can evaluate the nomination rules for a large number of settings. For example, for 𝑛 = 10 individuals, 
the number of possible settings is as high as 275. I have investigated, for each of the possible settings, 
whether a nomination rule exists that will satisfy IMP, AB, Pairwise Candidate Neutrality (2CN), Weak 
PU (WPU), and Negative Unanimity (NU). 2CN is a new axiom that I have formulated to express the 
idea of neutrality for endogenous nominating settings. My comparison analysis is possible because I 
succeed in describing the general structure that the impartial nomination rules commonly have under 
various settings (Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 9, Lemma 10, and Lemma 11 in subsection 4.3.2). 
Comparative results will be described in subsection 4.3.3.  
 Roughly speaking, the result shows that the threshold rule performs well in many settings. 
The threshold rule is defined as a rule that chooses all individuals whose scores (i.e., the number of 
approvals received by the individual) reach the fixed threshold. For example, if the threshold is fixed 
to two, every individual wins if and only if he or she is approved by at least two individuals. Indeed, 
the threshold rule, if it is well-defined for the setting, satisfies IMP and AB for almost all settings 
except those where self-approvals are allowed. The intuitive reason for this is that, when self-approval 
is not allowed, individuals cannot change their own score. This implies that individuals’ own ballots 
cannot affect whether their score reaches the fixed threshold. I will show that the threshold rule is 
characterized using IMP and some of the axioms well-known in relation to AV: anonymity, neutrality, 
positive/negative unanimity, and weak monotonicity.  
 The current chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 denotes the basic notation and 
section 4.2 describes the axioms of nomination rules in detail. I show the technical results of my 
comparative study in section 4.3. Further comments and discussion on the results are given in section 
4.4. All proofs are in the Appendix.  
 
4.1 Notation 
Let ?̅? = {1,2,… , 𝑛} be a society consisting of 𝑛 (3 ≤ 𝑛 < ∞) individuals. Each individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? 
casts a ballot 𝑁𝑖 ⊂ ?̅?, where the ballot 𝑁𝑖 is interpreted as the set of candidates approved by 𝑖. I 
refer to several circumstances that differ in the kinds of ballots that are admitted and winners that can 
be chosen. These pieces of information are formally expressed as the domains and codomains of 
nomination rules.  
 
Definition 20: Ballot Profile Domains—The Domain of the Nomination Rule  
Let 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 2}. For any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? I define four types of admissible ballot domains 
𝔑i, 𝔑𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , 𝔑𝑖
𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑖
𝑘 ⊆ 𝔓(?̅?) as follows: 
𝔑𝑖 = {𝑁𝑖 ∈ 𝔓(?̅?)│𝜙 ≠ 𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}} 
43 
 
𝔑𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 = {𝑁𝑖 ∈ 𝔓(?̅?)│𝜙 ≠ 𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}} 
𝔑𝑖
𝐴𝐵 = {𝑁𝑖 ∈ 𝔓(?̅?)│𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}} 
𝔑𝑖
𝑘 = {𝑁𝑖 ∈ 𝔑(?̅?)│𝑁𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝜙} 𝑎𝑛𝑑 |𝑁𝑖| = 𝑘} 
I refer to each 𝔑i, 𝔑𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓
, 𝔑𝑖
𝐴𝐵, and 𝔑𝑖
𝑘 as 𝑖’s ballot domain, generally denoted by 𝔇𝑖. A 
combination of all individuals’ ballots is called a ballot profile. I denote by 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘 the 
corresponding set of admissible ballot profiles for each of 𝔇𝑖 = 𝔑𝑖, 𝔑𝑖
𝐴𝐵,𝔑𝑖
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝑖
𝑘: 
𝔑 = 𝔑1×…×𝔑𝑛 
𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 = 𝔑1
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓×…×𝔑𝑛
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓
 
𝔑𝐴𝐵 = (𝔑1
𝐴𝐵×…×𝔑𝑛
𝐴𝐵) ∖ {(𝜙,𝜙, … , 𝜙)} 
𝔑𝑘 = 𝔑1
𝑘×…×𝔑𝑛
𝑘 
I refer to each 𝔑, 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, and 𝔑𝑘 as a (ballot profile) domain, generally denoted by 𝔇.  
 
 A ballot profile domain 𝔇𝑖 expresses what kind of ballot 𝑖 can cast. As we can see from 
the definition, 𝔑i allows individual 𝑖 to approve as many individuals as he or she likes, if 𝑖 
approves at least one individual (i.e., no abstention) and does not approve him or herself (i.e., no 
self-approval). The next two ballot profile domains 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 and 𝔑𝐴𝐵 are situations where self-
approval or abstention, respectively, are permitted. Finally, 𝔑𝑖
𝑘 is a ballot domain where 𝑖 must 
approve a fixed number of 𝑘 individuals from among the others. Note that the condition of 𝑘 ≤
𝑛 − 2 is not restricting because it only rules out 𝔑𝑖
𝑛−1 where 𝑖 has no choice but to approve all 
others. Considering all possible combinations of individuals’ ballots from the corresponding ballot 
profile domains 𝔇𝑖, I define the profile domains 𝔇. I note that 𝔑
𝐴𝐵 excludes the empty profile, 
where no one approves anyone.17 I denote the ballots using capital letters with a subscript 
representing the individual 𝑁𝑖,𝑀𝑖, 𝐾𝑖(∈ 𝔇𝑖). Ballot profiles are denoted by scripted styles 
𝒩,ℳ,𝒦(∈ 𝔇), and ballot profile domains are denoted by fraktur letters 𝔑,𝔇, etc. 
 
Definition 21: Possible Winners—The Codomain of the Nomination Rule 
Let 𝑙 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}. We consider several types of the codomain 𝔛 of the nomination rule.  
?̅? = 𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙} 
𝔛𝑙 = {𝑊 ∈ 𝔓(?̅?)│|𝑊| = 𝑙} 
?̅?𝑙 = {𝑊 ∈ 𝔓(?̅?)│|𝑊| ≥ 𝑙} 
𝔛𝑙 = {𝑊 ∈ 𝔓(?̅?)│|𝑊| ≤ 𝑙} 
I refer to each ?̅?, 𝔛, ?̅?𝑙, and 𝔛𝑙 as a codomain, generally denoted by 𝔛.  
 
                                                         
17 As we describe later, this condition follows the model of Alon et al. (2009).  
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The codomain 𝔛 = ?̅?,𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙 contains the information on the possible number of 
winners. The codomain ?̅? admits any number of winners except zero, while 𝔛𝑙 admits only the 
fixed number of winners, ?̅?𝑙 admits 𝑙 or more winners, and 𝔛𝑙 admits 𝑙 or less winners. It 
follows from the definition that ?̅? is a special case of ?̅?𝑙, or ?̅? = ?̅?1. Though I do not consider the 
case of 𝑙 = 𝑛, it is clear that 𝔛𝑛 = ?̅?𝑛 has little importance, and 𝔛𝑛(= ?̅?1 = ?̅?) is included in the 
other types. Thus, the restriction of 𝑙 < 𝑛 eliminates the trivial cases only. Hereafter, I call the pair 
of the domain and codomain a setting. A nomination rule is formally defined for each combination 
of domain and codomain.  
 
Definition 22: Nomination Rule  
The nomination rule 𝜑 of setting (𝔇,𝔛) is a function 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛, which assigns to each ballot 
profile 𝒩 = (𝑁1,… ,𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔇 the set of winners 𝜑(𝒩) ∈ 𝔛.  
 
My definition deals with many variations in the settings. Holzman and Moulin (2010) study 
the setting of (𝔇, 𝔛) = (𝔑1, 𝔛1), Tamura and Ohseto (2014) study the setting of (𝔇,𝔛) = (𝔑1, ?̅?), 
and Alon et al. (2009) study the setting of (𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔛𝑙). 
Here I will provide a few more notations. For any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, I will denote by 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) the 𝑖’s 
score at ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁1, … , 𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔇, which is calculated as follows: 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≔ |{𝑗 ∈ ?̅?│𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗}|. 
This counts the number of ballots that include 𝑖. I denote by 𝑠(𝒩) = (𝑠1(𝒩), 𝑠2(𝒩),… , 𝑠𝑛(𝒩)) 
the profile of scores at a ballot profile 𝒩. To distinguish this from ballot profiles, I denote by 𝑠(𝒩) 
the score profile (with respect to 𝒩). I also denote by 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) the individual 𝑗’s score coming 
from the individuals in ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} as follows: 
𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) = |{𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝜇}|. 
Finally, I define a special type of ballot profile that is useful for the proof. For all 𝑗 ∈ ℕ, I 
define 𝑗̅ ∈ ?̅? as 𝑗̅ = 𝑛 if 𝑗 ≡ 0 (mod 𝑛) and 𝑗̅ ≡ 𝑙 if 𝑗 ≡ 𝑙 (mod 𝑛) for some 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 −
1. For example, 𝑖̅ = 𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, and 0̅ = 𝑛, −1̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑛 − 1,−2̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑛 − 2,… and  𝑛 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1, 𝑛 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 2,…. Let me define cyclic ballot profiles 𝒞1, 𝒞2, … , 𝒞𝑛−1 ∈ 𝔑. For any 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, 
I define the 𝑚-cyclic ballot profile 𝒞𝑚 = (𝐶1
𝑚, 𝐶2
𝑚, … , 𝐶𝑛
𝑚) ∈ 𝔑 as 𝐶𝑖
𝑚 ≔ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 +𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅}. 
I further define a reversed 𝑚-cyclic ballot profile ℛ𝑚 = (𝑅1
𝑚, … , 𝑅𝑛
𝑚) such that 𝑅𝑖
𝑚 ≔
{𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 − 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 − 𝑚̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?.  
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4.2 Axioms for Nomination Rules 
4.2.1 Axioms 
I introduce some normative axioms for nomination rules. After the definitions, I will show some 
well-known nomination rules and argue their axiomatic performance in 4.2.2.  
Let 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule.  
(1) 𝜑 satisfies IMP if  
for any 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔇, 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, and 𝑁𝑖
′ ∈ 𝔇𝑖, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖) ⇔ 𝑖 ∈
𝜑(𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖).  
(2) 𝜑 satisfies (strong) PU if  
for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, if 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? exists such that 𝑖 ∈ ⋂ 𝑁𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 , then  
𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?}. 
(3) 𝜑 satisfies WPU if  
for any 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, if 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}, then 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
(4) 𝜑 satisfies NU if  
for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}, then 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩). 
(5) 𝜑 satisfies AB if  
for all 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇, if 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠(𝒩′), then 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝜑(𝒩′). 
(6) 𝜑 satisfies No Dummy (ND) if  
for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖) and 𝑁𝑖
′ ∈ 𝔇𝑖 exist such that 𝜑(𝒩) ≠ 𝜑(𝒩
′).  
 
 Note that these axioms, except WPU, coincide with those used in both Holzman and 
Moulin (2013) and Tamura and Ohseto (2014), if we consider the settings studied in those papers. 
WPU is my own axiom. To make this dissertation self-contained, I will briefly explain these axioms.  
Axiom IMP demands that each voter’s ballot has no influence over whether that voter wins 
or loses. In other words, everyone can approve anyone without fearing that the approval of one’s 
potential rivals decreases one’s own chance of winning.  
The axioms of PU, WPU, and NU relate to the idea of unanimity. PU and WPU demand that 
one must win if one earns unanimous approval from all others, and PU furthermore demands that 
those who fail to obtain unanimous approval from the others cannot win if someone else obtains 
unanimous approval. Note that PU and WPU are logically equivalent in some settings (e.g., in 
(𝔑1, 𝔛1)), which Holzman and Moulin (2013) studied. On the other hand, NU demands that if one 
cannot obtain approval from any of the others, he or she must not win.  
The fifth axiom, AB, states that all individuals should be treated equally as voters. If a rule 
satisfies AB, then it does not see who approves who, but only the scores of each individual. Note that 
this condition does not necessarily require individual equality as a candidate. For example, a 
nomination rule that chooses some fixed individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? satisfies AB, although this rule is clearly 
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discriminative over other candidates.  
The sixth axiom, ND, states that all voters have at least one situation (i.e., one ballot profile) 
where they can change the winners 𝜑(⋅). Thus, the constant rule does not satisfy ND because 
anyone in the society is a dummy voter.  
Note also that all the above axioms are satisfied by AV, except for IMP. Formal discussion 
on the properties of each rule will be given in section 4.2.2.  
To state the next axiom, I need to introduce further notation. Let 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗) be any 
transposition18 over ?̅? that swaps 𝑖 and 𝑗. For any ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁1,… , 𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔇 such that 
𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖, let 𝒩
σ = (𝑁1
𝜎 , … , 𝑁𝑛
𝜎) be the transposed ballot profile defined for any 𝑘 ∈ ?̅? 
and 𝜇 = 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜇 ∈ 𝑁𝑘 ⇔ 𝜎(𝜇) ∈ 𝑁𝑘
𝜎.  
In words, 𝒩σ is a ballot profile where the approvers of 𝑖 and 𝑗 are swapped from the 
original ballot profile 𝒩: those who approved 𝑖 at 𝒩 will newly approve 𝑗 at 𝒩σ, and those 
who approved 𝑗 at 𝒩 will approve 𝑖 at 𝒩σ. This means that the individuals’ judgments over 𝑖 
and 𝑗 are swapped with each other. Note that for any transposition 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗) and a ballot profile 
𝒩 ∈ 𝔇(= 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘) such that 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖, it follows that 𝒩
σ ∈ 𝔇. Therefore, we 
can freely consider the transposed ballot profile as long as 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. Note also that if it 
were not for the condition of 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖, it could be that 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 but 𝒩
σ ∉ 𝔇. This is 
because self-approval is not permitted in the domains 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑AB,𝔑𝑘. Therefore, if 𝑖 approves 𝑗 
at the original ballot profile 𝒩, we cannot define 𝒩σ  for 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗) in a direct manner because 
𝑁𝑖
𝜎 should include 𝑖 instead of 𝑗, which constitutes self-approval. Using this notation I introduce 
the next axiom.  
 
(7) 𝜑 satisfies Pairwise Candidate Neutrality (2CN) if  
for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, and transposition 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗), if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖, then we have 
𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝜎(𝑖) ∈ 𝜑(𝒩𝜎). 
(8) 𝜑 satisfies Cancellation (C) if  
for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) for all 𝑖. 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, then 𝜑(𝒩) = ?̅?.  
(9) 𝜑 satisfies Weak Monotonicity (WM) if  
for all 𝒩 = (𝑁1,… ,𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔇, 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⊆ ?̅?, and 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} such that 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 
𝑘 ∈ 𝑁𝑗, 
𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′) for 𝒩′ = (𝑁𝑗
′,𝑁−𝑗) ∈ 𝔇, where 𝑁𝑗
′ = (𝑁𝑗 ∪ {𝑖}) ∖ {𝑘}. 
 
2CN reflects the idea of the neutrality axiom in the nomination environment. Roughly speaking, 
2CN demands that the swap of 𝑖 and 𝑗 in the ballot profile causes the swap of 𝑖 and 𝑗 in the 
                                                         
18 We say that 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗) is a transposition over ?̅? between 𝑖 and 𝑗 if 𝜎: ?̅? → ?̅? is a bijection and 𝜎(𝑖) = 𝑗, 
𝜎(𝑗) = 𝑖, and 𝜎(𝑘) = 𝑘 for all 𝑘 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}.  
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result of 𝜑. However, 2CN says nothing if there is an internal approval between 𝑖 and 𝑗. Under 
2CN, we can say that each individual is treated almost equally. Cancellation states that if the scores 
of all the individuals are the same, then all the individuals win. As I show in Lemma 10, this axiom 
is logically connected to the others19. The last axiom, WM, states that the original winner 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? is 
still one of the winners after some 𝑗 newly approves 𝑖 instead of some 𝑘. 
 
Remark. 2CN is a weaker axiom than Candidate Neutrality (CN), which is used in Mackenzie 
(2015). To see this, let me give a slight paraphrasing of AC. If we consider ?̅? or 𝔑𝑘 as the 
domain, the condition of [𝑖 ∉ 𝑋𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑋𝑖] is equivalent to saying 𝑋
𝜎 ∈ 𝐷20. Furthermore, 
[𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝑋) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝑋𝜎)] is equivalent to saying [𝜑𝜎(𝑖)(𝑋
𝜎) = 𝜑𝑖(𝑋)] if we consider 
deterministic rules. Therefore, in these domains, 2CN and CN can be expressed as follows:  
CN: For each profile 𝑋 = (𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛) ∈ 𝐷, each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and each permutation 𝜎 ∈ 𝑆𝑁,  
𝑋𝜎 ∈ 𝐷 implies 𝜑𝜎(𝑖)(𝑋
𝜎) = 𝜑𝑖(𝑋). 
2CN: For each profile 𝑋 = (𝑋1, 𝑋2,… , 𝑋𝑛) ∈ 𝐵 , and each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and each transposition 
𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗),  
𝑋𝜎 ∈ 𝐷 implies 𝜑𝜎(𝑖)(𝑋
𝜎) = 𝜑𝑖(𝑋). 
The difference is whether they consider any permutation or any transposition. Clearly, CN implies 
2CN because a transposition is a permutation. It is well known that any permutation can be written 
as a product of transpositions, and so the reader might think that 2CN and CN are logically 
equivalent, but they are not. 2CN is strictly logically weaker than CN. The following example shows 
this fact.  
Let 𝜑:𝔑 → 𝔓(𝑁) ∖ {𝜙} be defined as follows: for each 𝒩 = (𝑁1,𝑁2, … , 𝑁𝑛) ∈ ?̅?,  
𝜑(𝑋) ≔ {
{1} if 𝑋 ∈ {𝐶𝑛−2, 𝑅𝑛−2}
𝑁1 otherwise.
 
In words, this rule chooses individual 1 only if the ballot profile is either (𝑛 − 2) -cyclic profile 
𝒞n−2 or its reverse ℛn−2. Otherwise, it chooses those who individual 1 approves. Let me show two 
statements:  
[1] the rule 𝜑 satisfies 2CN, and 
[2] the rule 𝜑 fails to satisfy CN.  
 
Proof of [1]  
I show [1] with four steps. Let 𝟏: ?̅? → ?̅? be the identity function.  
 
                                                         
19 We found some works that use this axiom in the characterization of AV: Fishburn (1978), Laffont (1979), and 
Alós-Ferrer (2006). 
20 In this remark, I use the following notation so that I can compare the definitions to those of Mackenzie (2015). 
𝑋𝑖
𝜏 = 𝜏(𝑋𝑖) = {𝜏(𝑦)│𝑦 ∈ 𝑋𝑖}. 
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Step 1: To show that (a) for each 𝜎 ∈ 𝑆?̅?, [𝜎(𝒞
𝑛−2) ∈ 𝔇 ⇔ 𝜎 is either (1,2,… , 𝑛) or 𝟏], and (b) 
for each 𝜎 ∈ 𝑆?̅?, [𝜎(ℛ
𝑛−2) ∈ 𝔇 ⇔ σ is either (𝑛, 𝑛 − 1, … ,1) or 𝟏].  
The proofs are similar, and so let me show (a) only. [⇐] is straightforward, therefore I show 
[⇒]. Take any 𝜎 ∈ 𝑆?̅? such that 𝜎(𝒞
𝑛−2) ∈ 𝔇 and 𝜎 ≠ 𝟏. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. Suppose 𝑖 ≠ 𝜎(𝑖) and 
let 𝑗 = 𝜎(𝑖). 𝜎(𝒞𝑛−2) ∈ 𝔇, and so 𝑗 does not nominate himself or herself at the profile 𝜎(𝒞𝑛−2). 
Formally,  
𝑗 ∉ {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑗 ∈ (𝒞𝑛−2)𝜇
𝜎} = {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝜇
𝑛−2} = ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
So, 𝑗 is either 𝑖 or 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . We assumed 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖, and so we have 𝑗 = 𝜎(𝑖) = 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
𝜎 ≠ 𝟏, and so there exists at least one individual 𝑖0 ∈ ?̅? such that 𝜎(𝑖0) ≠ 𝑖0. With the 
argument from the previous paragraph, we have 𝜎(𝑖0) = 𝑖0 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 𝜎 is a permutation, and so we have 
𝜎(𝑖0 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) ≠ 𝑖0 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , because otherwise 𝜎(𝑖0) and 𝜎(𝑖0 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) would become the same. Inductively, 
we have 𝜎(𝑖) ≠ 𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. With the previous paragraph, this means 𝜎(𝑖) = 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for all 𝑖 ∈
?̅?. As an extra notation, let me denote as Σ = (1,2,… , 𝑛) (and Σ−1 = (𝑛, 𝑛 − 1,… ,1)).  
 
Step 2: To confirm that 𝛴(𝒞𝑛−2) = ℛ𝑛−2 and Σ−1(ℛ𝑛−2) = 𝒞𝑛−2.  
The confirmation is straightforward. Note that Step 1 and Step 2 together imply that if 
𝜎(𝐶𝑛−2) ∈ 𝔇 for some 𝜎 ∈ 𝑆?̅?, it follows that 𝜎(𝒞
𝑛−2) is either 𝒞𝑛−2 or ℛ𝑛−2.  
 
Step 3: To show that there is no 𝜏 ∈ 𝑆?̅?  and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 ∖ {𝒞
𝑛−2, ℛ𝑛−2}  such that 𝜏(𝒩) ∈
{𝒞𝑛−2,ℛ𝑛−2}.  
 Suppose to the contrary that 𝜏(𝒩) = 𝒞𝑛−2  for 𝜏 ∈ 𝑆?̅?  and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 ∖ {𝒞
𝑛−2,ℛ𝑛−2} . 
Then,  
𝜏−1(𝒞𝑛−2) = 𝜏−1(𝜏(𝒩)) = 𝒩. 
This contradicts Step 2.  
 
Step 4: To show that 𝜑 satisfies 2CN.  
Take any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇. Let 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗). If 𝒩 ∈ {𝒞𝑛−2, ℛ𝑛−2}, Step 1 tells us that 
𝜎(𝒩) ∉ 𝔇 (if 𝑛 ≥ 3 ). So, the statement of 2CN automatically holds. If 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 ∖ {𝒞𝑛−2, ℛ𝑛−2} , 
step 3 shows that 𝜎(𝒩) ∉ 𝔇 or 𝜎(𝒩) ∈ 𝔇 ∖ {𝒞𝑛−2, ℛ𝑛−2} . In the former case, the statement of 
2CN automatically holds. In the latter case, 2CN also holds because 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑁1 and 𝜑(𝒩
𝜎) = 𝑁1
𝜎. 
■ 
 
Proof of [2] 
To check that 𝜑 does not satisfy CN, let us consider profiles 𝒞𝑛−2 and ℛ𝑛−2 and permutation 𝛴 
defined in the proof of [1]. By definition, 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−2) = 𝜑(ℛ𝑛−2) = {1}. However, CN demands that 
𝜑(ℛ𝑛−2) = 𝛴(𝒞𝑛−2) = {2}. Contradiction. ■ 
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4.2.2 Independence of the Axioms 
Here I show some basic examples of nomination rules and discuss whether they satisfy the main 
axioms: IMP, AB, WPU, PU, 2CN, and NU, which will be used frequently later on. Then I show the 
logical relation of the main axioms, mainly on the setting (𝔑, ?̅?)21.  
 
(1) Approval Voting 𝝋𝑨𝑽:𝕯 → ?̅?  
AV 𝜑𝐴𝑉 is the nomination rule that chooses as the winners those with the highest scores. For any 
ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇,  
𝜑𝐴𝑉(𝒩) ≔ argmax
𝑖∈?̅?
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?|𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?}. 
As I noted in the introduction, this rule is not impartial on 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘. I will briefly 
show this through two counterexamples.  
For the domains 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝐴𝐵,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , 𝔑1, let ?̅? = {1,2,3} and consider a ballot profile 
𝒩 = (𝑁1,𝑁2, 𝑁3) ∈ 𝔑, where 𝑁1 = {2},𝑁2 = {1},𝑁3 = {2}. The score profile is given by 𝑠(𝒩) =
(𝑠1(𝒩), 𝑠2(𝒩), 𝑠3(𝒩)) = (1,2,0). Thus, 𝜑𝐴𝑉(𝒩) = {2}. However, individual 1 can be better off 
by changing his or her ballot 𝑁1 to 𝑁1
′ ≔ {3}. AV will choose 𝜑𝐴𝑉(𝑁1
′, 𝑁−1) = {1,2,3} at this 
new ballot profile, for 𝑠1(𝒩) = 𝑠2(𝒩) = 𝑠3(𝒩) = 1, thus contradicting IMP.  
For the domain 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘, let ?̅? = {1,2,… , 𝑛}(𝑛 ≥ 3) and consider the 𝑘-cyclic ballot 
profile 𝒞𝑘 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. Then 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = ?̅?. Next, consider individual 1’s manipulation as 𝒟 =
(𝐷1, 𝐷−1) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘, where 𝐷1 = (𝐶1
𝑘 ∪ {𝑛}) ∖ {2} and 𝐷−𝑖 = 𝐶−𝑖
𝑘 . Note that 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 implies 𝑛 ∉
𝐶1
𝑘. Therefore, we can see 𝒟 as a ballot profile such that individual 1 approves 𝑛 instead of 2. 
Then, we have 𝑠𝑛(𝒟) = 𝑘 + 1 > 𝑠1(𝒟) = 𝑘, which implies 1 ∉ 𝜑𝐴𝑉(𝒟). Therefore, this rule does 
not satisfy IMP. These examples show a basic gap between the concept of AV and the axiom of 
IMP.  
 
(2) Constant-𝑪 Rule 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝐂:𝕯 → 𝖃  
Let 𝐶 ∈ 𝔛 be a subset of ?̅?. The constant-𝐶 rule, 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐶, is the nomination rule that always 
nominates 𝐶 regardless of the ballots:  
𝜑𝑖(𝒩) = 𝐶 for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔛 
Two illustrative cases are when 𝐶 = {𝑖} for some 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝐶 = ?̅? (i.e., 𝑐𝑜𝑛{𝑖} and 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?). The 
former is shown to be the unique nomination rule on the setting (𝔑1, 𝔛1) that satisfies both IMP 
and AB (Holzman & Moulin, 2013). In fact, it is easy to see that the constant-𝐶 rule, where 𝐶 ∈ ?̅? 
                                                         
21 For the logical relationship of the main axioms in other typical settings, see Holzman and Moulin (2013) for 
(𝔑1, 𝔛1) and Tamura and Ohseto (2014) for (𝔑1, ?̅?).  
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is any admissible set, satisfies IMP and AB. Consider the latter case 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅? on the setting (𝔑, ?̅?). In 
this case, it is clear that 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?:𝔑 → ?̅? satisfies WPU and 2CN, however, it fails to satisfy PU and 
NU.  
 
(3) Plurality With Runners-up Rule 𝝋𝑷:𝕹 → ?̅?  
The plurality with runners-up rule, 𝜑𝑃, defined below, is an extension of the original definition 
proposed in Tamura and Ohseto (2014). Although it was invented on the setting (𝔑1, ?̅?), I show that 
a similar idea works in (𝔑, ?̅?), in the sense that 𝜑𝑃 satisfies IMP and some other axioms. For any 
given ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑, I define 𝐹𝒩, 𝑆𝒩 ⊆ ?̅? as follows:  
𝐹𝒩 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?} 
𝑆𝒩 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝐹𝒩(𝒩)− 1} 
where 𝑠𝐹𝒩(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) for some 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩. Note that 𝐹𝒩 is the set of individuals with the largest 
scores. Therefore, it is nonempty for all ballot profiles 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑. On the other hand, 𝑆𝒩 is the set of 
individuals whose score is just one point smaller than the largest. Thus, 𝑆𝒩 can be empty for some 
ballot profiles. Let me define the plurality with runners-up rule, 𝜑𝑃, on (𝔑, ?̅?) as follows: 
for all 𝒩 = (𝑁1,… ,𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔑, 
𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = 𝐹𝒩 ∪ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝒩│𝐹𝒩 ⊆ 𝑁𝑖} 
This rule unconditionally chooses all individuals in 𝐹𝒩. For individuals in 𝑆𝒩, on the other hand, the 
rule chooses them if and only if they approve all of the individuals in 𝐹𝒩 at the given ballot profile 
𝒩. Note that if we swap the domain 𝔑 in the above definition to domain 𝔑1, the result is identical 
to what is proposed in Tamura and Ohseto (2014) under the setting (𝔑1, ?̅?). Proposition 5 will show 
that this rule satisfies WPU, NU, and IMP, but not PU22 nor 2CN. Furthermore, it fails to satisfy AB 
if 𝑛 ≥ 4.  
 
(4) Threshold-𝒕 Rule 𝝋𝒕 
For all 𝑡 ∈ {0,1,2,… , 𝑛}, I define the threshold-𝑡 rule, 𝜑𝑡(𝒩), for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 as follows:  
𝜑𝑡(𝒩) = {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑡}. 
In words, this rule chooses all of the individuals whose scores reach 𝑡. Note that for the threshold 
rule to be well-defined, the codomain must be rich enough. Consider a society of four individuals 
?̅? = {1,2,3,4} and the setting (𝔑,𝔛1). At the 1-cyclic ballot profile 𝒞1, we have  
𝑠1(𝒞
1) = s2(𝒞
1) = 𝑠3(𝒞
1) = 𝑠4(𝒞
1) = 1. 
Therefore, the threshold-1 rule should choose 𝜑1(𝒞1) = ?̅?. However, because ?̅? ∉ 𝔛1, we can see 
that the rule is not well-defined on this setting. For the same reason, we cannot provide 𝜑1 on the 
setting (𝔑,𝔛𝑙) or (𝔑,𝔛𝑙).  
                                                         
22 In their Theorem 1, Tamura and Ohseto (2014) show that their 𝜑𝑃: 𝔑
1 → ?̅? also satisfies PU. However, according 
to my expanded definition, 𝜑𝑃 : 𝔑 → ?̅? does not satisfy PU. Proposition 10 will demonstrate that this is because of 
the intrinsic impossibility in this setting rather than my failure to properly redefine the rule.  
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 Although unorthodox, I introduce three other nomination rules. These are introduced to 
show the logical independence of the main axioms.  
 
(5) Pseudo Threshold Rule 𝝃𝒊: 𝕹 → ?̅? for some 𝒊 ∈ ?̅?  
For all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑,  
𝜉𝑖(𝒩) = {
𝜑1(𝒩) if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≠ 𝑛 − 1
𝜑1(𝒩) ∖ {𝑖} if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1
 
This rule is very similar to the threshold-1 rule, 𝜑1, and only differs when individual 𝑖 receives 
unanimous approval from the others. It is easy to see that the pseudo threshold rule satisfies IMP, 
AB, 2CN, and NU, and does not satisfy WPU.  
 
(6) Pseudo Threshold Rule’ 𝝃′𝒊:𝕹 → ?̅? for some 𝒊 ∈ ?̅?  
For all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑,  
𝜉′𝑖(𝒩) = {
𝜑1(𝒩) if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≠ 1
𝜑1(𝒩) ∖ {𝑖} if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 1
 
It is clear that this rule satisfies IMP, AB, WPU, and NU, but not 2CN.  
 
(7) Pseudo-Dictatorial Rule 𝒅𝒊:𝕹 → ?̅? 
𝑑𝑖(𝒩) = {
𝑁𝑖 if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) < 𝑛 − 1
𝑁𝑖 ∪ {𝑖} if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1
 
Under this rule, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 wins if and only if 𝑗 is approved by 𝑖 while 𝑖 wins only if 𝑖 receives 
unanimous approval from the others. We can verify that the pseudo-dictatorial rule 𝑑𝑖:𝔑 → ?̅? 
satisfies WPU, NU, IMP, and 2CN, but not AB.  
 
 The following presents the conclusions from this section.  
Proposition 5.  
Let 𝑛 ≥ 3 and 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. The axioms IMP, AB, 2CN, WPU, and NU are all logically independent under 
the setting (𝔑, ?̅?). In fact, we have the following: 
(1) 𝜑𝐴𝑉 satisfies AB, 2CN, WPU, and NU, but not IMP. 
(2) 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅? satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, and WPU, but not NU.  
(3)23 𝜑𝑃 satisfies IMP, WPU, and NU, but not 2CN. 𝜑𝑃 satisfies AB if 𝑛 = 3, but fails if 
𝑛 ≥ 4.  
(4) 𝜑1 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, WPU, and NU.  
(5) 𝜉𝑖 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, and NU, but not WPU.  
                                                         
23 Part of the proof that 𝜑𝑃 satisfies I, specifically, can be obtained by modifying the proof from Tamura and Ohseto's 
(2014) Theorem 1.  
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(6) 𝜉′𝑖 satisfies IMP, AB, NU, and WPU, but not 2CN.  
(7) 𝑑𝑖 satisfies IMP, 2CN, WPU, and NU, but not AB.  
 
 These results are described in Table 3. For each entry in the table, 0 means that the rule 
does not satisfy the axiom, and 1 means that the rule satisfies the axiom. We can infer from the 
table that all the five axioms are logically independent of each other on the setting (𝔑, ?̅?).  
 
Table 3. Axiomatic Performances of Each Nomination Rule 
 IMP AB 2CN WPU NU 
𝜑𝐴𝑉 0 1 1 1 1 
𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅? 1 1 1 1 0 
𝜑𝑃 1 0 0 1 1 
𝜑1 1 1 1 1 1 
𝜉1 1 1 1 0 1 
ξ′i 1 1 0 1 1 
𝑑𝑖 1 0 1 1 1 
 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Known Impossibilities 
Before my own contributions in 4.3.2, I will state some other related results.  
Proposition 6 (Alon et al., 2011)24   
Let 𝑙 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}. There is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝐴𝐵 → 𝔛𝑙 that satisfies IMP and NU.   
 
Proposition 7 (Holzman & Moulin, 2013)  
Let 𝜑:𝔑1 → 𝔛1 be a nomination rule.  
(1) 𝜑 satisfies AB and IMP if and only if it is the constant rule 𝜑𝑖. 
(2) There is no nomination rule that satisfies IMP, PU, and NU.  
 
Proposition 8 (Tamura & Ohseto, 2014)  
Let 𝜑:𝔑1 → ?̅? be a nomination rule.  
(1) The plurality with runners-up rule satisfies IMP, PU, and NU.  
(2) If 𝑛 ≥ 4, there is no nomination rule 𝜑 that satisfies IMP, AB, and PU.  
 
                                                         
24 Indeed, their result is based on the concept of finite approximate ratio, and they do not explicitly refer to NU. 
However, one can easily derive this from their Theorem 3.1. 
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 Each of these propositions shows a basic impossibility or difficulty regarding IMP and some 
of the well-known axioms, though most of their results differ both in the domain and the codomain, 
which makes it difficult to directly compare the extent of the possibilities. Roughly speaking, we can 
infer from these results that it seems difficult to design a nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, and 
the axioms related to unanimity. This motivates me to investigate the extent of the possibilities for 
other typical settings.  
 
4.3.2 Basic Results 
Clearly, the axiomatic possibility of designing impartial nomination rules 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 depends largely 
on the setting (𝔇,𝔛). However, I will first show the structure that impartial nomination rules have in 
common under various settings, especially as it pertains to AB. For simplicity of description, I 
introduce another term.  
 
Definition 23  
Let 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 be the nomination rule. For any ballot profiles 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 and an individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, 
we say that two ballot profiles 𝒩 and 𝒩′ are 𝑖 -equivalent (under the nomination rule 𝜑 ), or 
𝒩~𝑖𝒩
′ if and only if [𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′)] holds.  
 
The 𝑖 -equivalence relationship ~𝑖  defined in this way makes an equivalence relation over the 
domain 𝔇 (i.e., it satisfies reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity). With this terminology, we can 
rephrase the axiom of IMP as: a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP if and only if for any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? 
and for any ballot profiles 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔇, 𝒩
′ = (𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔇, 𝒩 and 𝒩
′ are 𝑖-equivalent.  
 
Lemma 7: Table Lemma, the Common Structure Stipulated by IMP and AB25  
Let 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 2} and 𝑙 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} . Let 𝔇 be either 𝔑,𝔑AB, 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝑘 and let 𝜙 ≠
𝔛 ⊆ 𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙}. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP and AB. For any ballot profiles 
𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 and for any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′), then 𝒩 and 𝒩′ are 𝑖-equivalent.  
 
This lemma states that, under IMP and AB, the 𝑖-equivalence class grows much larger than 
under IMP only. It also states that, for any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, any two ballot profiles 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 with 
individual 𝑖 ’s score being the same, or 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) , must yield the same result on 𝑖 . This 
property is widely observed in all settings that are introduced in section 4.1. Indeed, this lemma applies 
for all combinations of the domain 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘 (i. e. , as many as (𝑛 + 1) domains) 
                                                         
25 The case of 𝔇 = 𝔑1 and 𝔛 = 𝔛1 is implicitly shown in the proof of Holzman and Moulin's (2013) Theorem 3. 
Thus, this lemma can be interpreted as a generalization result for any setting (𝔇,𝔛) that is introduced in section 4.1.  
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and the codomain 𝔛 = ?̅?, 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙 (i. e. , as many as (3𝑛 − 5) codomains). 26 This lemma holds 
even for other codomains if they are nonempty and do not allow an empty set as a winner set.  
The technical implications of this lemma will be shown in the proofs of the following results. 
Here I provide an intuitive explanation of this lemma. Consider a society with four individuals, ?̅? =
{1,2,3,4}, and a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑 → ?̅?. Because the number of possible ballots by any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? is 
23 − 1 = 7, the cardinality of the ballot profile domain 𝔑 is 74 = 2401. The number of possible 
sets of winners is |?̅?| = |𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙}| = 24 − 1 = 15. Therefore, the number of possible nomination 
rules is as many as 152401 > 102800 . However, according to Lemma 7, the nomination rule that 
satisfies IMP and AB is fully expressed by the table below.  
Table 4. A Table Expressing a Nomination Rule 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ∖ 𝑖 1 2 3 4 
0 Win Lose Win Win 
1 Win Win Lose Win 
2 Win Win Lose Lose 
3 Win Lose Lose Lose 
 
The columns in table 2 are labeled with the individuals and the rows express the score. For 
example, the information in row "2"  and column "1" states whether individual 1 wins or loses 
when individual 1’s score is two. Because any two ballot profiles with 1’s score being two are 1-
equivalent, we can say that a nomination rule corresponds with a way to fill in the table. Thus, we 
know that the number of possible nomination rules that satisfy IMP and AB for four individuals is at 
most 216 = 65536.27  
For a given ballot profile domain 𝔇, we define the score profile domain 𝕊[𝔇] as follows: 
𝕊[𝔇] = {𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛}
𝑛│∃𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 s. t.  𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖  for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?} 
Thus, 𝕊[𝔇] is the set of all score profiles that can appear under the ballot profile domain 𝔇. Under 
AB, any two ballot profiles 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠(𝒩′) yield the same result. Thus, we 
can interpret a given nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛  as a function of 𝜑: 𝕊[𝔇] → 𝔛  with a natural 
manner that for all 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔇], 𝜑(𝑠) ≔ 𝜑(𝒩), where 𝒩 is a ballot profile such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠. The 
axiom of AB guarantees that 𝜑:𝕊[𝔇] → 𝔛 defined in this manner is well-defined. Lemma 8 shows 
the structure of 𝕊[𝔇] for any 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵,𝔑𝑘.  
  
Lemma 8: The Relationship Between 𝕯 and 𝕊[𝕯] 
Let 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}.  
                                                         
26 If 𝑛 = 10, the number of the combinations equals 275. 
27 There are not as many as 65536 different nomination rules. This is because we cannot fill in all the entries in 
column 2 with ‘lose’. Considering 𝜑(𝒞2) ≠ 𝜙, we know that there is at least one individual who wins when he or 
she receives a score of two.  
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𝕊[𝔑𝑘] = {(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛│∑𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑛𝑘} 
𝕊[𝔑] = {(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛│∑𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 𝑛} 
𝕊[𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓] = {(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛}
𝑛│∑𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 𝑛} 
𝕊[𝔑𝐴𝐵] = {(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛│∑𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 1}. 
This lemma shows that all the score profile domains related to 𝔑𝑘,𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵 can be captured 
through a simple arithmetic formula on the sum of the individual scores. The next lemma shows that 
by imposing 2CN as well, each individual should be treated almost equally in terms of their score. In 
terms of the table, this implies that the entries in almost every row should be filled in with the same 
results.  
Let 𝑀𝔇 ∈ ℤ be the maximum score possible at the domain 𝔇, viz. 
𝑀𝔇 = {
𝑛 − 1 if 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘
𝑛 if 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓.
 
 
Lemma 9   
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘 be the domain and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 
satisfies IMP, AB and 2CN. For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 and for any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, suppose 𝑖 ∈
𝜑(𝒩) and 0 ≤ 𝑑 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1 . Then, for any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩
′ ∈ 𝔇 , if we have 
𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑑, then 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
′). 
As a direct consequence of these lemmas (8 and 9), the relationship between C and other 
main axioms can be found, which fact will also be used in the proofs of the results in section 4.3.3.  
 
Lemma 10: Derivation of Cancellation  
Let 𝑛 ≥ 4, 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑘, and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. If a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP, AB, WPU, 
and 2CN, 𝜑(𝒞𝑚) = ?̅? holds for any 𝑚 ∈ {1,2,… . 𝑛 − 1}.  
 
Proof of Lemma 10  
Take any 𝑚-cyclic ballot profile 𝒞𝑚 ∈ 𝔇, where 𝑚 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}.28 The case of 𝑚 = 𝑛 − 1 
is easily verified by WPU. Assume 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛 − 2. Then Lemma 9 implies that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞𝑚) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈
𝜑(𝒞𝑚) for all 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?. Because 𝜑(𝒞𝑚) ≠ 𝜙, this implies that 𝜑(𝒞𝑚) = ?̅?. ■ 
  
                                                         
28 Note that 𝒞1, … , 𝒞𝑛−1 are all in 𝔇 = 𝔑 and 𝒞𝑘 is also in 𝔑𝑘.  
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Although the statement of the lemma specifies only 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = ?̅?, using the AB condition, 
any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠(𝒞𝑘), in other words 𝑠1(𝒩) = 𝑠2(𝒩) = ⋯ =
𝑠𝑛(𝒩) = 𝑘,  yields the same choice as 𝒞
𝑘: 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝜑(𝒞𝑘). Therefore, we can say that the 
combination of IMP, AB, 2CN, and WPU implies C.  
 
Lemma 11: Threshold Lemma  
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝑘(1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2)  and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙 . Let 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛  be a nomination 
rule that satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, and WM. Suppose 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) for some individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and ballot 
profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1 . Then, for any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩
′ ∈ 𝔇 , if we 
have 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≥ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩), then 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
′).  
 
This lemma states that under IMP, AB, 2CN, and WM, a possible nomination rule, if it 
exists, would be the threshold rule. However, I do not intend to claim that the reverse holds. As I 
have noted in section 4.2.2, there are many settings where the threshold rule is not well-defined, and 
therefore this lemma fails to characterize the threshold rule. The details pertaining to this will be 
shown in the next section. Note also that as a corollary of these lemmas, we have the following:  
 
Corollary 4 
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝑘 and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, 𝔛𝑙 . There is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies 
IMP, AB, and 2CN.  
 
Proof of Corollary 4  
Take any 𝑘 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 2}. Note that 𝒞𝑘 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 ⊆ 𝔑 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵 ∩ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓. Therefore, we have 𝒞𝑘 ∈
𝔇. Assume that a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies IMP, AB, and 2CN. Because 𝜙 ∉
𝔛, there is a winner 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞𝑘). Based on Lemma 9, the entire society ?̅? should be the winner set, 
which contradicts 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛. ■ 
 
Corollary 5  
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑘 (1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2) and 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 fails to satisfy 
NU. In this case, 𝜑 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, and WM, if and only if it is 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?.  
 
Proof of Corollary 5  
It is clear that 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?:𝔇 → ?̅?
𝑙 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, and WM, but not NU. Suppose a nomination 
rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 fails to satisfy NU. In this case, there is an individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and a ballot profile 
𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) and 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 0. Based on Lemma 11, it follows that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
′) for 
all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇. This means that 𝜑 is identical to 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?. ■  
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Corollary 6: IMP, AB, 2CN, WM⇒WPU 
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘 and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. If a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP, 
AB, 2CN, and WM, then it also satisfies WPU.  
 
Proof of Corollary 6  
Note that 𝒞𝑘 ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑠𝑖(𝒞
𝑘) = 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. Because 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛, there is a winner 𝑗 ∈
𝜑(𝒞𝑘). Therefore, according to Lemma 5, we have for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, if 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≥ 𝑘, 
then 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). This means that one can win whenever one obtains a score 𝑀𝔇. ■ 
 
Let me discuss these results from the viewpoint of designing a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 
that satisfies IMP and AB. Corollary 4 shows that the codomain of 𝔛𝑙, 𝔛𝑙, both of which bound the 
number of winners from above, are not suited to further impose 2CN; the number of winners must be 
unbound for consideration of 2CN. Indeed, Corollary 5 shows that the codomain ?̅?𝑙 enables us to 
impose 2CN as well. Another lesson from Corollary 5 is the importance of NU. Once NU is broken, 
the possibility of designing an impartial nomination rule is limited by the four axioms of IMP, AB, 
2CN, and WM. These results motivate me to consider the class of nomination rules that satisfy IMP, 
AB, and NU in each of the possible settings, and we will answer this in the next subsection. On the 
other hand, Corollary 6 can be seen as a relationship between WPU and WM under the axioms of 
IMP, AB, and 2CN. This result will also be used to compare the possibility results in 4.2.2. 
 
4.3.3 Comparative Results for Various Settings 
I first show a basic impossibility result that motivates us to compare various settings.  
 
Proposition 9: Universal Impossibility 
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑self, 𝔑𝐴𝐵,𝔑𝑘 and 𝔛 = ?̅?,𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. There is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that 
satisfies IMP, AB, and PU. 
 
Note that Proposition 5 is a generalization of Proposition 8 (Tamura & Ohseto, 2014).   
 
Proposition 10: Complementary Results on Proposition 9   
[1] Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝐴𝐵 , 𝔑𝑘 and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. A nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies 
IMP and AB.  
[2] Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝐴𝐵. If 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, 𝔛𝑙, there is no nomination rule that satisfies PU. If 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙, 
there is no nomination rule that satisfies IMP and PU.  
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘. 
Let 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙. If 𝑘 = 1 and 𝑙 = 1, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 exists that satisfies IMP 
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and PU if and only if 𝑛 ≥ 4 . Otherwise (𝑘 ≥ 2 or 𝑙 ≥ 2 ), there is no nomination rule 
𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies IMP and PU. 
If 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies IMP and PU if and only if 𝑘 ≤
𝑛 − 3 and 𝑙 = 1. 
If 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙 and 𝑘 > 𝑙, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies PU.  
If 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙 and 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies IMP and 
PU. 
If 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙 and 𝑘 = 1, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies IMP and PU.  
[3] Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝐴𝐵 and 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙. There is a nomination rule that satisfies AB and PU.  
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘. 
If 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies AB and PU if and only if 𝑘 =
1 and 𝑙 = 1.  
If 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies AB and PU if and only if 𝑙 =
1. 
If 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies AB and PU if and only if 𝑘 ≤
𝑙. 
 
Proposition 9 shows a simple limitation to the design of impartial nomination rules, saying 
that a nomination rule cannot be designed to satisfy IMP, AB, and PU under any setting we have 
defined. The essence of the proof is very simple and worth noting. Once we admit IMP and AB, 
Lemma 7 tells us that the winners are determined by individual scores rather than the structure of the 
ballot profile itself. If PU is then imposed, the existence of ballot profiles of the form 
(… , 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑀𝔇, … , 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑥,… ) will inevitably demand that individual 𝑗 will lose the election 
whenever 𝑗 gets score 𝑥. Because this argument holds as long as 𝑥 < 𝑀𝔇, it is very difficult to 
determines the winner when no one obtains score 𝑀𝔇.  
For more detail, Proposition 10 shows the necessity of each axiom to derive the 
impossibility. We can see that it is generally difficult to satisfy PU. While the axiom pair IMP and 
AB does not itself yield an impossibility (see [1] in Proposition 10), PU itself or the combination of 
PU and one of IMP or AB often leads to a negative result. Let me describe the difficulties concerning 
PU. The first problem comes from the unconditional acceptance of those with a maximum score 𝑀𝔇 
(let me call them 𝑀𝔇-holders). Under the domain 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , 𝔑𝐴𝐵, for example, the number of 
𝑀𝔇-holders can vary from zero to 𝑛 − 1. However, if the codomain 𝔛 does not allow that many 
winners, there is no way to design a nomination rule with PU. This problem occurs when the 
codomain is 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. Note that we cannot escape this problem even if we substitute WPU for PU. 
The second problem is the exclusiveness of PU. Recall that PU chooses only 𝑀𝔇-holders if they 
exist. Thus, PU directly yields impossibility under the following circumstances: 
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𝔛 = 𝔛l, ?̅?𝑙 and if there is a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 where less than 𝑙 (but at least one) 
individuals are 𝑀𝔇-holders, or 
𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, 𝔛𝑙 and if there is a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 where more than 𝑙 individuals are 
𝑀𝔇-holders. 
In this case, the situation would be expected to improve once we substitute WPU for PU. 
Furthermore, the exclusiveness of PU is also harmful when we consider its combination with IMP or 
AB. As shown in the intuitive proof of Proposition 9 in the previous paragraph, this exclusiveness 
essentially works to derive the impossibility.  
Therefore, from this point forward I will mainly consider WPU or other normative axioms 
as along with the pair of IMP and AB. The following results are attempts to determine the escape 
routes from the impossibility of Proposition 9 by substituting WPU for PU. In some settings, in fact, 
I find a very positive result. Assume 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1.  
 
Proposition 11: The Codomain 𝖃𝒍  
Let 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙 . If 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘 , a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP and AB if and 
only if it is the constant rule 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐶 for any 𝐶 ∈ 𝔛
𝑙.  
 
Proposition 11 states that if the possible number of winners is fixed and we consider the 
domains introduced, the constant rule is the only (class of) nomination rule that satisfies IMP and AB. 
This is a generalization of Theorem 3 from Holzman and Moulin (2013) in the sense that Proposition 
11 shows that their result holds under any setting I tested.  
 
Proposition 12: The Codomain ?̅?𝒍  
Let 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙 (1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1).  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅?𝑙 satisfies IMP and AB if and only if it is the constant rule 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋 for some 𝑋 ∈ ?̅?
𝑙.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵 and 𝑙 ≥ 2, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅?𝑙 that satisfies NU.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵 and 𝑙 = 1, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅?𝑙 satisfies IMP, AB, and NU if and only if it is 
𝜑1.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑 and 𝑙 ≥ 3, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies NU.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑 and 𝑙 = 2, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅?𝑙 satisfies IMP, AB, and NU if and only if it is 𝜑1. 
If 𝔇 = 𝔑 and 𝑙 = 1, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅?𝑙 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, WPU, and NU if and 
only if it is 𝜑1.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 and 𝑙 ≥ 𝑘 + 2, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅?𝑙 that satisfies NU.  
A nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅?𝑙 where 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, NU, and WM if and only 
if it is the threshold-𝑚 rule, where 𝑥 is an integer such that 
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1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ ⌈
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ (= ⌈
𝑛(𝑘 + 1 − 𝑙) + 𝑙 − 1
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉) 
 
Remark on (𝕹𝒌, ?̅?𝒍), 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. Let us briefly evaluate the right-hand side of the inequality we 
obtain for (𝔑𝑘, ?̅?𝑙), 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1. To see the numerator, we have 𝑘 + 1− 𝑙 ≥ 0 and 𝑙 − 1 ≥ 0 by 
1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1. The equalities hold if 𝑙 = 𝑘 + 1 and 𝑙 = 1, respectively. Because 𝑘 ≥ 1, these 
conditions do not hold at the same time, which means that at least one is strictly positive. Thus, we 
have  
𝑛(𝑘 + 1 − 𝑙) + 𝑙 − 1
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
> 0. 
This implies for all 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1,  
⌈
𝑛(𝑘 + 1 − 𝑙) + 𝑙 − 1
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ ≥ 1. 
Thus, we know that 𝜑1 is the nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, WM, and NU for all 
(𝔑𝑘, ?̅?𝑙), 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1. Furthermore, if 𝑙 < 𝑘, then it is also easy to see that 
⌈
𝑛(𝑘 + 1 − 𝑙) + 𝑙 − 1
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ ≥ 2. 
This means that 𝜑2 is also well-defined and satisfies the five axioms.  
 
Proposition 13: The Codomain 𝖃𝒍  
Let 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙(1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1).  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 satisfies IMP and AB if and only if it is the constant rule 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋 for some 𝑋 ∈ 𝔛
𝑙.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 that satisfies WPU. Furthermore, there is no 
nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, and NU.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑 , there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 that satisfies WPU. If 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 , there is no 
nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, and NU. If 𝑙 = 𝑛 − 1, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 satisfies 
IMP, AB, and NU if and only if it is 𝜑−𝑖
1 :𝔑 → 𝔛𝑙 (for some 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?) defined for any ballot profile 
𝒩 ∈ 𝔑, 𝜑−𝑖
1 (𝒩) = 𝜑1(𝒩) ∖ {𝑖}. 
 
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 and 𝑙 < 𝑘, there is no nomination rule that satisfies WPU.  
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 and 𝑙 = 𝑘 . If 𝑛 = 3 , there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 that satisfies IMP and 
WPU. If 𝑛 ≥ 4 , there is a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and WPU. However, there is no 
nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 that satisfies IMP, AB, and WPU.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 and 𝑙 > 𝑘, there is a nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, and WPU (but we cannot 
further impose 2CN).  
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Table 5. (Im)Possibilities of Nomination Rules in Various Settings 
Dom∖Codomain 𝔛𝑙 ?̅?𝑙 𝔛𝑙 ?̅?(= ?̅?1) 
𝔑 
IMP and AB⇔
Const. 
𝑙 ≥ 3: NU⇒
None.  
 
𝑙 = 2: IMP, AB, 
and NU⇔𝜑1. 
𝑙 = 1: IMP, AB, 
2CN, NU, and 
WPU⇔𝜑1. 
WPU⇒None.  
 
𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 2: IMP, 
AB, and NU⇒
None.  
𝑙 = 𝑛 − 1: IMP, 
AB, and NU⇔
𝜑−𝑖
1 .  
IMP, AB, 2CN, 
NU, and WPU⇔
𝜑1 
𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 
IMP and AB⇔
Const. 
IMP and AB⇔
Const. 
  
IMP and AB⇔
Const. 
 
IMP and AB⇔
Const.  
 
𝔑𝐴𝐵 
IMP and AB⇔
Const. 
𝑙 ≥ 2: NU⇒
None.  
 
𝑙 = 1: IMP, AB, 
and NU⇔𝜑1.  
WPU⇒None.  
IMP, AB, and 
NU⇒None.  
  
IMP, AB, and 
NU⇔𝜑1.  
𝔑𝑘 
IMP and AB⇔
Const. 
𝑙 ≥ 𝑘 + 2: NU⇒
None.  
𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1: IMP, 
AB, 2CN, NU, 
and WM⇔some 
threshold. 
  
𝑙 < 𝑘: WPU⇒
None.  
𝑙 = 𝑘 and 𝑛 =
3: IMP and WPU
⇒None.  
𝑙 = 𝑘 and 𝑛 ≥
4: IMP and 
WPU. 
IMP, AB, and 
WPU⇒None.  
𝑙 > 𝑘: IMP, AB, 
and WPU.  
IMP, AB, 2CN, 
NU, and WM⇔
𝜑1, 𝜑2, … , 𝜑𝑘. 
 
Proposition 12 and Proposition 13 are the results from the cases where the possible number 
of winners is bounded from below or above, respectively. Although these look complicated, we can 
see that the impossibility shown in Proposition 9 is relieved by substituting WPU for PU. Indeed, in 
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some of the settings, such as (𝔑𝑘, ?̅?𝑙) (𝑙 ≤ 𝑘 + 1), we can see that the threshold rule satisfies many 
normative axioms. Because ?̅? = ?̅?1 by definition, we have the following situation.  
 
Corollary 7: The Codomain 𝖃 = ?̅?   
Let 𝔛 = ?̅?(= ?̅?1).  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, NU, and WPU if and only if it is 
𝜑1.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑self, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies IMP and NU. A nomination rule 
𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies I and AB if and only if it is constant.  
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP, AB, and NU if and only if it is 𝜑1 
If 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, NU, and WM if and only if it is 
the threshold-𝑥 rule for some 𝑥 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑘}.  
 
Proof of Corollary 7  
For 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, the corollary is obvious from Proposition 12.  
For 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘, the case of 𝑙 = 1 ≤ 𝑘 + 2 in Proposition 12 can be applied. We need only check the 
upper bound of the threshold. When 𝑙 = 1, we have the following:  
⌈
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ = ⌈
𝑛𝑘
𝑛 + 1
⌉ = ⌈𝑘 −
𝑘
𝑛 + 1
⌉ = 𝑘. 
The final equality is given by 0 <
𝑘
𝑛+1
< 1. ■  
Table 5 is an aggregation of the preceding results.  
 
 Some comments can be made on the comparative results. First, let us examine the table row-
by-row. This comparison is expected to provide a lesson on the choice of domain when a society is 
given a fixed codomain 𝔛. Take, for example, the domains of 𝔑 and 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓and recall that they differ 
only in whether they allow self-approval on the ballots. Let us compare rows 𝔑 and 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, first 
comparing (𝔑,𝔛𝑙)  and (𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔛𝑙) , then (𝔑, ?̅?𝑙)  and (𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , ?̅?𝑙) , and finally (𝔑,𝔛𝑙)  and 
(𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔛𝑙). Then, although we cannot find a difference in the first comparison, we find that 𝔑 works 
better than 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 for the given pair of normative axioms. In the second comparison, if the value of 𝑙 
is sufficiently large, both domains fail to generate nomination rules that satisfy NU. When 𝑙 is small, 
however, we can find for 𝔇 = 𝔑 many nomination rules that satisfy IMP and NU as well as the other 
axioms, while we cannot for 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 . A similar comparison with the codomain 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙 also 
suggests that the performance of 𝔑 is at least as good as 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 for all 𝑙 (and indeed the former 
seems better in some 𝑙, i.e., 𝑙 = 𝑛 − 1). Note that I do not intend to imply that the results in the table 
fully describe the advantages and disadvantages of each domain, nor do I say that the comparison 
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entirely determines the relative normative ranking of each domain. However, I conclude that the 
comparison has some importance for when we face a domain choice problem in terms of the axiomatic 
possibility. If the domains are evaluated with respect to the proposed axioms, this table shows that the 
acceptance of self-inclusion (𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓) or the acceptance of abstention (𝔑𝐴𝐵) will not improve the 
situation over the normal domain 𝔑.  
Next, let us review the table column-by-column. This corresponds with the situation where a 
society is, for some reason, given the domain and is seeking a good codomain. Thus, this view is close 
to Tamura and Ohseto (2014), who study the escape routes from the impossibility by expanding the 
codomain 𝔛1 to ?̅?. The result shows that the codomain of ?̅?𝑙 when 𝑙 = 1 (in the right column ?̅?) 
works as well as any other codomain. This is very intuitive because ?̅? is the largest codomain of all.  
The second note concerns the axiomatic property of the threshold rule. The threshold rule, if 
properly defined on a certain setting (𝔇,𝔛) where 𝔇 ≠ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, surely satisfies IMP and AB because 
one cannot change one’s own score and thus one cannot change the possibility of winning oneself 
(IMP), and the winners are determined through scores (AB). It is also clear that it satisfies 2CN, WPU, 
and NU29 if the value of the threshold is between one and the maximum score 𝑀𝔇. It also satisfies 
the axioms of ND and NE (no exclusion). Recall that the well-known AV method defined on (𝔑, ?̅?), 
(𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, ?̅?) , and (𝔑𝐴𝐵, ?̅?) also satisfies all these axioms. In this sense, the basic structure of the 
threshold rule has many things in common with AV. The difference between them is the axiom of 
IMP—the robustness against manipulation. 
 
4.4 Discussion 
My main contribution in the previous section is shown in Table 5 (Proposition 11, Proposition 12, 
and Proposition 13), which systematically shows the extent of the possibilities in a variety of 
settings, the domain and codomain pairs, and the possible strategies to weaken the impossibility 
results. The most positive result among these is the characterization of the threshold rule for those 
settings as (𝔑, ?̅?1), (𝔑, ?̅?2), (𝔑𝑘, ?̅?1),… , (𝔑𝑘, ?̅?𝑘+1) by the combination of IMP, AB, 2CN, NU, 
and either WPU or WM. Indeed, I show that the threshold rule satisfies other normative axioms 
referred to in previous studies, such as ND or NE. To conclude the chapter, I give here several 
comments as well as some extra theorems related mainly to the threshold rule.  
 
(1) Manipulability by More Than one Person  
Let us consider the codomain 𝔛 = ?̅?, which allows as many winners as possible except the empty set. 
The setting (𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, ?̅?) is quite often studied in relation to AV, although in endogenous nominating 
environments I showed that (𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, ?̅?) and (𝔑𝐴𝐵, ?̅?) are less promising than (𝔑, ?̅?). Tamura and 
Ohseto (2014) show that the use of (𝔑1, ?̅?) is effective in relieving the impossibility. In all these 
                                                         
29 Recall that my definition of 𝔑𝐴𝐵 ensures that there is at least one individual who has a positive score.  
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settings except (𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, ?̅?), we have seen that the threshold rule can be characterized with some of 
IMP, AB, 2CN, NU, WPU, and WM. A strong concern, however, regarding the threshold-1 rule, 𝜑1, 
would be the (extreme) simplicity of its winning condition. Because any voter can win simply by 
obtaining one approval from the others, this rule might be weak against collusion. For example, 
suppose two individuals, 𝑖 and 𝑗, promise in advance to approve each other. Then 𝜑1 will choose 
both 𝑖 and 𝑗, even if they fail to get any support from the individuals in ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. Because IMP 
guarantees that such mutual approvals between two individuals do not cause them to lose their chance 
of winning, this type of collusion could be understood as a weakly dominant strategy for all voters. 
My purpose here is to impose a measure of robustness against this type of collusion; I will first define 
this robustness against collusion. 
 
Definition 24  
A nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies weak 2CP (2-person collusion-proof) if and only if for any 
distinct individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?  and for any ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁𝑗, 𝑁−𝑖,𝑗) ∈ 𝔇  and 𝒩
′ =
(𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁𝑗
′,𝑁−𝑖,𝑗) ∈ 𝔇, if 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩) and 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩
′), then 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′) or 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′). 
 
In other words, two individuals, 𝑖 and 𝑗, will not be better off by forming a two-person coalition. 
This axiom is weak in the sense that it only excludes the possibility of rules under which two persons 
can be strictly better off at some profile. The following result provides a basic limit for the design of 
weak 2CP and Impartial nomination rules.  
 
Proposition 14: Collusion Proof  
Let 𝔛 = ?̅?.  
[1] Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓,𝔑𝐴𝐵 , 𝔑𝑘 (2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 3) and 𝑛 ≥ 4. There is no nomination rule of the 
setting (𝔇,𝔛) that satisfies IMP, AB, ND, and weak 2CP.  
[2] Let 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 (𝑘 = 1) and 𝑛 ≥ 4. Then, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅? exists that satisfies IMP, 
AB, ND, and weak 2CP. However, there is no nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, NU, and weak 
2CP.  
[3] Let 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 (𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2). In this case, the threshold-1 rule 𝜑1 satisfies all of IMP, AB, 2CN, 
NU, WPU, ND, and weak 2CP. 
 
Under the axioms IMP and AB, [1] says that we cannot expect ND and weak 2CP at the 
same time, and [2] shows that the domain of 𝔑1 is promising, but has the limitation that we cannot 
have NU and weak 2CP as well as IMP and AB. Interestingly, there is a strong possibility in the 
threshold-1 rule, 𝜑1, in [3]: 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑛−2. The reason 𝜑1 satisfies weak 2CP in this setting can be 
described as follows. According to the definition, a nomination rule can fail to satisfy weak 2CP only 
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if there is a ballot profile where two individuals, 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? for example, have a score of zero. 
However, 𝔑𝑛−2 does not allow that kind of situation. Consider a score profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈
{0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛, where 𝑠1 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑛−2 = 𝑛 − 1 (and 𝑠𝑛−1 = 𝑘, and 𝑠𝑛 = 0, for example). 
Because 𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛−2 is maximal at this score profile, we cannot assign more to the first 𝑛 − 2 
individuals. This means that the sum of the scores of any two individuals must be at least 𝑘. 
Therefore, if 𝑘 is almost as large as 𝑛, we cannot have two individuals with a score of zero. 30  
 
(2) Relative Ranking Among the Candidates 
My characterization results show the high performance of the threshold rule in terms of IMP and 
other classical axioms such as anonymity, neutrality, or unanimity. The threshold rule, by definition, 
determines the winner not by the relative score, but by the absolute score of each individual. As a 
result, the threshold rule can often yield a much larger number of winners compared with other 
familiar nomination rules like AV. And it also follows that the rule can choose someone who has the 
lowest number of approvals from the others. Let me discuss this using an example. Consider a 
society of 10 individuals ?̅? = {1,2,… ,10} and a ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁1, … , 𝑁10) ∈ 𝔑 as 
𝑁1 = {2,3,… ,10} 
𝑁2 = {3,4,… ,10} 
𝑁3 = {4,5… ,10} 
… 
𝑁9 = {10} 
𝑁10 = {1} 
At this ballot profile, each individual gets a score of at least 1, and so 𝜑1(𝒩) =
{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10}, while 𝜑𝐴𝑉 = {10} and 𝜑𝑃 = {9,10}. Furthermore, calculation of the scores 
in the above ballot profile 𝒩 shows that individual 10 earns the maximum score 9, individual 9 
earns 8, and so on. Thus, the relative ranking of scores is as follows: 
9 = 𝑠10(𝒩) > 𝑠9(𝒩) > ⋯ > s2(𝒩) = 𝑠1(𝒩) = 1. 
Although the scores differ greatly, each individual is not distinguished in the eyes of the threshold-1 
rule. The threshold rule is, in this sense, does not discern the relative ranking of the scores. Note that 
these properties can be problematic for certain contexts, such as the determination of prize-winners. 
Based on this observation, I consider the existence of nomination rules such that (1) the number of 
the winners is restricted, and (2) the rule excludes those who have bad score rankings. To state the 
latter formally, let me define a term.  
  
                                                         
30 This argument does not fully succeed if 𝑘 ≤ 1 ⇔ 𝑛 = 3. For complete proof, see the Appendix. 
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Definition 25 
For any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, I define the score ranking of 𝑖 at 𝒩 as 
𝑟𝑖(𝒩), where  
𝑟𝑖(𝒩) ≔ |{𝑗 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑗(𝒩) > 𝑠𝑖(𝒩)}| + 1 
Thus, if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) is the largest among 𝑠1(𝒩), 𝑠2(𝒩),… , 𝑠𝑛(𝒩), then 𝑟𝑖(𝒩) = 1. If there is just one 
individual 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 such that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) > 𝑠𝑖(𝒩), then we have 𝑟𝑖(𝒩) = 2, and so on.  
 
Definition 2631 
Let 𝜑:𝔑 → 𝔛𝑙 be a nomination rule and let 𝑟 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛}. I say 𝜑 has rank 𝑟 if and only if  
𝑟 ≤ 𝑟𝑖(𝒩) for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) 
 
In words, a nomination rule 𝜑 is said to have rank 𝑟 if its winners 𝜑(⋅) are always in the top 𝑟𝑡ℎ 
ranking of scores. Let us calculate the rank in the previous example 𝒩. According to the definition 
of 𝑟𝑖(𝒩), we can see that 
𝑟10(𝒩) = 1 
𝑟9(𝒩) = 2 
𝑟8(𝒩) = 3 
… 
𝑟3(𝒩) = 8 
𝑟2(𝒩) = 𝑟1(𝒩) = 9 
Thus, a nomination rule of rank 𝑟 = 3, for example, must choose the winner from {8,9,10}, whose 
ranking is equal to or less than 3, or 𝑟𝑖(⋅) ≤ 3. 1,2 ∈ 𝜑
1(𝒩), and so we can say that the rank of 
𝜑1 is 9 or larger in the society of 10 individuals. On the other hand, it is clear that 𝜑𝐴𝑉:𝔑 → 𝔛
1 
(with some tie-breaking rule) has rank 1, though it is not impartial. A natural question arises: is there 
a rank-based impartial nomination rule? However, the following proposition gives a negative result 
on the setting (𝔑,𝔛𝑙).  
 
Proposition 15 
Let 𝑛 ≥ 3, 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, and 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵. There is no impartial nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 →
𝔛𝑙 that has rank 𝑛 − 1.  
 
Proposition 15 says that under the setting (𝔑, 𝔛𝑙), the concepts of rank and impartiality are entirely 
incompatible. Although the formal proof is a little complicated, we can easily see that no impartial 
                                                         
31 The reader might wonder about the looseness of this definition, for if a nomination rule 𝜑 has rank 𝑟 ∈
{1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}, then it must be that the rule also has rank 𝑟 + 1, 𝑟 + 2, … , 𝑛. This ambiguity can be omitted by 
adding the extra condition of “𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖(𝒩) for some 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩)” for the definition of rank. For the sake 
of simplicity I omit the uniqueness because it is unnecessary for stating the result of Proposition 15.  
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nomination rule on the setting (𝔑,𝔛𝑙) has rank less than 𝑛 − 2. To demonstrate this, consider a 
ballot profile 𝒞1 = (𝐶1
1, … , 𝐶𝑛
1) ∈ 𝔑. 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛𝑙, and so there is a winner 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞1). Now consider a 
ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 as 
𝑁𝑖 = ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} 
𝑁𝑗 = 𝐶𝑗
1 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}. 
IMP demands 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). However, because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝒩) = 1 < 𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 2 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, the score ranking of individual 𝑖 at this ballot profile 𝒩 is such that 𝑟𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1. 
Thus, we cannot avoid choosing a winner at 𝑛 − 1 (or more). The proposition says that there exists 
a ballot profile for which the impartial nomination rule chooses the individual with the worst score 
ranking.  
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5 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I study the infinite regress problem in collective decision making. I give here 
a brief summary of each chapter and some additional comments.  
In Chapter 2, I introduced the notion of (weak/strong) convergence, which I regard as a 
basic solution concept for the infinite regress of procedural choice, and studied its basic 
performance on a menu of three scoring rules. Specifically, Theorem 4 states that a large society 
with the menu {plurality (P), Borda (B), anti-plurality (A)} can almost always find a strong 
convergence unless it is in a trivial deadlock. Further regress has no effective meaning in each 
case, and so an interpretation of the theorems in the chapter is as follows: the infinite regress 
problem degenerates in such a society and, moreover, for the menu {P, B, A} and for a set of three 
alternatives 𝑋 , its probability of convergence (98.2% under IC and 98.8% under IAC) is 
shown to be much higher than that of stability (84.49% under IC and 84.10% under IAC). 
Although trivial deadlock gives no specific answers to the problem of infinite regress, the 
probability calculation shows the positive effect of considering my convergence notion. 
The results in Chapter 2 show that trivial deadlock can happen, with a small but positive 
probability for a large society with the menu {P, B, A}. This problem motivates my analysis in 
Chapter 3, which focuses on finding a menu of voting rules with which a society can always find 
convergence: in my words, menus with the weak/strong convergent property and asymptotically 
weak/strong convergent property. In the first part of Chapter 3, I investigate the possibility of each 
property. Specifically, I question if there exists a menu of voting rules that have the strong 
convergent property, the strongest of the four, and find the answer to be yes (Theorem 7). Such a 
menu completely releases any society (of any finite size) from the troublesome infinite regress 
problem.  
One problem concerning Theorem 7 might be that the proposed menu is made up of 
somewhat technical (and not intuitive) voting rules. In the latter part of Chapter 3, therefore, I 
consider how the convergent property can be obtained for a given menu that does not already 
have this property such as {P, B, A}. My Theorem 8 shows that the expanded menu {P, B, A, φ} 
has the asymptotically weak convergent property. This means that a society with the menu 
{P, B, A} can acquire the convergent property without abandoning any of P, B, or A. The society 
has only to add an extra voting rule as an alternative rule. Indeed, such expansion is shown to be 
possible for many cases (Theorem 9).  
To sum up, I find two answers to the question of how to find a convergence. One answer 
is to equip the society with the menu proposed in Theorem 7. The other, oriented toward a large 
society, is to expand the menu in the way shown in Theorem 9.  
 Having discussed the frequency and the mechanism of the convergence phenomenon, I 
will add some comments about it. My first comment is on how convergence works in a real 
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situation using the example introduced in Chapter 2. Let me show it again here: 
- The society is 𝑁 = {1,2,… ,14} 
- The set of alternatives is 𝑋 = {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}.  
- The level-0 preference profile 𝐿0 is 𝐿1−10
0 : 𝑎𝑏𝑐 and 𝐿11−14
0 : 𝑏𝑐𝑎.  
Although the outcomes of the first-level SCRs are not the same (𝑓𝑃(𝐿
0) = 𝑓𝐵(𝐿
0) = 𝑎 and 
𝑓𝐴(𝐿
0) = 𝑏), the profile 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑎}. This means that  
- If the level-1 preference profile 𝐿1 is, for instance, 𝐿1−4
1 : 𝑃𝐵𝐴 , 𝐿5−10
1 : 𝐵𝑃𝐴 , and 
𝐿11−14
1 : 𝐴𝑃𝐵, then any level-2 SCR in the menu ultimately results in {𝑎}.  
- No matter what other CI profiles are examined, they do not weakly converge to 
{𝑏}, {𝑐}, {𝑎, 𝑏}, {𝑏, 𝑐}, {𝑐, 𝑎},  or {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐}.  
In the process of finding the convergence, we need to take an appropriate sequence of CI profiles. 
The fact that 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑎} does not claim that if each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 reports their 
consequential meta preferences independently, then 𝐿0 necessarily converges at some level. It is 
of course possible that such non-systematic reports never reach convergence. Rather, the fact that 
𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑎} means that if 𝐿0 converges, the outcome couldn’t be other than 
{𝑎}. So, in one sense, the society faces two options: to accept the outcome of strong convergence 
or to get into the entangled infinite regress without finding an answer. In other words, if everyone 
agreed to the process in which the authority picked up appropriate voters’ meta-level preferences 
from the submitted level-0 preference profile (i.e. if the authority were admitted to manipulate 
only the indifference part of the consequentially-induced weak preference profile), then the 
convergence could be found. In this sense, once accepted, the notion of convergence tells us the 
possible outcome that could be reached from the submitted level-0 preference profile. Thus, each 
individual has only to submit their preferences over the original set 𝑋 just as required in an 
ordinary voting procedure.  
 As my second comment, I would like to state the mechanism of convergence with 
respect to a formal description of the infinite regress problem in procedural choice. Gratton (2009) 
formally states that an infinite regress argument is made up of two propositions: the regress 
formula, a universal proposition that can be endlessly instantiated, and the triggering statement.32 
Borrowing from Gratton, an example of two such propositions is: “every intelligent act is 
preceded by an intelligent act” (regress formula) and “act 1 is intelligent” (triggering statement). 
With the repeated use of the regress formula, we have that “act 1 is preceded by act 2”, “act 2 is 
preceded by act 3”, and so on. Using his words, the infinite regress of procedural choice can be 
described by two propositions “for all level 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, a level-𝑘 voting procedure is shown to be 
legitimate if it is selected by a level-(𝑘 + 1) legitimate voting procedure” (regress formula) and 
                                                         
32 Technically speaking, Gratton provides some hypothesis for the condition that such argument is truly an infinite 
regress argument in the subsequent argument.  
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“we (hope to) show that a level-𝑘∗ voting rule 𝑓 is legitimate”. At first glance, this pair of 
propositions demonstrates an infinite regress. However, according to Chapters 2 and 3, the regress 
get degenerated within finite levels, if we restrict our attention to a set of a few voting rules, say 
{P, B, A}, and if we have good reasons to regard the voters as consequentialist. Indeed, Corollary 
1 and Theorem 4 state that the probability of convergence is quite high (when there are three 
alternatives). We humans cannot verify the infinitely long process of justification, but 
convergence says that no matter which rule in a higher level is selected, its ultimate outcome is 
uniquely determined within finite steps, the proof of which I have shown. Indeed, in the profile 
𝐿0 upon which I based my argument in the previous paragraph, I find such a phenomenon at level 
1. The convergence is thus a phenomenon that solves the infinite regress within finite levels of 
arguments.  
 Subsequently, in Chapter 4, I discuss the axiomatic design of nomination rules:  
𝜑: (𝑁1, 𝑁2, … , 𝑁𝑛) ↦ 𝜑(𝑁1, 𝑁2 , … ,𝑁𝑛) ⊆ ?̅?. 
When each individual is a candidate as well as a voter and they want to be chosen themselves, 
then voters may be inclined to cast ballots that can make themselves better off. Impartiality (IMP), 
invented by Holzman and Moulin (2013), is an axiom of nomination rules that demands that each 
individual cannot change his or her own result even by manipulating his or her ballot. My analysis 
in Chapter 4 aims to find some escape routes from Holzman and Moulin’s impossibility by 
considering various typical domains and codomains of the nomination rules. I first specify the 
common structure of nomination rules under various settings (Lemma 7), and then I investigate 
the design possibility of nomination rules for each setting (Proposition 11, Proposition 12, 
Proposition 13, and Table 5). The results indicate that the threshold rule works well in many 
settings in terms of IMP, anonymity, neutrality, and unanimity. In other words, we can acquire 
impartiality and satisfy other popular axioms by using the objective score of each individual (i.e., 
whether they reach a set threshold) instead of the relative score (i.e., who gets the highest score, 
as in AV).  
 As I suggest at the beginning of Chapter 4, the axiomatic study is oriented to the 
determination of the society 𝑁 (i.e., who should have the right to vote) before the procedural 
choice is made. In environmental issues, for instance, the boundary of the effects of a decision is 
sometimes vague, and hence there may sometimes be no ex ante answer for the question of whose 
opinions should be reflected in the decision-making. The framework of nomination rules can be 
applied to such cases if we interpret 𝑁𝑖 as the set of individuals who 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? thinks should have 
the right to vote and 𝜑 as the aggregation rule for people’s ballot profiles (𝑁1, 𝑁2, … , 𝑁𝑛). From 
his premise of Procedural Autonomy, Dietrich (2005) derives anonymity (precisely speaking, 
anonymous procedural submission), neutrality, and monotonicity as the basic axioms that should 
be satisfied by the manner of procedural choice. Indeed, if the determination of the society is 
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made before the procedural choice is made (and therefore, there are no persons or alternatives that 
have some kind of dominance over others) consideration of anonymity and neutrality is largely 
noncontroversial because their very demand is that each individual and alternative must be treated 
equally. Monotonicity (or unanimity as a weaker axiom) is also natural to impose because the 
determination of a society is supposed to reflect individuals’ opinions properly. IMP is a rather 
empirical, but also rational, axiom that demands that each individual can record his or her true 
opinion without fearing ruling him- or herself out from the determined society. Therefore, the 
threshold rule, which I show satisfies these axioms in various domain-codomain settings, can be 
regarded as the most appropriate way of determining a society. 
 To conclude, the dissertation consists of two main parts: Chapters 2 and 3 (the first part) 
and Chapter 4 (the second part). The first part studies the question of “how to determine how to 
choose based on people’s preferences” while the second part studies the question of “how to 
determine who should form the society.” In each part, I provide answers for each of the “how” 
and “who” problems with some underlying assumptions. Although these two problems comprise 
the essential parts of procedural choice, there are additional  components of the issue of 
procedural choice that are of interest, such as the choice of the decision problem itself (Kesting 
& Lindstädt, 2004). For example, considering the whole process of choosing a constitution could 
be an interesting future study.  
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Appendix 
Probability of Trivial Deadlock Under the 56 Menus 
When 𝑛 → ∞ , |𝑋| = 3 , IAC, the probability of trivial deadlock can be calculated in the way 
described by Diss et al. (2012). Here I show the probability of trivial deadlock under the 56 menus 
cited in Theorem 6. Figure 6 shows the result. The horizontal axis shows the 56 menus, numbered  
from 1 to 56 as described in Table 6, and the vertical axis shows the probability of deadlock. Note 
that each of the 56 menus yields at most a probability of 0.035 = 3.5% of trivial deadlock (the 
highest is actually 3.35648%  in the menu {𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐻} ; Data number 2 ). In other words, the 
probability of weak convergence is at least 100% − 3.5% = 96.5% in all menus.  
 
Figure 6. Probability of trivial deadlock under the 𝟓𝟔 menus when |𝑿| = 𝟑. 
 
The specific ingredients in and probability of each menu is shown in Table 6 below.  
  
10 20 30 40 50
DataNo.
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
prob of deadlock
77 
 
 
Table 6. Specific Values for Each Menu; Data Numbers 1–28 (continued on next page) 
 
  
Data number Prob of trivial deadlock
1 plurality anti-plurality Borda 1/84
2 plurality anti-plurality Hare 29/864
3 plurality anti-plurality Nanson 5/432
4 plurality anti-plurality Coomb 43/1728
5 plurality anti-plurality Maximin 5/432
6 plurality anti-plurality Black 199/17280
7 plurality Borda Hare 115/6912
8 plurality Borda Nanson 1/432
9 plurality Borda Coomb 1/192
10 plurality Borda Maximin 1/432
11 plurality Borda Black 1/864
12 plurality Hare Nanson 25/1728
13 plurality Hare Coomb 131/6912
14 plurality Hare Maximin 25/1728
15 plurality Hare Black 115/6912
16 plurality Nanson Coomb 7/1728
17 plurality Nanson Maximin 0
18 plurality Nanson Black 1/864
19 plurality Coomb Maximin 7/1728
20 plurality Coomb Black 7/1728
21 plurality Maximin Black 1/864
22 anti-plurality Borda Hare 241/16128
23 anti-plurality Borda Nanson 67/12096
24 anti-plurality Borda Coomb 17/1512
25 anti-plurality Borda Maximin 67/12096
26 anti-plurality Borda Black 181/60480
27 anti-plurality Hare Nanson 11/864
28 anti-plurality Hare Coomb 185/6912
Menu
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Table 6: Specific Values for Each Menu; Data Numbers 29–56 (continued from previous page)  
 
  
29 anti-plurality Hare Maximin 11/864
30 anti-plurality Hare Black 413/34560
31 anti-plurality Nanson Coomb 25/1728
32 anti-plurality Nanson Maximin 0
33 anti-plurality Nanson Black 11/4320
34 anti-plurality Coomb Maximin 25/1728
35 anti-plurality Coomb Black 113/8640
36 anti-plurality Maximin Black 11/4320
37 Borda Hare Nanson 23/6912
38 Borda Hare Coomb 23/3456
39 Borda Hare Maximin 23/6912
40 Borda Hare Black 0
41 Borda Nanson Coomb 1/864
42 Borda Nanson Maximin 0
43 Borda Nanson Black 0
44 Borda Coomb Maximin 1/864
45 Borda Coomb Black 0
46 Borda Maximin Black 0
47 Hare Nanson Coomb 31/6912
48 Hare Nanson Maximin 0
49 Hare Nanson Black 23/6912
50 Hare Coomb Maximin 31/6912
51 Hare Coomb Black 23/3456
52 Hare Maximin Black 23/6912
53 Nanson Coomb Maximin 0
54 Nanson Coomb Black 1/864
55 Nanson Maximin Black 0
56 Coomb Maximin Black 1/864
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Proof of Proposition 1 
Suppose 𝐿0  is in a trivial deadlock under the menu 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑚} . I show the following 
statement to be true:  
For all 𝑘 ≥ 2 and for all sequence 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 of CI profiles to level 𝑘, the class of 
each 𝑓1
𝑘, 𝑓2
𝑘, … , 𝑓𝑚
𝑘 with respect to 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 is a distinct singleton. 
(Note that the proposition is straightforward once this statement is proven.) I prove the statement by 
an induction on 𝑘 ≥ 2 . For 𝑘 = 2 , the statement is straightforward from the definition of trivial 
deadlock. Let 𝑘0 ≥ 2 and suppose that the statement holds until 𝑘 ≤ 𝑘0. Take any sequence of CI 
profiles 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘0−1. By the assumption of the induction, each 𝑓1
𝑘0, 𝑓2
𝑘0 , … , 𝑓𝑚
𝑘0 is assumed to 
result in a distinct singleton. This can be denoted as  
𝑓𝑝
𝑘0(𝐿𝑘0−1) = {𝑓𝜎(𝑝)
𝑘0−1}  for all 𝑝 ∈ {1,2,… ,𝑚}. 
Now, 𝜎: {1,2,… ,𝑚} → {1,2,… ,𝑚} defined in this way is clearly a bijection. By the assumption of 
the induction again, each SCR in 𝐹1, 𝐹2, … , 𝐹𝑘0 yields a singleton at the given profile. Hence, their 
classes are also singleton subsets of 𝑋. Take any 𝑓𝑝
𝑘0, 𝑓𝑞
𝑘0 ∈ 𝐹𝑘0 and denote their classes as {𝑥} and 
{𝑦}, respectively (𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋). By the definition of a CI profile, we have that for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, and for all 
𝐿𝑘0 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘0−1],  
𝑓𝑝
𝑘0𝐿𝑖
𝑘0𝑓𝑞
𝑘0 
⇔ {𝑥}𝑒𝑖(𝐿𝑖
0){𝑦} 
⇔ 𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦 (∵ Extension rule). 
Therefore, the level-𝑘0 CI profile 𝐿
𝑘0  is uniquely determined. Moreover, it is clear that the classes 
of 𝑓𝜎(𝑝)
𝑘0−1 and 𝑓𝜎(𝑞)
𝑘0−1 are also {𝑥} and {𝑦}, respectively. Similarly, we have that  
𝑓𝜎(𝑝)
𝑘0−1𝐿𝑖
𝑘0−1𝑓𝜎(𝑞)
𝑘0−1 ⇔ 𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦. 
In summary, we have that 𝑓𝑝
𝑘0𝐿𝑖
𝑘0𝑓𝑞
𝑘0 ⇔ 𝑓𝜎(𝑝)
𝑘0−1𝐿𝑖
𝑘0−1𝑓𝜎(𝑞)
𝑘0−1. 𝑓𝑝
𝑘0 and 𝑓𝑞
𝑘0 are arbitrary elements in 
𝐹𝑘0 , and so this logical equivalence implies that 𝐿𝑘0 is a permutated profile from 𝐿𝑘0−1 by 𝜎. 
Because of the neutrality of the menu, we have that 𝑓𝑟
𝑘0+1(𝐿𝑘0) = {𝑓𝜎(𝑟)
𝑘0 } for all 𝑟 ∈ {1,2,… ,𝑚}. 
𝜎 is a bijection, and so this guarantees the statement when 𝑘 = 𝑘0 + 1. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2  
Suppose 𝑛𝛼 ∈ ℕ.  
[Under IC] All the alternatives are treated symmetrically in IC, and so each voter prefers 𝑥 to 𝑦 with 
probability 
1
2
 (and 𝑦 to 𝑥 with probability 
1
2
). Therefore, we have:  
𝑃(𝛼) = (
𝑛
𝑛𝛼
)(
1
2
)
𝑛𝛼
(
1
2
)
𝑛(1−𝛼)
= (
𝑛
𝑛𝛼
)(
1
2
)
𝑛
. 
Because the proofs are similar, I show the proof only for even 𝑛. Let 𝑛 = 2𝑝 (𝑝 ∈ ℕ). Because of 
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the property of combination, we can evaluate this as follows:  
𝑃(𝛼) ≤ 𝑃 (
1
2
) = (
2𝑝
𝑝 )(
1
2
)
2𝑝
=
(2𝑝)!
𝑝! 𝑝!
(
1
2
)
2𝑝
. 
Using Stirling’s approximation, we can evaluate the right-hand side as 
lim
𝑝→∞
(⇔𝑛→∞)
(2𝑝)!
𝑝! 𝑝!
(
1
2
)
2𝑝
= lim
𝑝→∞
√2𝜋 ⋅ 2𝑘 (
2𝑝
𝑒 )
2𝑝
(√2𝜋𝑝(
𝑝
𝑒)
𝑝
)
2 (
1
2
)
2𝑝
= lim
𝑝→∞
1
√𝜋𝑛
= 0. 
[Under IAC] Let 𝑎 = #{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} = 𝑛𝛼 and 𝑏 = 𝑛 − 𝑎. The probability is described as: 
𝑃(𝛼) = (𝑎 +
|𝑋|!
2
− 1
𝑎
) ⋅ (𝑏 +
|𝑋|!
2
− 1
𝑏
) (𝑎 + 𝑏 +
|𝑋|! − 1
𝑎 + 𝑏
)⁄ . 
With a simple calculation, this is shown to converge to zero as 𝑛 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 → ∞. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
Assume that 𝐹 = {𝑔1, … , 𝑔𝑝, ℎ1, … , ℎ𝑞} and 𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 satisfy the given condition. Let 𝐴 =
{1,2,… , 𝑎} = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦}. If 𝑞 = 0, the lemma is obvious. So, we assume 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞 > 0. It follows 
that 0 < |𝐴| = 𝑎 < 𝑛 (if 𝑎 = 0, e.g., no level-1 SCR chooses {𝑥}, which contradicts 𝑝 > 0). 𝑛 ≥
𝑚, and so we have 𝑎 ≥ (𝑛 2⁄ ) ≥ (𝑚 2⁄ ) ≥ 𝑞. Let 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ(𝐹𝑘)𝑛 be defined as follows:  
𝐿𝑖
𝑘: 𝑔1
𝑘, 𝑔2
𝑘, … , 𝑔𝑝
𝑘, ℎ1
𝑘, ℎ2
𝑘, … , ℎ𝑖−1
𝑘 , ℎ𝑖+1
𝑘 , … , ℎ𝑞
𝑘, ℎ𝑖
𝑘 for all 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑞.
𝐿𝑖
𝑘: 𝑔1
𝑘, 𝑔2
𝑘, … , 𝑔𝑝
𝑘, ℎ1
𝑘, ℎ2
𝑘, … , ℎ𝑞
𝑘 for all 𝑞 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎.
𝐿𝑖
𝑘: ℎ1
𝑘, ℎ2
𝑘, … , ℎ𝑞
𝑘, 𝑔1
𝑘, 𝑔2
𝑘, … , 𝑔𝑝
𝑘 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 ∖ 𝐴.
 
In words, this is a level-𝑘 profile where everyone (except the first 𝑞 individuals) orders {𝑔1
𝑘, … , 𝑔𝑝
𝑘} 
and {ℎ1
𝑘, … , ℎ𝑞
𝑘}  lexicographically. Clearly, we have 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] . Take any 𝑓𝑘+1: [1 =
𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑚 = 0] ∈ 𝐹
𝑘+1 and consider the scores evaluated by this 𝑓𝑘+1 . Note that ℎ1
𝑘 has the 
largest score among ℎ1
𝑘, … , ℎ𝑞
𝑘. We have: 
𝑠(𝑔1
𝑘) − 𝑠(ℎ1
𝑘) = {𝑎 + (𝑛 − 𝑎)𝑠𝑞+1} − {𝑛 − 𝑎 + (𝑎 − 1)𝑠𝑝+1}
≥ 2𝑎 − 𝑛 + (𝑛 − 𝑎)𝑠𝑞+1 − (𝑎 − 1)𝑠𝑞+1 (∵ 𝑝 ≥ 𝑞 ⇒ 𝑠𝑞+1 ≥ 𝑠𝑝+1)
= (2𝑎 − 𝑛)(1 − 𝑠𝑞+1) + 𝑠𝑞+1 > 0 (∵ 2𝑎 > 𝑛 and 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑞+1 ≤ 1).
 
This holds for any 𝑓𝑘+1 ∈ 𝐹𝑘+1, and so the profile weak convergences to {𝑥}. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 4 
Let 𝐴 = {1,2,… , 𝑎} = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} , 𝐺 ≔ {𝑔│𝐶𝑔 = {𝑥}} = {𝑔1
𝑘, … , 𝑔𝑝
𝑘}  (𝑝 = |𝐺|)  and 𝐻 ≔
{ℎ│𝐶ℎ = {𝑦}} = {ℎ1
𝑘, … , ℎ𝑞
𝑘} (𝑞 = |𝐻|). With Lemma 3, we have only to consider 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑛 − 𝑎 
and 𝑝 > 𝑞 > 0 (i.e., (𝑝, 𝑞) = (2,1) if 𝑚 = 3 or (𝑝, 𝑞) = (3,1) if 𝑚 = 4) . Because the proofs 
are similar, I show only the proof for the latter, 𝑚 = 4. We can check that for all 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, … , 𝐿𝑘−1], 
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𝑓𝐸1(𝐿
𝑘) ⊆ 𝐻 and the scores (at 𝐿𝑘) satisfy:  
𝑆 ≔ 𝑠𝐵(𝑔1
𝑘) + 𝑠𝐵(𝑔2
𝑘) + 𝑠𝐵(𝑔3
𝑘) = 𝑎(𝑠1 + 𝑠2 + 𝑠3) + (𝑛 − 𝑎)(𝑠2 + 𝑠3 + 𝑠4) = 𝑛 + 𝑎. 
Let 𝑝1, … , 𝑝6  be preferences over 𝐺  such that 𝑝1: 𝑔1
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘𝑔3
𝑘 , 𝑝2: 𝑔3
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘 , 𝑝3: 𝑔3
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘 , 
𝑝4: 𝑔2
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘𝑔3
𝑘, 𝑝5: 𝑔1
𝑘𝑔3
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘, and 𝑝6: 𝑔2
𝑘𝑔3
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘. We construct 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0,… , 𝐿𝑘−1] as follows: if 𝑖 ≡ 𝑗 
(mod 6)  then 𝐿𝑖
𝑘│𝐺 = 𝑝𝑗  (𝑗 = 1,2,… ,6) , and 𝑔𝜇
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘ℎ1
𝑘 (𝜇 = 1,2,3) ⇔ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎 . Because of the 
symmetry, we obtain that 𝑠𝐵(𝑔𝑗
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘) − 𝑆 3⁄ ∈ {−1 3⁄ , 0, 1 3⁄ } (𝑗 = 1,2,3). Hence:  
𝐷(𝐿𝑘) ≔ 𝑠𝐵(ℎ1
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘) − max{𝑠𝐵(𝑔1
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘), 𝑠𝐵(𝑔2
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘), 𝑠𝐵(𝑔3
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘)} ≥
2
3
(𝑛 − 2𝑎) −
1
3
. 
𝑛 − 2𝑎 ≥ 1, and so we have 𝐷(𝐿𝑘) > 0.  
(1) In the case of 𝑛 − 2𝑎 ≥ 2 , we have 𝐷(𝐿𝑘) ≥ 1 . Suppose {𝑔, ℎ1
𝑘} ∈ 𝑓𝐸𝑗′
(𝐿𝑘) for some 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 
and 𝑗′ = 2,3. Let 𝑗 be the smallest such 𝑗′. 𝑠𝑗(ℎ1
𝑘) = 𝑛 − 𝑎 < 𝑛, and so there exists 𝑖𝑔 ∈ 𝑁 whose 
𝐿𝑖𝑔
𝑘  assign zero points to 𝑔 and one point to 𝑔′ ∈ 𝐺 ∖ {𝑔}. Now let 𝐿′𝑘 be a profile where 𝑖𝑔 swaps 
𝑔 and 𝑔′. Then we have 𝑠𝑗(𝑔: 𝐿
′𝑘) > 𝑠𝑗(𝑔: 𝐿
𝑘) = 𝑠𝑗(ℎ1
𝑘: 𝐿𝑘) > 𝑠𝑗(ℎ1
𝑘: 𝐿′𝑘). Therefore, 𝑓𝐸𝑗(𝐿
′𝑘) =
{𝑔} ⊆ 𝐺. The change in Borda score of 𝑔1
𝑘, 𝑔2
𝑘, 𝑔3
𝑘 is at most 2 3⁄ , and so we still have 𝐷(𝐿′𝑘) ≥
1 − (2 3⁄ ) > 0.  
(2) In the case of 𝑛 − 2𝑎 = 1, because 𝑛 is odd, we can write 𝑛 = 6𝜇 + 𝜈, where 𝜇 ∈ ℕ ∪ {0} and 
𝜈 = 1,3,5. Note that the swap of 𝐿𝑖
𝑘│𝐺 and 𝐿𝑗
𝑘│𝐺 for any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁 does not affect 𝑠1(⋅) and 𝑠𝐵(⋅). 
If 𝑛 = 6𝜇 + 1  (𝜇 ≥ 1  because 𝑛 ≥ 𝑚 = 4 ), let (ℒ(1))
𝑛
∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0,… , 𝐿𝑘−1]  be defined as: 1 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝜇 ⇒ 𝐿(1)𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝3 , 𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 2𝜇 ⇒ 𝐿
(1)
𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝4 , 2𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 3𝜇 ⇒ 𝐿
(1)
𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝5 , 3𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
4𝜇 ⇒ 𝐿(1)𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝1 , 4𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 5𝜇 ⇒ 𝐿
(1)
𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝2 , 5𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 6𝜇 ⇒ 𝐿
(1)
𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝6 , and 𝑖 = 6𝜇 + 1 ⇒
𝐿(1)𝑖
𝑘
: 𝑝1 . Then we have 𝑠3 (𝑔1
𝑘: 𝐿(1)
𝑘
) ≥ 𝑠2 (𝑔1
𝑘: 𝐿(1)
𝑘
) = 3𝜇 + 2 > 3𝜇 + 1 = 𝑠2 (ℎ1
𝑘: 𝐿(1)
𝑘
) =
𝑠3 (ℎ1
𝑘: 𝐿(1)
𝑘
). It follows that 𝑓𝐸2
𝑘+1 (𝐿(1)
𝑘
) ⊆ 𝐺 and 𝑓𝐸3
𝑘+1 (𝐿(1)
𝑘
) ⊆ 𝐺. For the other cases of 𝑛 =
6𝜇 + 3 and 𝑛 = 6𝜇 + 5 , the following 𝐿(2)
𝑘
 (𝑔3
𝑘 wins) and 𝐿(3)
𝑘
 (𝑔1
𝑘 wins), respectively, give 
the corresponding inequalities.  
𝐿(2)
𝑘
  is defined as: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝜇 ⇒ 𝑝4 , 𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 2𝜇 ⇒ 𝑝5 , 2𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 3𝜇 ⇒ 𝑝6 , 𝑖 = 3𝜇 +
1 ⇒ 𝑝1 , 3𝜇 + 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 4𝜇 + 1 ⇒ 𝑝1 , 4𝜇 + 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 5𝜇 + 1 ⇒ 𝑝2 , 5𝜇 + 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 6𝜇 + 1 ⇒ 𝑝3 , 
𝑖 = 6𝜇 + 2 ⇒ 𝑝2, and 𝑖 = 6𝜇 + 3 ⇒ 𝑝3.  
𝐿(3)
𝑘
  is defined as: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝜇 ⇒ 𝑝2 , 𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 2𝜇 ⇒ 𝑝3 , 2𝜇 + 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 3𝜇 ⇒ 𝑝4 , 𝑖 = 3𝜇 +
1 ⇒ 𝑝3 , 𝑖 = 3𝜇 + 2 ⇒ 𝑝4 , 3𝜇 + 3 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 4𝜇 + 2 ⇒ 𝑝1 , 4𝜇 + 3 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 5𝜇 + 2 ⇒ 𝑝5 , 5𝜇 + 3 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 6𝜇 + 2 ⇒ 𝑝6, 𝑖 = 6𝜇 + 3 ⇒ 𝑝1, and 𝑖 = 6𝜇 + 4 ⇒ 𝑝2, and 𝑖 = 6𝜇 + 5 ⇒ 𝑝5.  
In either case above, at least 2 level-(𝑘 + 1) SCRs have class {𝑥} and the other two have 
either {𝑥} or {𝑦}. So, we can apply Lemma 3 to get the weak convergence. ■ 
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Proof of Lemma 5 
Let 𝐴 = {1,2,… , 𝑎} = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦}. Assume that both 𝑎 and 𝑛 − 𝑎 are odd. (The cases where at 
least one of them is even can be similarly, and more simply, proven.) Note that the fact that 𝐶𝑔1𝑘 = {𝑥} 
and 𝐶𝑔3𝑘 = {𝑦} guarantees that 𝑎 > 0 and 𝑛 − 𝑎 > 0.  
Let 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ(𝐹𝑘)𝑛 be such that 𝑔1
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔3
𝑘 for all 𝑖: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
𝑎
2
+
1
2
, 𝑔2
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔3
𝑘 for all 𝑖: 1 ≤
𝑖 ≤
𝑎
2
−
1
2
 , 𝑔3
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘 for all 𝑖: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
𝑛−𝑎
2
−
1
2
 , and 𝑔3
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔1
𝑘𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔2
𝑘 for all 𝑖: 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
𝑛−𝑎
2
+
1
2
 . 
Clearly, 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1]. We have also that: 
|𝑠(𝑔1
𝑘) − 𝑠(𝑔2
𝑘)| = |(1 − 𝑠) − 𝑠| = |1 − 2𝑠|. 
The assumption of 0 ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 1 indicates that this absolute value is at most one. ■ 
 
Proof of Theorem 3 
As I stated in section 2.4, the probability of a tied outcome is negligible as 𝑛 → ∞. So, we can consider 
the case where every level-1 SCR chooses a singleton subset of 𝑋. If 𝑓1
1(𝐿0) = 𝑓2
1(𝐿0) = 𝑓3(𝐿
0), 
weak convergence is straightforward. If each 𝑓1
1(𝐿0), 𝑓2
1(𝐿0), 𝑓3
1(𝐿0) is a distinct singleton, 𝐿0 is in 
trivial deadlock. Therefore, the only nontrivial case is that in which two level-1 SCRs choose {𝑥} 
and the other one chooses {𝑦}, where 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋.  
Let 𝐴 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖𝑦}  and 𝛼 ≔ |𝐴| 𝑛⁄  . Let us label them as 𝑔1
1(𝐿0) = 𝑔2
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥}  and 
𝑔3
1(𝐿0) = {𝑦}, where 𝐹1 = {𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 𝑔3
1}. Due to Lemma 3, we need only consider 𝛼 < 1 2⁄ . Take any 
𝑓: [1, 𝑠, 0] ∈ 𝐹2. With Lemma 5, we have the following: 
𝑠(𝑔3
1: 𝐿1) = 𝑛 − |𝐴|, max
𝐿1∈ℒ[𝐿0]
𝑠(𝑔1
1: 𝐿1) = |𝐴| + 𝑠(𝑛 − |𝐴|) 
min
𝐿1∈ℒ[𝐿0]
max{{𝑠(𝑔1
1: 𝐿1), 𝑠(𝑔2
2: 𝐿1)}} ≤
1
2
{|𝐴|(1+ 𝑠) + (𝑛 − |𝐴|)𝑠} +
1
2
. 
Therefore, 𝑓 can choose {𝑔1
1} (or {𝑔2
1}) if and only if:  
|𝐴| + 𝑠(𝑛 − |𝐴|) > 𝑛 − |𝐴| ⇔ 𝑠 >
𝑛 − 2|𝐴|
𝑛 − |𝐴|
=
1 − 2𝛼
1 − 𝛼
= 𝜑(𝛼). 
Also, 𝑓 can choose {𝑔3
1} if: 
1
2
{|𝐴|(1+ 𝑠) + (𝑛 − |𝐴|)𝑠} +
1
2
< 𝑛 − |𝐴| 
⇔ 𝑠 < 2 −
3|𝐴|
𝑛
−
1
𝑛
= 2 − 3𝛼 −
1
𝑛
(→ 2− 3α = 𝜓(𝛼) as 𝑛 → ∞). 
If 𝛼 < 1 3⁄ , we have 𝜓(𝛼) > 1. Thus, any scoring SCR 𝑓: [1, 𝑠, 0] can choose {𝑔3
1}. If 1 3⁄ < 𝛼 <
1 2⁄  , we have three cases. (Note that events such as 𝛼 = 1 3⁄  or 𝜓(𝛼) − 1 𝑛⁄ < s < 𝜓(𝛼) are 
negligible because of Lemma 2.) 
1) The case of 𝑠3 ≥ 𝜑(1 3⁄ ) = 1 2⁄  . In this case, each 𝑓1
2, 𝑓2
2, 𝑓3
3 can exclude 𝑔3
1 for any 𝛼 ∈
(1/3,1/2).  
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2) The case of 𝑠3 < 𝜑(1 3⁄ ) and 𝑠2 ≤ 𝜓(𝜑
−1(𝑠3)). Note that the event 𝛼 = 𝜑
−1(𝑠3) is negligible 
because of Lemma 2. In this case, if 1 3⁄ < 𝛼 < 𝜑−1(𝑠3), we have 𝜓(𝛼) > 𝑠2, which implies that 
𝐿1 ∈ ℒ1[𝐿0] exists such that 𝑓2
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓3
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1} and 𝑓1
2(𝐿0) is either {𝑔1
1} or {𝑔3
1}. In either 
case, 𝐿0 is shown to weakly converge to {𝑦}. If 𝜑−1(𝑠3) < 𝛼 < 1 2⁄ , 𝐿
1 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0] exists such that 
𝑓1
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓2
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓3
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔1
1}.  
3) The case of 𝑠3 < 𝜑(1 3⁄ ) and 𝑠2 > 𝜓(𝜑
−1(𝑠3)). In this case, an interval of 𝛼 (with a positive 
Lebesgue measure) exists where 𝑓1
1 and 𝑓2
1 necessarily choose {𝑔1
1} or {𝑔2
1} and 𝑓3
2 necessarily 
chooses {𝑔3
1}. If 𝛼 is in this interval, we cannot solve the regress, because inductively we can show 
for all 𝑘 ≥ 3 that 𝑓1
𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) and 𝑓2
𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) are either {𝑓1
𝑘−1} or {𝑓2
𝑘−1} and 𝑓3
𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) = {𝑓3
𝑘−1}. 
■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1 
Under IC, trivial deadlock corresponds with cases 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, and 27 in Diss and Merlin (2010). 
Their Table 7 (p. 302) shows that each probability is 0.00299346. Therefore, 𝑝𝐷 = 0.00299346×
6 ≒ 1.8%. Under IAC, on the other hand, trivial deadlock corresponds with the cases 1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 
and 27 in Diss et al. (2012). Their Table 9 (p. 62) shows that each probability is 1 504⁄ . Therefore, 
𝑝𝐷 = (1 504⁄ )×6 ≒ 1.2%. ■ 
 
Proof of Theorem 4 
The only nontrivial case is 𝑓1
1(𝐿0) = 𝑓2
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥} and 𝑓3
1(𝐿0) = {𝑦}, where 𝐹1 = {𝑓1
1, 𝑓2
1, 𝑓3
1} for 
distinct 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋. Let 𝐴 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} = {1,2,… , 𝑎}. I show that 𝐿0 strongly converges unless 𝛼 
takes several specific values. The case of 𝛼 > 2 3⁄  or 𝛼 < 1 3⁄  is straightforward. Because the 
proofs are similar, I show only the proof for 1 3⁄ < 𝛼 < 1 2⁄ . To prove the uniqueness of convergence 
to {𝑦}, I inductively show that for any level 𝑘 ≥ 2, 𝑓𝑘 ∈ 𝐹𝑘 exists whose class is {𝑦}. For 𝑘 = 2, 
it follows that 𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) = {𝑓3
1}. Assume that the statement holds until 𝑘 − 1(≥ 2) and 𝐶𝑔1𝑘−1 = {𝑦}. 
For the other two rules 𝑔2
𝑘 and 𝑔3
𝑘, the class is either {𝑥}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, or {𝑦}. Because 𝑔2
𝑘−1 and 𝑔3
𝑘−1 
are symmetric, there are six possible cases on the combination of (𝐶𝑔1𝑘−1 , 𝐶𝑔2𝑘−1 , 𝐶𝑔3𝑘−1) : Case 1: 
({𝑦}, {𝑥}, {𝑥}), Case 2: ({𝑦}, {𝑥}, {𝑥, 𝑦}), Case 3: ({𝑦}, {𝑥}, {𝑦}), Case 4: ({𝑦}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, {𝑥, 𝑦}), Case 5: 
({𝑦}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, {𝑦}), and Case 6: ({𝑦}, {𝑦}, {𝑦}). For each case, I show that at least one of 𝑓𝑃
𝑘, 𝑓𝐵
𝑘, 𝑓𝐴
𝑘 has 
class {𝑦} . For cases 1, 3, and 6, this is obvious. For case 2, ℒ𝑘−1[𝐿0, … , 𝐿𝑘−2] is a singleton: 
𝐿𝑖
𝑘−1: 𝑓3
𝑘−1𝑓2
𝑘−1𝑓1
𝑘−1 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝐿𝑖
𝑘−1: 𝑓1
𝑘−1𝑓3
𝑘−1𝑓2
𝑘−1 for all 𝑖 ∉ 𝐴. Because 𝑎 < 𝑛 2⁄ , we 
have 𝑓𝑃
𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) = {𝑓1
𝑘−1}, which means 𝐶𝑓𝑃𝑘 =
{𝑦}. Case 4 is similarly shown. For case 5, we have 
𝑓𝐴
𝑘(𝐿𝑘−1) ⊆ {𝑓1
𝑘−1, 𝑓3
𝑘−1} for all 𝐿𝑘−1 ∈ ℒ𝑘−1[𝐿0,… , 𝐿𝑘−1]. ■ 
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Proof of Theorem 5 
Take a profile 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛 that is not in trivial deadlock. Because of the remark just after 
Proposition 1, 𝑓𝑃∗(𝐿
0), 𝑓𝑋∗(𝐿
0), 𝑓𝐴∗(𝐿
0) cannot be three distinct singletons. If all three coincide with 
each other, strong convergence is straightforward. Otherwise, we have that: 
{𝑓𝑃∗(𝐿
0), 𝑓𝑋∗(𝐿
0), 𝑓𝐴∗(𝐿
0)} = {{𝑥}, {𝑦}} 
for some distinct 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑋. Without loss of generality, 𝑓, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐹1 choose {𝑥} and ℎ chooses {𝑦}. 
We assume 𝑛 is odd, and so we have 𝑎 ≔ #{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} ≠ #{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝐿𝑖
0𝑥}. The rest of the 
proof, i.e., to check Weak Convergence and Uniqueness, can be done in the same way as in the proof 
of Theorem 4. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 6 
Given a menu 𝐹 and a sequence of CI profiles 𝐿0, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 which satisfy the stated conditions, 
let 
𝐹𝑥 ≔ {𝑓 ∈ 𝐹│𝐶𝑓[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = {𝑥}} , 
𝐹𝑦 ≔ {𝑓 ∈ 𝐹│𝐶[𝑓: 𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = {𝑦}}, 
and let 𝛼 ≔ |𝐹𝑥| and 𝛽 ≔ |𝐹𝑦|. We label the elements as 𝐹𝑥 = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, … , 𝑔𝛼} and 𝐹𝑦 =
{ℎ1, ℎ2, … , ℎ𝛽}. Also 𝑁𝑥 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦}, 𝑁𝑦 = {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝐿𝑖
0𝑥}, 𝑛𝑥 = |𝑁𝑥|, and 𝑛𝑦 = |𝑁𝑦|. 
Since 𝛼 + 𝛽 = 3, we have two possible cases: (a) (𝛼, 𝛽) = (2,1) and (b) (𝛼, 𝛽) = (1,2). 
 
(a) The case of (𝜶, 𝜷) = (𝟐, 𝟏).  
Define 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] as follows.  
𝐿𝑖
𝑘: {
𝑔1, 𝑔2, ℎ1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑥
ℎ1, 𝑔1, 𝑔2 𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑦 .
 
It is easy to see that every 𝑓 ∈ ℱ chooses a subset of {𝑔1, 𝑔2}. So, 𝐿
0 weakly converges to 
{𝑥}.  
(b) The case of (𝜶, 𝜷) = (𝟏, 𝟐). 
Define 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] as follows. 
𝐿𝑖
𝑘:
{
 
 
 
 
𝑔1, ℎ1, ℎ2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑛𝑦 + 1) individuals in 𝑁𝑥
𝑔1, ℎ2, ℎ1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑛𝑥 − (𝑛𝑦 + 1) individuals in 𝑁𝑥
ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑔1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋ − (𝑛𝑦 + 1) individuals in 𝑁𝑦
ℎ2, ℎ1, 𝑔1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠.
 
Intuitively, 𝐿𝑘 is a profile such that the score of 𝑔1 is the largest and the scores of ℎ1 and ℎ2 
are the smallest. First, it is easy to see that each level-(𝑘 + 1) 𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐻 , 𝑓C, 𝑓𝐵𝑙 , 𝑓𝑀 chooses {𝑔1}. 
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 Consider 𝑓𝐵. For simplicity, we denote by 𝑠(𝑓) the score of 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹
𝑘 evaluated by 
𝑓𝐵. Since each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑥  ranks 𝑔1 at the first position and each 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑦 ranks it at the third, we 
have 𝑠(𝑔1) = 𝑛𝑥. Since ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋ individuals rank ℎ1 above ℎ2 and 𝑛 − ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋ = ⌈
𝑛
2
⌉ individuals 
rank ℎ2 above ℎ1, we have 𝑠(ℎ2) ≥ 𝑠(ℎ1). Furthermore,  
𝑠(ℎ2) =
1
2
[{𝑛𝑥 − (𝑛𝑦 + 1)} + {⌊
𝑛
2
⌋ − (𝑛𝑦 + 1)}] + (2𝑛𝑦 + 1 − ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋)
=
1
2
𝑛𝑥 + 𝑛𝑦 −
1
2
⋅ ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋
≤
1
2
𝑛𝑥 + 𝑛𝑦 −
1
2
⋅ 𝑛𝑦  (∵ ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋ ≥ 𝑛𝑦)
< 𝑛𝑥 = 𝑠(𝑔1) (∵ 𝑛𝑥 > 𝑛𝑦).
 
Therefore, 𝑓𝐵
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) = {𝑔1}. It is straightforward to check that 𝑓𝑁
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) = {𝑔1}. 
 Finally, consider 𝑓𝐴. Since 𝑛𝑦 individuals rank 𝑔1 at the third position and 
(𝑛𝑦 + 1) individuals rank ℎ2 at the third, it follows that 𝑓𝐴
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) ⊆ {𝑔1, ℎ1}. Recall that 
each 𝑓 ∈ ℱ ∖ {𝑓𝐴} chooses {𝑔1} at 𝐿
𝑘. If 𝑓𝐴
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) = {𝑔1}, this implies that 𝐿
0 weakly 
converges to {𝑥}. If 𝑓𝐴
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) = {ℎ1}, we can apply the case (a) to the CI sequence 
𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘 (instead of the sequence 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1) to find the convergence. Suppose 
𝑓𝐴
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) = {𝑔1, ℎ1}. Then, it follows that  
𝑛𝑥 − (𝑛𝑦 + 1) = 𝑛𝑥. 
This implies that 𝑛𝑥 = 2𝑛𝑦 + 1. Then, let 𝑀
𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] as 
𝑀𝑖
𝑘:
{
 
 
 
 
𝑔1, ℎ1, ℎ2 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑛𝑦 + 2) individuals in 𝑁𝑥
𝑔1, ℎ2, ℎ1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 (𝑛𝑦 − 1) individuals in 𝑁𝑥
ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑔1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ⌊
𝑛
2
⌋ − (𝑛𝑦 + 2) individuals in 𝑁𝑦
ℎ2, ℎ1, 𝑔1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠.
 
In a similar way, we can check that 𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐻 , 𝑓C, 𝑓𝐵𝑙 , 𝑓𝑀 , 𝑓𝐵 , 𝑓𝑁 chooses {𝑔1} at 𝑀
𝑘. Also, we 
have 𝑓𝐴
𝑘+1(𝑀𝑘) = {ℎ1}. So, we can apply the case (a) to the CI sequence 𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … ,𝑀𝑘 to find 
the convergence. ■ 
 
Proof of Theorem 6 
Let 𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3 be distinct SCRs among 𝑓𝑃 , 𝑓𝐵 , 𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐻 , 𝑓𝑁, 𝑓𝐶 , 𝑓𝑀, 𝑓𝐵𝑙 . When 𝑛 → ∞ under IAC, it is 
easy to see that the probability of tied outcomes by some of 𝑓1
1, 𝑓2
2, 𝑓3
1 is negligible. So, we can 
discuss only 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛  such that each 𝑓1
1(𝐿0), 𝑓2
1(𝐿0), 𝑓3
1(𝐿0)  is a singleton. Let ℱ =
{𝑓𝑃, 𝑓𝐵𝑜, 𝑓𝐴, 𝑓𝐻 , 𝑓𝑁, 𝑓𝐶 , 𝑓𝑀, 𝑓𝐵𝑙}.  
 
(1) The Case of |{𝒇𝟏(𝑳
𝟎), 𝒇𝟐(𝑳
𝟎), 𝒇𝟑(𝑳
𝟎)}| = 𝟐 
Let {𝑓1(𝐿
0), 𝑓2(𝐿
0), 𝑓3(𝐿
0)} = {𝑥, 𝑦}. When 𝑛 → ∞, the probability of the event  
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#{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} ≤ #{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝐿𝑖
0𝑥} + 2𝑚 
is negligible. Hence, we can apply Lemma 6 to derive weak convergence.  
 
(2) The Case of |{𝒇𝟏(𝑳
𝟎), 𝒇𝟐(𝑳
𝟎), 𝒇𝟑(𝑳
𝟎)}| = 𝟑 
In this case, level-1  CI profile 𝐿1  is uniquely determined. It is also straightforward that the 
probability of tied outcomes by some of the level- 2  SCRs is negligible. If 
|{𝑓1
2(𝐿1), 𝑓2
2(𝐿1), 𝑓3
2(𝐿1)}| = 2, we can apply Lemma 6 again to derive weak convergence. I next show 
that |{𝑓1
2(𝐿1), 𝑓2
2(𝐿1), 𝑓3
2(𝐿1)}|  cannot be 3 if the menu 𝐹  is one of the stated menus in the 
proposition. Suppose to the contrary that it is 3. Note that  
ℒ(𝐹1) = {𝑓1𝑓2𝑓3, 𝑓1𝑓3𝑓2, 𝑓2𝑓1𝑓3, 𝑓2𝑓3𝑓1, 𝑓3𝑓1𝑓2, 𝑓3𝑓2𝑓1}. 
Let 𝑛𝑗  be the number of individuals who have 𝑗
th preference. For example, 𝑛1 and 𝑛4 are the 
numbers of individuals whose level-1 CI preferences are 𝑓1𝑓2𝑓3 and 𝑓3𝑓1𝑓2, respectively.  
From now on, the proof is similar for the ten menus in the proposition. Let us prove the case 
of 𝐹 = {𝑓𝐵, 𝑓𝐻, 𝑓𝐵𝑙} . Without loss of generality, we can assume 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓1 , 𝑓𝐻
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓2 , and 
𝑓𝐵𝑙
2 (𝐿1) = 𝑓3. With 𝑛1, … , 𝑛6, we can rephrase these conditions as follows:  
𝑓𝐵𝑜
2 (𝐿1) = 𝑓1
1: {
𝑛1 + 2𝑛2 +𝑛5 > 𝑛3 + 2𝑛4 + 𝑛6
2𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +𝑛3 > 𝑛4 + 𝑛5 + 2𝑛6
 
𝑓𝐻
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓2
1:
{
  
 
  
 {
𝑛3 + 𝑛4 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2
𝑛1 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 > 𝑛2 + 𝑛5 +𝑛6
or
{
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 > 𝑛5 + 𝑛6
𝑛3 +𝑛4 > 𝑛5 + 𝑛6
𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛5 < 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +𝑛6
 
𝑓𝐵𝑙
2 (𝐿1) = 𝑓3
1:  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(𝑛4 + 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛3 and 𝑛2 + 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛4)
or
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(𝑛3 + 𝑛4 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛5 or 𝑛4 + 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛3)
and
(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛5 > 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 + 𝑛6 or 𝑛2 +𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛3 +𝑛4) 
and
(𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛3 > 𝑛4 + 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 or 𝑛1 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 > 𝑛2 + 𝑛5 + 𝑛6)
and
𝑛4 + 𝑛5 + 2𝑛6 > 2𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛3
and
𝑛2 + 2𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 + 2𝑛3 + 𝑛4 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With elementary verification 33 , we can see that there is no non-negative integer solution 
(𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛6) for this system of inequalities. ■ 
 
                                                         
33 For actual verification, I used the function "FindInstance" in the software Mathematica.  
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Proof of Theorem 7 
I provide extra notation in (0), and then prove for three distinct cases (1), (2), and (3).  
(0) Extra Notation 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, 𝑓3} be a menu of SCFs such that:  
𝑓1: plurality rule where ties are broken in favor of individual 1,  
𝑓2: anti-plurality rule where ties are broken in favor of individual 1, and 
𝑓3: for all set 𝐴 and 𝐿 = (𝐿1, 𝐿2, … , 𝐿𝑛) ∈ ℒ(𝐴)
𝑛, 𝑓3(𝐿) is  
⋅ the greatest element for 𝐿1 among 𝑓𝑃(𝐿) if |𝑓𝑃(𝐿)| ≥ 2,  
⋅ 𝑓1(𝐿) if plurality score of some alternative is greater than 𝑛 2⁄ , and 
⋅ 𝑓2(𝐿) otherwise.  
I show that this set 𝐹  satisfies the required conditions (to confirm neutrality and difference is 
straightforward) and has the strong convergent property.  
Take any 𝐿0 ∈ ℒ(𝑋)𝑛. Note that 𝑓3(𝐿
0) is either 𝑓1(𝐿
0) or 𝑓2(𝐿
0). If 𝑓1(𝐿
0) = 𝑓2(𝐿
0), 
strong convergence is straightforward. Assume 𝑓1(𝐿
0) ≠ 𝑓2(𝐿
0) . We can label 𝐹1 = {𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3} , 
where 𝑔1(𝐿
0) = 𝑔2(𝐿
0) = 𝑥 and 𝑔3(𝐿
0) = 𝑦. Let 𝑁𝑥 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑥𝐿𝑖
0𝑦} and 𝑁𝑦 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝐿𝑖
0𝑥}. 
I denote their cardinalities as 𝑛𝑥 = |𝑁𝑥| and 𝑛𝑦 = |𝑁𝑦|. Note that we have 𝑁 = 𝑁𝑥 ∪ 𝑁𝑦 and 𝑛 =
𝑛𝑥 + 𝑛𝑦.  
 
(1) The Case of 𝒏𝒙 > 𝒏𝒚 
I show that 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑥}. To prove this, we need to show two things:  
Weak convergence: 𝐿0 weakly converges to {𝑥}, and  
Uniqueness: 𝐿0 does not weakly converge to other 𝐶′ ≠ {𝑥}.  
We prove them one by one.  
 
Weak convergence: Take 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0] such that:  
𝐿𝑖
1: 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑥.
𝐿𝑖
1: 𝑔3, 𝑔1, 𝑔2 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑦.
 
𝑛𝑥 > 𝑛𝑦, and so it follows that 𝑓1
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓2
2(𝐿1) = 𝑓3
2(𝐿2) ⊆ {𝑔1, 𝑔2}. This means that 𝐿
0 weakly 
converges to {𝑥}.  
 
Uniqueness: I inductively prove the following proposition, which implies that 𝐿0 does not weakly 
converge to 𝐶′ ≠ {𝑥}.  
 
Proposition: Assume the conditions in (0) and 𝑛𝑥 > 𝑛𝑦. For all 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, and for all sequences of CI 
profiles to level (𝑘 − 1) 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1, there exists 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹𝑘 such that 𝐶[𝑓: 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = {𝑥}.  
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Proof of the Proposition:  
If 𝑘 = 1, the proposition is straightforward from the assumption. Suppose the statement holds for 
𝑘 = 1,2,… , 𝑘0 − 1 (𝑘0 ∈ ℕ). Take any sequence of CI profiles 𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘0−1.  
(a) If every 𝑓1
𝑘0, 𝑓2
𝑘0, 𝑓3
𝑘0 has class {𝑥}, the proposition is straightforward.  
(b) Suppose two of 𝑓1
𝑘0, 𝑓2
𝑘0, 𝑓3
𝑘0, denoted ℎ1
𝑘0 and ℎ2
𝑘0, have class {𝑥} and the other one, 
denoted ℎ3
𝑘0, has class {𝑦}. For all 𝐿𝑘0 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘0−1], individuals in 𝑁𝑦 rank ℎ1
𝑘0 or ℎ2
𝑘0 
at the worst, while individuals in 𝑁𝑥  rank ℎ3
𝑘0  at the worst. 𝑛𝑥 > 𝑛𝑦 , and so it follows that 
𝑓2
𝑘0+1(𝐿𝑘0) ⊆ {ℎ1
𝑘0, ℎ2
𝑘0}.  
(c) Suppose one of 𝑓1
𝑘0 , 𝑓2
𝑘0, 𝑓3
𝑘0, denoted ℎ1
𝑘0, has class {𝑥} and the other two, denoted 
ℎ2
𝑘0 and ℎ3
𝑘0 , have class {𝑦} . For any 𝐿𝑘0 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘0−1] , individuals in 𝑁𝑦 rank ℎ2
𝑘0 or 
ℎ3
𝑘0  at the top while individuals in 𝑁𝑥  rank ℎ1
𝑘0  at the top. 𝑛𝑥 > 𝑛𝑦 , and so it follows that 
𝑓1
𝑘0+1(𝐿𝑘0) = ℎ1
𝑘0.  
 
(2) The Case of 𝒏𝒙 < 𝒏𝒚 
In this case, 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑦}.  
Weak convergence: Consider the same 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0]  defined in (1). 𝑛𝑦 > 𝑛𝑥 , and so we have 
𝑓1
2(𝐿1) = 𝑔3 and 𝑓3
2(𝐿1) = 𝑔3 . If 𝑓2
2(𝐿1) = 𝑔3 , weak convergence is straightforward. Otherwise, 
without loss of generality, we can assume 𝑓2
2(𝐿1) = 𝑔1. Let us take 𝐿
2 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0, 𝐿1] as follows:  
𝐿𝑖
2: 𝑓2, 𝑓1, 𝑓3 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑥.
𝐿𝑖
2: 𝑓1, 𝑓3, 𝑓2 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑦.
 
It follows that 𝑓1
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓2
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓3
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓1.  
 
Uniqueness: The proof can be made in the same way as in (1).  
 
(3) The Case of 𝒏𝒙 = 𝒏𝒚 
Uniqueness proof can be shown as in (1), and so I show only the proof of weak convergence.  
(a) Suppose 𝑥𝐿1
0𝑦 . In this case, 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑥} . Consider the same 𝐿1 ∈
ℒ[𝐿0] as in (1). 𝑓𝑃(𝐿
1) = {𝑔1, 𝑔3} and 𝑔1𝐿𝑖
1𝑔3, and so we have 𝑓1(𝐿
1) = 𝑔1. It also follows that 
𝑓2(𝐿
1) = 𝑓3(𝐿
1) = 𝑔1.  
(b) Suppose 𝑦𝐿1
0𝑥. In this case, 𝐿0 strongly converges to {𝑦}. Consider the same 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0] as in 
(1). It follows that 𝑓1(𝐿
0) = 𝑓3(𝐿
0) = 𝑔3 and 𝑓2(𝐿
0) = 𝑔1. Consider 𝐿
2 ∈ ℒ[𝐿0, 𝐿1] that we used in 
(2). Now, we have 𝑓1
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓2
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓3
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓1
2. This completes the proof. ■ 
 
Proof of Theorem 8 
The probability of tied outcomes at level−1 SCRs can be negligible, and so we can expect that each 
𝑓𝑃
1(𝐿0), 𝑓𝐵
1(𝐿0), 𝑓𝐴
1(𝐿0),𝜑1(𝐿0) is a singleton. If |𝐹1(𝐿0)| ≤ 2, we can apply Lemma 6 to guarantee 
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the weak convergence. Because of the definition of 𝜑, we know that 𝜑(𝐿0) ⊆ 𝑓𝑃
1(𝐿0) ∪ 𝑓𝐵
1(𝐿0) ∪
𝑓𝐴
1(𝐿0). So, we can assume |𝐹1(𝐿0)| = 3. Let 𝐹1 = {𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 𝑔3
1, 𝑔4
1}. Without loss of generality, we 
can assume 𝑔1
1(𝐿0) = 𝑔2
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥1}, 𝑔3
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥2}, and 𝑔4
1(𝐿0) = {𝑥3}.  
 Let 𝐿1 ∈ ℒ1[𝐿0] be such that everyone ranks 𝑔1
1 above 𝑔2
1. Note that the probability of 
tied outcomes by some of 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝜑2  can be also negligible. So, we can expect that 
𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1), 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1), 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1),𝜑2(𝐿1) are also singletons. It is simple to see that there are six types of 
preference in 𝐿1 . Let 𝑛1, … , 𝑛6  be the number of individuals who have each specific type of 
preference as follows:  
𝑛1 individuals: 𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 𝑔3
1, 𝑔4
1 
𝑛2 individuals: 𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 𝑔3
1, 𝑔4
1 
𝑛3 individuals: 𝑔3
1, 𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 𝑔4
1 
𝑛4 individuals: 𝑔3
1, 𝑔4
1, 𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1 
𝑛5 individuals: 𝑔4
1, 𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 𝑔3
1 
𝑛6 individuals: 𝑔4
1, 𝑔3
1, 𝑔1
1, 𝑔2
1, 
where 𝑛 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 + 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 + 𝑛5 +𝑛6 . Note also that if |𝐹
2(𝐿1)| ≤ 2 , then Lemma 6 again 
guarantees the weak convergence. So, we assume that |𝐹2(𝐿1)| = 3. At this time, 𝜑2(𝐿1) is either 
𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) or 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1). We can also expect 𝑛𝑖 > 0 for 𝑖 = 1,2,3,4,5,6 when 𝑛 → ∞, and so we have 
that 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔1
1}. Now, we have only two possibilities:  
(1) 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = 𝜑2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1}, 𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔4
1}, and 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔1
1}, or 
(2) 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1}, 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = 𝜑2(𝐿1) = {𝑔4
1}, and 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔1
1}.  
 
(1) The case of 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = 𝜑2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1}, 𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔4
1}, and 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔1
1}. 
Let 𝐿2 ∈ (ℒ(𝐹2))
𝑛
 be as follows:  
𝑛1 individuals: 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝑃
2. 
𝑛2 individuals: 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2. 
𝑛3 individuals: 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝑃
2. 
𝑛4 individuals: 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝑓𝐴
2. 
𝑛5 individuals: 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2. 
𝑛6 individuals: 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝐴
2. 
Clearly, we have 𝐿2 ∈ ℒ2[𝐿0, 𝐿1].  
𝑛1, … , 𝑛6 are positive, and so we obtain that 𝑓𝐴
3(𝐿2) = {𝑓𝐵
2} . 𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔4
1} , and so the plurality 
score of 𝑔4
1 is greater than those of 𝑔1
1 and 𝑔3
1:  
{
𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛1 +𝑛2.
𝑛5 + 𝑛6 > 𝑛3 + 𝑛4.
 
This also shows that the plurality score of 𝑓𝑃
2 is greater than those of 𝑓𝐴
2 and 𝑓𝐵
2 at 𝐿2. Hence, we 
have that 𝑓𝑃
3(𝐿2) = {𝑓𝑃
2}. Next, we show that 𝑓𝐵
3(𝐿2) = {𝑓𝐵
2}.  
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Because 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1}, the Borda scores at 𝐿1 are as follows:  
𝑠𝐵(𝑔3
1) > 𝑠𝐵(𝑔1
1) ⇔ 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
𝑛6 +
1
3
𝑛1 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +
2
3
(𝑛3 + 𝑛5) +
1
3
(𝑛4 + 𝑛6). 
𝑠𝐵(𝑔3
1) > 𝑠𝐵(𝑔4
1) ⇔ 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
𝑛6 +
1
3
𝑛1 > 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 +
2
3
𝑛4 +
1
3
𝑛2. 
At 𝐿2, we have: 
𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝑃
2) = 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 +
2
3
𝑛2 +
1
3
𝑛4.
𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐵
2) = 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
(𝑛1 + 𝑛6) +
1
3
(𝑛2 + 𝑛5).
𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐴
2) = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +
2
3
𝑛5 +
1
3
𝑛3.
𝑠𝐵(𝜑
2) < 𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐵
2).
 
These equations show that 𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐵
2) > max{𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝑃
2), 𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐴
2), 𝑠𝐵(𝜑
2)}.  
 
(2) The case of 𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1}, 𝑓𝑃
2(𝐿1) = 𝜑(𝐿1) = {𝑔4
1}, and 𝑓𝐴
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔1
1}. 
𝑓𝐵
2(𝐿1) = {𝑔3
1}, and so the score of 𝑔3
1 at 𝐿1 is strictly greater than those of 𝑔1
1 and 𝑔4
1. Formally, 
we have that:  
 
𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
𝑛6 +
1
3
𝑛1 > 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +
2
3
(𝑛3 + 𝑛5) +
1
3
(𝑛4 +𝑛6). 
𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
𝑛6 +
1
3
𝑛1 > 𝑛5 +𝑛6 +
2
3
𝑛4 +
1
3
𝑛2. 
(3)    
Let 𝐿2 ∈ ℒ2[𝐿0, 𝐿1] be such that: 
𝑛1 individuals: 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝜑2. 
𝑛2 individuals: 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝐵
2. 
𝑛3 individuals: 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝜑2. 
𝑛4 individuals: 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝐴
2. 
𝑛5 individuals: 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝐵
2. 
𝑛6 individuals: 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝜑2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝑓𝐴
2. 
In words, this is a consequentially induced preference where everyone ranks 𝑓𝑃
2 above 𝜑2. Similar 
to (1), we can check that 𝑓𝑃
3(𝐿2) = 𝑓𝐴
3(𝐿2) = {𝑓𝑃
2} . Furthermore, the scores of 𝑓𝐴
2, 𝑓𝑃
2, 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝜑2 
evaluated by 𝑓𝐵
3 are as follows:  
𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐴
2) = 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +
2
3
𝑛3 +
1
3
𝑛5. 
𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐵
2) = 𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
𝑛1 +
1
3
𝑛6. 
𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝑃
2) = 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 +
2
3
(𝑛2 +𝑛4) +
1
3
(𝑛1 + 𝑛3). 
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With (1) we have that 𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐵
2) > 𝑠𝐵(𝑓𝐴
2). Note that ties between 𝑓𝐵
2, 𝑓𝑃
2 occur only if  
𝑛3 + 𝑛4 +
2
3
𝑛1 +
1
3
𝑛6 = 𝑛5 + 𝑛6 +
2
3
(𝑛2 + 𝑛4) +
1
3
(𝑛1 + 𝑛3). 
This event can be negligible as 𝑛 → ∞. ■ 
 
Proof of Theorem 9 
Let 𝐹 = {𝑓1, 𝑓2, … , 𝑓𝑀} be a menu of 𝑀 ≥ 3 concave scoring rules. Define 𝐸 = {𝐸1, 𝐸2, … , 𝐸𝜇} 
and 𝐶 = {𝑐𝑓,𝑗│𝑓 ∈ 𝐸 ∪ 𝐶 and 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑟}, where 𝑐𝑓,𝑗 is a voting rule such that 
𝑐𝑓,𝑗(𝐿: 𝑋) ≔ {
𝐺(𝐿1, 𝑋) if |{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝐿𝑖 = 𝐿1}| = 𝑗, 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑓(𝐿: 𝑋) otherwise.
 
The probability of the event |{𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝐿𝑖 = 𝐿1}| = 𝑗  is negligible as 𝑛 → ∞ , and so each 
𝑐𝑓,1, 𝑐𝑓,2, … , 𝑐𝑓,𝑟 is asymptotically the same as 𝑓. In this sense, 𝐶 is a set of pseudo-copies of the 
elements in 𝐹 ∪ 𝐸. We show that 𝐺 ≔ 𝐹 ∪ 𝐸 ∪ 𝐶 has the asymptotically weak convergent property 
for 𝜇 and 𝑟 such that 𝑟 ≥ 𝜇 ≫ 𝑀. The proof is made up of several steps.  
 
Step 1: To Prove the Following Statement 
Let 𝑘 ≥ 1. Let 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 be a sequence of CI profiles to level (𝑘 − 1). Suppose:  
(1) {𝐶𝑔[𝐿
0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1]│𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑘} = {{𝑦1}, {𝑦2},… , {𝑦𝑚}},  
(2) 𝑐𝑓,𝑗(𝐿
𝑘−1) = 𝑓(𝐿𝑘−1) for all 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 ∪ 𝐸 and 𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝑟, and 
(3) {𝑗∗} = argmax
𝑗∈{1,2,…,𝑚}
|𝑈𝑗|, where for all 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑚,  
𝑈𝑗 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑦𝑗𝐿𝑖
0𝑦 for all 𝑦 ∈ {𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚}}. 
Then there exists 𝐿𝑘 ∈ ℒ𝑘[𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] such that  
𝐶𝐸𝑒𝑘+1[𝐿
0,… , 𝐿𝑘−1, 𝐿𝑘] = {𝑦𝑗∗} for all 𝐸𝑒
𝑘+1 ∈ 𝐸𝑘+1. 
 
Proof of the Statement 
For each 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚, let us define some extra notation: let 𝑢𝑗 ≔ |𝑈𝑗| be the cardinality of each 
𝑈𝑗. Let 𝐺𝑗 ≔ {𝑔 ∈ 𝐺
𝑘│𝐶𝑔[𝐿
0, … , 𝐿𝑘−1] = {𝑦𝑗}} be the set of level-𝑘 voting rules whose class is 𝑦𝑗 
and let 𝑏𝑗 ≔ |𝐺𝑗| be the cardinality of 𝐺𝑗 . We label each element of 𝐺𝑗  as 
𝐺𝑗 = {𝑔𝑗,1, 𝑔𝑗,2, … , 𝑔𝑗,𝑏𝑗}. 
Without loss of generality, we can assume 𝑗∗ = 1. Next, we define a profile 𝐿𝑘 = (𝐿1
𝑘, 𝐿2
𝑘 , … , 𝐿𝑛
𝑘 ) ∈
(ℒ(𝐺𝑘))
𝑛
 through five steps:  
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(a) Preferences on 𝐺𝑗∗(= 𝐺1).  
For all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, let 
𝐿𝑖
𝑘│𝐺𝑗∗: 𝑔𝑗∗,1, 𝑔𝑗∗,2, … , 𝑔𝑗∗,𝑏𝑗∗ . 
 
(b) Re-Label Individuals 
There are 𝑚! possible preferences over {𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚} . Suppose we array them in lexicographic 
order (in terms of the subscripts) and denote them as the 1st, 2nd, … , (𝑚!)th preferences. For example, 
the 1st preference is 𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚−1, 𝑦𝑚, the second is 𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚 , 𝑦𝑚−1, and the (𝑚!)
th (last) 
one is 𝑦𝑚 , 𝑦𝑚−1, … , 𝑦1. For each 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚, let 𝑁𝑗 denote the set of individuals who have the 
𝑗th preference over {𝑦1, 𝑦2, … , 𝑦𝑚}. Let 𝑛𝑗 = |𝑁𝑗| be its cardinality. Let us re-label individuals as 
follows: 𝑁1 = {𝑖1, 𝑖2, … , 𝑖𝑛1}. For each 𝑗 ∈ {2,3,… ,𝑚}, let  
𝑁𝑗 = {𝑖𝑛1+𝑛2+⋯+𝑛𝑗−1+1, 𝑖𝑛1+𝑛2+⋯+𝑛𝑗−1+2,… , 𝑖𝑛1+𝑛2+⋯+𝑛𝑗−1+𝑛𝑗}. 
Note that 𝑁1,𝑁2, … , 𝑁𝑚! gives a partition of 𝑁.  
 
(c) Define Permutations on 𝐺𝑗 .  
For each 𝑗 = 2,3,… ,𝑚, let 𝜎𝑗: 𝐺𝑗 → 𝐺𝑗  be a permutation on 𝐺𝑗  such that  
𝜎𝑗(𝑔𝑗,𝑝) = {
𝑔𝑗,𝑝+1 if 1 ≤ 𝑝 < 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝑔𝑗,1 if 𝑝 = 𝑏𝑗.
 
As usual, we denote 𝜎𝑗
𝑞 = 𝜎𝑗 ∘ 𝜎𝑗 ∘ ⋯∘ 𝜎𝑗  (𝑞 times) for each positive integer 𝑞. We interpret 𝜎𝑗
0 as 
the identity. 
 
(d) Preferences on 𝐺𝑗 ≠ 𝐺𝑗∗.  
For each 𝑝 = 1,2,… , 𝑛 and 𝑗 = 2,3, … ,𝑚, let 
𝐿𝑖𝑝
𝑘 │𝐺𝑗 : 𝜎𝑗
𝑝−1(𝑔𝑗,1), 𝜎𝑗
𝑝−1(𝑔𝑗,2),… , 𝜎𝑗
𝑝−1 (𝑔𝑗,𝑏𝑗). 
 
(e) Preferences Between 𝐺𝑗  and 𝐺𝑗′ .  
For all distinct 𝑗, 𝑗′ ∈ {1,2,… ,𝑚}, 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑗 , and 𝑔
′ ∈ 𝐺𝑗′, let  
𝑔𝐿𝑖
𝑘𝑔′ ⇔ 𝑦𝑗𝐿𝑖
0𝑦𝑗′. 
 
Now, let us confirm that 𝐸1
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘),𝐸2
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘),⋯ , 𝐸𝜇
𝑘+1(𝐿𝑘) ⊆ 𝐺1
𝑘 . Condition (2) demands that each 
𝑏1, 𝑏2, … , 𝑏𝑟 is at least as large as 1 + 𝑟, because at least one element in 𝐹 ∪ 𝐸 has class 𝑦𝑗 and 𝑟 
copies yield the same outcome as theirs. Recall that we assumed 𝜇 ≤ 𝑟. 𝐸𝑒 (1 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 𝜇) looks only 
at the first, second, …, 𝑒th position in the preference profile, and so it follows that voters in 𝑈𝑗 
assign positive scores only to elements in 𝐺𝑗
𝑘 at 𝐿𝑘. Therefore, we have that for all 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚 
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and 𝑔𝑗 ∈ 𝐺𝑗 ,  
𝑠(𝑔𝑗) ≤ 𝑢𝑗. 
It is straightforward from (a) that 𝑠(𝑔1,1) = 𝑢1. 𝑢1 is, by definition, the largest among 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑚, 
and so we have 
𝑠(𝑔1,1) = 𝑢1 > max
𝑗≠1,𝑔𝑗∈𝐺𝑗
𝑠(𝑔𝑗). 
This completes the proof of step 1.  
 
In general, the proof process above determines the way we design 𝐿𝑘 in the face of 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿𝑘−1 
under conditions (1), (2), and (3). From now on, I denote by 𝐿∗𝑘 such a profile 𝐿𝑘.  
 
Step 2: Asymptotic Consequence of step 1 
Let us define the effective number (of alternatives) {𝑚𝑘}𝑘=0,1,…,|𝐺|  inductively. Intuitively, 𝑚𝑘 
represents the number of classes at level 𝑘.  
First, let 𝑚0 ≔ |𝑋|. When 𝑛 → ∞, the probability of a tied outcome by some SCR in 𝐺 is 
negligible. Hence, we accept that condition (1) holds when 𝑘 = 1. In a similar way, we can check that 
conditions (2) and (3) also hold when 𝑘 = 1 as 𝑛 → ∞. Hence, we can infer that 𝐿∗1 is well-defined. 
Suppose 𝐿∗𝑘 is well-defined for 𝑘 = 0,1,… , ?̅?. Again, we can infer that the probability that any of 
the conditions (1), (2), or (3) breaks is negligible as 𝑛 → ∞. Therefore, inductively we can say that if 
?̅? is finite, we can design 𝐿0, 𝐿1, … , 𝐿?̅? so that each condition (1), (2), and (3) holds till level ?̅?.  
Now, let 𝑚𝑘  be the value of 𝑚  determined at level 𝑘 = 1,2, … , ?̅? . Clearly, the sequence 
𝑚0,𝑚1, … ,𝑚|𝐺|  is decreasing, i.e., 𝑀 = 𝑚0 ≥ 𝑚1 ≥ 𝑚2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝑚|𝐺| ≥ 1  and 𝑚1 ≤ |𝐺| . If 
𝑚|𝐺| = 1 , it directly means convergence. Suppose 𝑚|𝐺| ≥ 2 . It follows that |𝐺|  integers 
𝑚1, … ,𝑚|𝐺| are between 2 and |𝐺|. Therefore, there exists 𝑘1 ∈ {1,2,… , |𝐺|} such that 𝑚𝑘1−1 =
𝑚𝑘1.  
 
Step 3: Classes of Level-𝒌𝟏 Voting Rules 
For simplicity, let 𝑘 = 𝑘1 and 𝑚 = 𝑚𝑘 throughout this step. Based on the discussion in step 2, we 
have that: 
(1’) {𝐶𝑔[𝐿
0, 𝐿∗1, … , 𝐿∗𝑘−1]│𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑘} = {{𝑧1}, {𝑧2},… , {𝑧𝑚}}, 
(2’) 𝑐𝑓,𝑗(𝐿
∗𝑘−1) = 𝑓(𝐿∗𝑘−1) for all 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 ∪ 𝐸 and 𝑗 = 1,2,… , 𝑟, and 
(3’) {|𝑇𝑗∗|} = argmax{|𝑇1|, |𝑇2|,… , |𝑇𝑚|}, where for all 𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑚,  
𝑇𝑗 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ 𝑁│𝑧𝑗𝐿𝑖
0𝑧 for all 𝑧 ∈ {𝑧1, 𝑧2, … , 𝑧𝑚}}. 
For each 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚 , let 𝐺𝑗
𝑘 ≔ {𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑘│𝐶𝑔[𝐿
0, 𝐿∗1, … , 𝐿∗𝑘−1] = {𝑧𝑗}} and 𝑎𝑗 ≔ |𝐺𝑗| . We also 
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denote by 𝑡𝑗 the cardinality of 𝑇𝑗 . Without loss of generality, we can assume again that |𝑇1| >
|𝑇2|,… , |𝑇𝑚|. Furthermore, step 1 shows that the elements in 𝐸 and its copies are all in 𝐺1
𝑘. Therefore, 
we have 𝑎1 ≥ 𝜇(1 + 𝑟) and 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑚 ≤ 𝑀(1 + 𝑟).  
Take arbitrary concave score assignments [𝑠1
|𝐺|, 𝑠2
|𝐺|, … , 𝑠|𝐺|
|𝐺|] and calculate the score of each 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑘 
evaluated by this 𝑓 at 𝐿∗𝑘. For simplicity, we write 𝑠𝑗 instead of 𝑠𝑗
𝑚 (𝑗 = 1,2,… ,𝑚) throughout 
this step.  
First, we consider the score of 𝑔1,1
𝑘 . Note that voters in |𝑇1| rank 𝑔1,1
𝑘  at the first position 
and the other voters rank 𝑔1,1
𝑘  at least at the (𝑎2 + 𝑎3 +⋯+ 𝑎𝑚 + 1)
th position. Hence, we have 
that  
𝑠(𝑔1,1
𝑘 ) ≥ 𝑠1 ⋅ |𝑇1| +∑𝑠𝑎2+𝑎3+⋯+𝑎𝑚+1 ⋅ |𝑇𝑗|
𝑚
𝑗=2
. 
Take any 𝑔𝜆 ∈ 𝐺𝜆
𝑘 (2 ≤ 𝜆 ≤ 𝑚) and let us evaluate its score 𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘). Because of the recipe for 𝐿∗𝑘, 
we can infer that the scores of the elements in 𝐺𝜆
𝑘 do not vary much from each other. Indeed, we have 
the following proposition.  
 
Proposition. Take any 𝑗 ∈ {2,3,… ,𝑚}  and 𝑔, 𝑔′ ∈ 𝐺𝑗
𝑘 . Then we have |𝑠(𝑔) − 𝑠(𝑔′)| ≤ |𝐺|!  at 
𝐿∗𝑘.  
Proof. Let us introduce some extra notation. For any 𝐴 ⊆ 𝑁 and ℎ ∈ 𝐺𝑘 , let 𝑠(𝑔:𝐴) be the score 
of ℎ from 𝐴. Formally,  
𝑠(ℎ: 𝐴) = ∑𝑠𝑥 ⋅ 𝑅𝑥(ℎ:𝐴)
|𝐺|
𝑥=1
 
Here, we denote by 𝑅𝑥(ℎ: 𝐴) the number of individuals in 𝐴 who rank ℎ at the 𝑥
th position. With 
this notion, we can develop the score of 𝑔 as follows:  
𝑠(ℎ) =∑𝑠(ℎ:𝑁𝑗)
𝑚!
𝑗=1
. 
Because of this equation (and 𝑚 ≤ |𝐺|), we have only to prove the following: that for each 𝑝 =
1,2,… ,𝑚! , |𝑠(𝑔: 𝑁𝑝) − 𝑠(𝑔
′: 𝑁𝑝)| ≤ |𝐺| . Take any 𝑁𝑝 ∈ {𝑁1,𝑁2, 𝑁3,… ,𝑁𝑚!} . Dividing 𝑛𝑝  by 
|𝐺𝑗|, we have 
𝑛𝑝 = 𝛼|𝐺𝑗| + 𝛽 
where 𝛼 ∈ ℕ ∪ {0} and 0 ≤ 𝛽 < |𝐺𝑗|. For simplicity, let 𝑣𝑗 ≔ 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +⋯+ 𝑛𝑗−1. First, look at 
individuals 𝐼 ≔ {𝑖𝑣𝑗+1, 𝑖𝑣𝑗+2,⋯ , 𝑖𝑣𝑗+𝛼|𝐺𝑗|}. Recall that their level-𝑘 CI preferences are the same over 
𝐺𝑘 ∖ 𝐺𝑗
𝑘 and  
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𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑗+1
𝑘 │𝐺𝑗𝑘
: 𝜎
𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+1)−1(𝑔𝑗,1), 𝜎𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+1)−1(𝑔𝑗,2),… , 𝜎𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+1)−1 (𝑔𝑗,𝑎𝑗) 
𝐿𝑖𝑣𝑗+2
𝑘 │𝐺𝑗𝑘
: 𝜎
𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+2)−1(𝑔𝑗,1), 𝜎𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+2)−1(𝑔𝑗,2),… , 𝜎𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+2)−1 (𝑔𝑗,𝑎𝑗) 
⋮ 
𝐿𝑖
𝑣𝑗+𝛼|𝐺𝑗|
𝑘 │𝐺𝑗𝑘
: 𝜎
𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+𝛼|𝐺𝑗|)−1(𝑔𝑗,1), 𝜎𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+𝛼|𝐺𝑗|)−1(𝑔𝑗,2),… , 𝜎𝑗
(𝑖𝑣𝑗+𝛼|𝐺𝑗|)−1 (𝑔𝑗,𝑎𝑗). 
Because 𝜎𝑗
|𝐺| = 𝜎𝑗
0 (identity), we can see the symmetry between elements, i.e., each element 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝑗  
appears at each rank with exactly the same frequency. Hence, we have 
𝑠(𝑔: 𝐼) = 𝑠(𝑔′: 𝐼). 
Therefore,  
|𝑠(𝑔: 𝑁𝑝) − 𝑠(𝑔
′: 𝑁𝑝)| = |{𝑠(𝑔: 𝐼) + 𝑠(𝑔:𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼)} − {𝑠(𝑔
′: 𝐼) + 𝑠(𝑔′: 𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼)}|
= |𝑠(𝑔:𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼) − 𝑠(𝑔
′: 𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼)|.
 
For any individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁 and any ℎ, ℎ′ ∈ 𝐺𝑗 , we have (by the definition of a scoring rule): 
|𝑠(ℎ, {𝑖}) − 𝑠(ℎ′, {𝑖})| ≤ 1. 
Using this, we have 
|𝑠(𝑔:𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼) − 𝑠(𝑔
′: 𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼)| ≤ ∑ |𝑠(𝑔: {𝑖}) − 𝑠(𝑔
′: {𝑖})|
𝑖∈𝑁𝑝∖𝐼
≤ |𝑁𝑝 ∖ 𝐼|
= 𝛽 < |𝐺𝑗|.
 
This completes the proof of the proposition. ■ 
 
For each 𝑗 ≠ 𝜆, voters in 𝑇𝑗 rank 𝑔𝜆 at the 𝑎𝑗 + 1
th or lower position, because such voters rank 
the elements of 𝐺𝑗
𝑘 at the 1st, 2nd,… , 𝑎𝑗
th positions. On the other hand, voters in 𝑇𝜆 rank 𝑔𝜆
𝑘 at the 
1st or lower position. Therefore, we can evaluate 𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘) as follows:  
𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘) <
1
𝑎𝜆
{(𝑠1 + 𝑠2 +⋯+ 𝑠𝑎𝜆) ⋅ |𝑇𝜆| +∑(𝑠𝑎𝑗+1 + 𝑠𝑎𝑗+2 +⋯+ 𝑠𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆) ⋅ |𝑇𝑗|
𝑚
𝑗≠𝜆
} + |𝐺|!. 
For each 𝑤1, 𝑤2 ∈ ℕ such that 𝑤1 < 𝑤2, we write for simplicity 
𝑎𝑝~𝑞 = 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑎𝑝+1 +⋯+ 𝑎𝑞 . 
𝑠𝑝~𝑞 = 𝑠𝑝 + 𝑠𝑝+1 +⋯+ 𝑠𝑝+𝑞 . 
Now the difference between 𝑠(𝑔1,1
𝑘 ) and 𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘) can be evaluated as follows:  
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𝑠(𝑔1,1
𝑘 ) − 𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘) > (𝑠1 −
𝑠(𝑎1+1)~(𝑎1+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
) ⋅ |𝑇1| + (𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
) ⋅ |𝑇𝜆|
+{∑ (𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠(𝑎𝑗+1)~(𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
) ⋅ |𝑇𝑗|
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
}− |𝐺|!.
 
 
Recall that |𝑇1| is assumed to be the largest among |𝑇1|, |𝑇2|,… , |𝑇𝑚|. Note also that the coefficients 
of |𝑇𝜆| and |𝑇𝑗| for 𝑗 ≠ 1, 𝜆 are non-positive, because 𝑠1, 𝑠2, … is, by definition, a decreasing 
sequence. Therefore, we have that 
𝑠(𝑔1,1
𝑘 ) − 𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘) > (𝑠1 −
𝑠(𝑎1+1)~(𝑎1+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
) ⋅ |𝑇1| + (𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
) ⋅ |𝑇1|
 +{∑ (𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠(𝑎𝑗+1)~(𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
) ⋅ |𝑇1|
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
}− |𝐺|!
≥  (𝑠1 −
𝑠(𝑎1+1)~(𝑎1+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
+ 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
+ ∑ (𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠(𝑎𝑗+1)~(𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
)
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
−
|𝐺|!
|𝑇1|
) ⋅ |𝑇1|.
 
 
In the next step, I show that the right-hand side is non-negative for any concave score assignment 
[𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|]. Once that is shown, the proof of Theorem 9 is complete, because 𝑠(𝑔1,1
𝑘 ) − 𝑠(𝑔𝜆
𝑘) >
0 (for any concave score assignment) implies that any concave voting rule in 𝐺𝑘+1 would choose a 
subset of 𝐺1
𝑘. This means convergence to {𝑥1} at level (𝑘 + 1).  
 
Step 4: Prove the Inequality 
Let 𝐻(𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|) be the coefficient part of |𝑇1| in the last inequality, i.e.,  
𝐻(𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|)
≔ 𝑠1 −
𝑠(𝑎1+1)~(𝑎1+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
+ 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
+ ∑ (𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 −
𝑠(𝑎𝑗+1)~(𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆)
𝑎𝜆
)
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
−
|𝐺|!
|𝑇1|
. 
I will show that 𝐻(𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|) ≥ 0 for all [𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|] ∈ 𝒞|𝐺|. To show this, let 𝑡 ≔ 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1. 
Let 𝒟𝑡 ⊆ 𝒞|𝐺| be the set of score assignments in 𝒞|𝐺| such that 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 = 𝑡. Because of Proposition 
2, we have  
𝒞|𝐺| = ⋃ 𝒟𝑡
𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1
𝐵 ≤𝑡≤1
. 
We also define:  
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?̃?𝑡(𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚 , 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+2,… , 𝑠|𝐺|)
≔ 𝐻(𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚 , 𝑡, 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|) 
= 1 + (𝑚 − 1)𝑡 −
𝑠𝑎1+1~𝑎1+𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
−
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
− ∑ (
𝑠𝑎𝑗+1~𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
)
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
−
|𝐺|
|𝑇𝑗|
. 
(4)    
 
In words, ?̃?𝑡 is a (|𝐺| − 1)-variable function that is generated from 𝐻 by regarding 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1 = 𝑡 
as a fixed parameter. For simplicity, we write this combination of |𝐺| − 1 elements as [𝑠𝑗]𝑗≠𝑎2~𝑚+1
.  
Let  
𝑙1(𝑥) = −
1 − 𝑡
𝑎2~𝑚
(𝑥 − 1) + 1 
be the equation of the straight line passing through (1,1) and (𝑎2~𝑚 + 1, 𝑡) . Let 𝑒1 ≔ 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚 −
𝑙1(𝑎2~𝑚)(> 0), and define 
𝑙2(𝑥) ≔ −(𝑠𝑎2~𝑚 − 𝑡)(𝑥 − 𝑎2~𝑚 − 1) + 𝑡 
as the equation of the straight line passing through (𝑎2~𝑚, 𝑠𝑎2~𝑚+1) and (𝑎2~𝑚 + 1, 𝑡). Because of 
the concavity of (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺|), we have that 𝑠𝑥 ≤ 𝑙2(𝑥) for all 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎2~𝑚.  
Let  
𝑒2 ≔ max
𝑥∈[1,𝑎2~𝑚]
{min{𝑙2(𝑥), 1} − 𝑙1(𝑥)}. 
Because of concavity, we have that 𝑠𝑥 ≤ 𝑙2(𝑥) for all 𝑎1 + 1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑎1 + 𝑎𝜆.  
Next, consider [𝑠𝑗
∗]
𝑗≠𝑎2~𝑚+1
∈ 𝒟𝑡 such that  
𝑠𝑥
∗ ≔ {
𝑙1(𝑥) if 𝑥 ≠ |𝐺|.
0 if 𝑥 = |𝐺|.
 
It is straightforward to check that this [𝑠𝑗
∗]
𝑗≠𝑎2~𝑚+1
 is in 𝒟𝑡. Let  
𝑒3 ≔ 𝑠𝑎1+𝜉
∗ − 𝑙2(𝑎𝜉 + 1) (𝜉 = 1,2, … , 𝑎𝜆). 
Then we have  
𝑒3 ≥
𝑎1 + 1 − (𝑎2~𝑚 + 1)
𝑎2~𝑚 + 1 − 𝑥𝑒
⋅ 𝑒2 ≥
𝑎1 − 𝑎2~𝑚
𝑎2~𝑚
⋅ 𝑒2. 
When 𝑎1 ≫ 𝑎2~𝑚, we have 𝑒3 ≥ (𝑚− 1) ⋅ 𝑒2. This means that the middle three terms in equation 
(4) :  
−
𝑠𝑎1+1~𝑎1+𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
−
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
− ∑ (
𝑠𝑎𝑗+1~𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆
𝑎𝜆
)
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
 
have their minimum value at [𝑠𝑗
∗]
𝑗≠𝑎2~𝑚+1
 and therefore, ?̃?𝑡 has its minimum value when all the 
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𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠|𝐺| are on 𝑙1(𝑥). Let 𝑠|𝐺|
∗ = 0. 𝑠1
∗, 𝑠2
∗, … , 𝑠|𝐺|−1
∗  is a sequence of numbers with common 
difference, and so we have:  
𝐻(𝑠1
∗, … , 𝑠|𝐺|
∗ ) = 1 + (𝑚 − 1)𝑡 −
𝑠𝑎1+1~𝑎1+𝑎𝜆
∗
𝑎𝜆
−
𝑠1~𝑎𝜆
∗
𝑎𝜆
− ∑ (
𝑠𝑎𝑗+1~𝑎𝑗+𝑎𝜆
∗
𝑎𝜆
)
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
−
|𝐺|!
|𝑇1|
= 1 + (𝑚 − 1)𝑡 − ℎ (𝑎1 +
1 + 𝑎𝜆
2
) − ℎ (
1 + 𝑎𝜆
2
) − ∑ ℎ(𝑎𝑗 +
1 + 𝑎𝜆
2
)
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆
−
|𝐺|!
|𝑇1|
= (1 − 𝑡) [1 −𝑚+
𝑎1 + (∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑚
𝑗≠1,𝜆 ) +
𝑚
2
(𝑎𝜆 − 1)
𝑎2~𝑚
] −
|𝐺|!
|𝑇1|
.
 
If 𝑡 = 1, the proof of 𝐻(𝑠1
∗, … , 𝑠|𝐺|
∗ ) > 0 is trivial. Suppose 𝑡 < 1. Then, if 𝑎1 is sufficiently large, 
the equation denoted by [⋯ ] can be large enough to make 𝐻(𝑠1
∗, … , 𝑠|𝐺|
∗ ) positive. ■ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2 
Let us first confirm that 𝑝𝛼 defined above is actually a scoring rule. To see this, we need to check 
that 𝑠1
𝑚 = 1, 𝑠𝑚
𝑚 = 0, and that 𝑠1
𝑚 , 𝑠2
𝑚 , … , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚 is decreasing.  
𝑠1
𝑚 = 1 − (
1 − 1
𝑚 − 1
)
𝛼
= 1, and 
𝑠𝑚
𝑚 = 1 − (
𝑚 − 1
𝑚 − 1
)
α
= 0. 
Let 
ℎ(𝑥) ≔ 1 − (
𝑥 − 1
𝑚− 1
)
𝛼
. 
This function is clearly decreasing, and so we have 𝑠1
𝑚 = ℎ(1), 𝑠2
𝑚 = ℎ(2),… , 𝑠𝑚
𝑚 = ℎ(𝑚) is also 
decreasing.  
Next, we show that 𝑝𝛼 is concave. By taking the second derivative of ℎ(𝑥), we have  
ℎ′′(𝑥) = −
𝛼(𝛼 − 1)
(𝑚 − 1)𝛼
(𝑥 − 1)𝛼−2 ≤ 0. 
This shows that is ℎ(𝑥) concave. Therefore, 𝑝𝛼 is concave. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
It will be sufficient to show a proof for (3) 𝜑𝑃, because the other cases are straightforward.  
 WPU and NU: It is obvious that 𝜑𝑃 satisfies WPU; I will show that 𝜑𝑃 also satisfies NU. 
Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 0. Because abstention is not allowed, there must be 
an individual 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? that has a score of at least two. Hence, we can say that 𝑖 ∉ 𝐹𝒩 ∪ 𝑆𝒩, which 
implies 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩).  
 IMP: Take any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and ballot profiles 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖),𝒩
′ = (𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔑. 
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1) The Case of 𝒊 ∈ 𝑭𝓝. It follows that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩), and we will show 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
′). Note 
that for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≤ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) + 1, where the equality holds only if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖
′. So, we have either 
𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩′  or [𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝒩′ and 𝐹𝒩′ ⊆ 𝑁𝑖
′]. Thus, 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
′).  
2) The Case of 𝒊 ∉ 𝑭𝓝. Let us first consider the case of 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩). It follows that 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝒩 
and 𝐹𝒩 ⊆ 𝑁𝑖 . These statements show that for any 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? , 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≤ 𝑠𝐹𝒩(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) + 1 =
𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) + 1. Indeed, 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) = 𝑠𝐹𝒩(𝒩) holds only if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖
′. Thus, we have again either 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩′ 
or [𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝒩′ and 𝐹𝒩′ ⊆ 𝑁𝑖
′], either of which implies 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
′). 
  Next, consider the case of 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩). I will show that 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
′). Because 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩), 
there is an individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} such that either (a) 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≥ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) + 2 or (b) 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) +
1 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
′. In the case of (a), it is clear that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≥ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) − 1 ≥ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) + 1 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) + 1, 
where 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) − 1 holds only if 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
′. So, we have 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
′). In the case of (b), we 
have 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≥ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) + 1 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) + 1, where the equality in the first inequality holds 
only if 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
′. Again, we can say that 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
′).  
 Non-2CN: Here I will use a counterexample. Consider a ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁1,… ,𝑁𝑛) ∈
𝔑1 ⊆ 𝔑 (the following proof holds for both settings (𝔑, ?̅?) and (𝔑1, ?̅?)) as follows: 
𝑁1 = {3},𝑁2 = {1}, and 
𝑁𝑖 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1,2}. 
Then we have 𝑠1(𝒩) = 2 , 𝑠2(𝒩) = 0 , 𝑠3(𝒩) = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑛(𝒩) = 1 , 𝐹𝒩 = {1}  and 𝑆𝒩 = ?̅? ∖
{1,3}. Furthermore, we have 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = {1,2, 𝑛}. Now consider a transposed ballot profile 𝒩
σ, where 
𝜎 = (2,3). In this case we have 𝐹𝒩𝜎 = {1} and 𝑆𝒩𝜎 = ?̅? ∖ {1,2}. Because 1 ∉ 𝑁3, we have 3 ∉
𝜑𝑃(𝒩
𝜎), whereas 2CN demands that 3 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩
𝜎).  
AB: It follows from Theorems 1 and 2 of Tamura and Ohseto (2014) that 𝜑𝑃 does not 
satisfy AB under (𝔑1, ?̅?) if 𝑛 ≥ 4. In fact, we can generalize their result as follows: 
1) 𝜑𝑃 satisfies AB if 𝑛 = 3 both under (𝔑, ?̅?) and (𝔑
1, ?̅?). 
2) 𝜑𝑃 satisfies AB if 𝑛 ≥ 4 both under (𝔑, ?̅?) and (𝔑
1, ?̅?). 
Note that the following proof applies for both settings. 
 1) If 𝒏 = 𝟑, 𝝋𝑷 satisfies AB. Take any two ballot profiles 𝒩,ℳ ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠(𝒩) =
𝑠(ℳ). I will show that 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝜑(ℳ). Let 𝑡 ≔ #{𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ) = 2}.  
a) The case of 𝑡 = 3. We have 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = 𝜑𝑃(ℳ) = ?̅?, because 𝐹𝒩 = 𝐹ℳ = ?̅?.  
b) The case of 𝑡 = 2. Suppose 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 2 > 𝑠𝑘(𝒩). Because 𝐹𝒩 = 𝐹ℳ = {𝑖, 𝑗}, 
we have {𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆ 𝐹𝒩 ∩ 𝐹ℳ . Furthermore, 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 2  implies (𝐹𝒩 = 𝐹ℳ =){𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆
𝑁𝑘,𝑀𝑘 , so whether 𝑘 is in 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) is determined thoroughly by 𝑘 belonging to 𝑆𝒩 and 𝑆ℳ , 
which is also entirely determined by the score profile. Thus, we have 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = 𝜑𝑃(ℳ).  
c) The case of 𝑡 = 1. Suppose 2 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) > 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≥ 𝑠𝑘(𝒩). Then 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ) = 2 
implies 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 ∩ 𝑁𝑘 ∩𝑀𝑗 ∩𝑀𝑘. Recall that in ∑ 𝑠𝑙 ≥
𝑛
𝑙=1 𝑛, there are only two possibilities for the 
value of the score profile: (𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑠𝑘) = (2,1,1) and (𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑠𝑘) = (2,1,0). If (𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗, 𝑠𝑘) = (2,1,1), 
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it follows that {𝑗, 𝑘} ⊆ 𝑆𝒩 ∩ 𝑆ℳ and we have {𝑗, 𝑘} ⊆ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) ∩ 𝜑𝑃(ℳ) . On the other hand, if 
(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗, 𝑠𝑘) = (2,1,0), we have 𝑆𝒩 = 𝑆ℳ = {𝑗} and therefore 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) ∩ 𝜑𝑃(ℳ). In either case, 
𝑘 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) ∪ 𝜑𝑃(ℳ).  
d) The case of 𝑡 = 0 . Because ∑ 𝑠𝑙 ≥
𝑛
𝑙=1 𝑛 , the only possible score profile is 𝑠(𝒩) =
𝑠(ℳ) = (1,1,1). Because 𝐹𝒩 = 𝐹ℳ = ?̅?, we have 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = 𝜑𝑃(ℳ) = ?̅?.  
 In all four of these cases, I have shown that 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = 𝜑𝑃(ℳ) . Because 𝒩,ℳ  are 
arbitrary ballot profiles with the same score profile, this means that 𝜑𝑃 satisfies AB if 𝑛 = 3.  
2) If 𝒏 ≥ 𝟒, 𝝋𝑷 does not satisfy AB. I will provide a counterexample. Consider two ballot 
profiles 𝒩 = (𝑁1, … , 𝑁𝑛),ℳ = (𝑀1,… ,𝑀𝑛) ∈ 𝔑
1 ⊆ 𝔑 as follows: 
𝑁1 = {3},𝑁2 = {1} 
𝑁𝑖 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1,2} 
and 
𝑀1 = {3},𝑀2 = {4},𝑀3 = {1} 
𝑀𝑖 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? 
Because we have 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠(ℳ) = (2,0,1,1,… ), AB demands that 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) = 𝜑𝑃(ℳ). However, we 
can check that 3 ∉ 𝜑𝑃(𝒩) and 3 ∈ 𝜑𝑃(ℳ). This shows that 𝜑𝑃 does not satisfy AB if 𝑛 ≥ 4. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 7 
Case 1: 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌. To prove case 1, we provide two lemmas.  
Lemma 12. Let 𝜙 ≠ 𝔛 ⊆ 𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙} and 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and 
AB. For any distinct individuals 𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ ?̅? and for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝛽, 
and 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝛼, there is a ballot profile 𝒩
′ ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝛼
′ , 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝛽
′ , and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝛾 ⇔
𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝛾
′  for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}.  
Proof of Lemma 12. If there is an individual 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} such that 𝜇 ∈ 𝑁𝛼 and 𝜇 ∉ 𝑁𝛽, then 
let 𝒩′ = (𝑁1
′,… , 𝑁𝑛
′) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 be such that:  
𝑁𝛼
′ = (𝑁𝛼 ∪ {𝑖}) ∖ {𝜇}, 
𝑁𝛽
′ = (𝑁𝛽 ∪ {𝜇}) ∖ {𝑖}, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑁𝛾
′ = 𝑁𝛾 for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝛼, 𝛽}. 
Because 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠(𝒩′), AB demands 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′. Therefore, because we also have 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝛼
′ , 𝑖 ∉
𝑁𝛽
′ , and 𝑁𝛾
′ = 𝑁𝛾 for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝛼, 𝛽}, the lemma holds.  
Suppose there is no such individual 𝜇. Then for any 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}, 𝜇 ∈ 𝑁𝛼 implies 
𝜇 ∈ 𝑁𝛽. It follows that 𝑁𝛼 ∖ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} ⊆ 𝑁𝛽 ∖ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}. Because we also have |𝑁𝛼| = |𝑁𝛽|, it follows 
that |𝑁𝛼 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}| ≥ |𝑁𝛽 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}|. Recall that we have 𝑁𝛼 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼} = 𝜙 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝛽 by the 
assumptions. Therefore, we can say that 𝑁𝛼 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} = {𝛽} and 𝑁𝛽 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} = {𝑖}.  
Because 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, 𝑖’s ballot 𝑀𝑖 ∈ 𝔑𝑖
𝑘 exists such that 𝛼 ∈ 𝑀𝑖 and 𝑏 ∉ 𝑀𝑖. Let 
us define ℳ = (𝑀𝑖,𝑀−𝑖) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘 as 𝑀−𝑖 = 𝑁−𝑖. IMP demands 𝒩 ~𝑖 ℳ. Note that we have 𝑀𝛼 ∩
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{𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} = {𝛽}, 𝑀𝛽 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} = {𝑖}, and 𝑀𝑖 ∩ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽} = {𝛼}. Therefore, we can construct ℳ
′ =
(𝑀1
′ , … ,𝑀𝑛
′ ) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
′ = (𝑀𝑖 ∪ {𝛽}) ∖ {𝛼}, 
𝑀𝛼
′ = (𝑀𝛼 ∪ {𝑖}) ∖ {𝛽}, 
𝑀𝛽
′ = (𝑀𝛽 ∪ {𝛼}) ∖ {𝑖}, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑀𝛾
′ = 𝑀𝛾 = 𝑁𝛾 for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝛼, 𝛽}. 
By AB, we have ℳ ~i ℳ
′. It is clear that ℳ′ has the necessary properties. ■ 
 
 
Lemma 13.  
Let 𝜙 ≠ 𝔛 ⊆ 𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙} and 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and AB. Take any 
individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and a ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁1, … , 𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘. For any 𝜇, 𝜆, 𝜈 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}, if 
𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉ 𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and 𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, then we have 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′ = (𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
′ ,𝑁−𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
′ ), where 𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
′ = (𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∪
{𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }.  
 
Proof of Lemma 13. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? , 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 and integers 𝜇, 𝜆, 𝜈 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} such that 
𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉ 𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   and 𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ . Because 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 , 𝑖 ’s ballot 𝑀𝑖 ∈ 𝔑𝑖
𝑘  exists such that 
𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝑀𝑖  and 𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉ 𝑀𝑖 . Let ℳ = (𝑀𝑖, 𝑀−𝑖) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘  be such that 𝑀−𝑖 = 𝑁−𝑖 . IMP demands 
𝒩 ~𝑖 ℳ. Define ℳ
′ = (𝑀1
′ , … ,𝑀𝑛
′ ) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
′ = (𝑀𝑖 ∪ {𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
′ = (𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∪ {𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
𝑀𝑥
′ = 𝑀𝑥 for all 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑖 + 𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
By AB, we have ℳ ~𝑖 ℳ
′ . Finally, let us define ℳ′′ = (𝑀𝑖
′′,𝑀−𝑖
′′ ) ∈ 𝔑𝑘  as 𝑀𝑖
′′ = 𝑁𝑖
′′  and 
𝑀−𝑖
′′ = 𝑁−𝑖
′′ . IMP demands ℳ′ ~i ℳ
′′. Clearly, ℳ′′ has all the properties required for 𝒩′. ■ 
 
 Proof of Case 1: 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑘 (Lemma 7). Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP and 
AB. Fix any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?  through the proof. Let us partition the ballot profile domains 𝔑𝑘  to 
𝔐0,𝔐1, … ,𝔐𝑛−1, where: 
𝔑𝑘 = 𝔐0 ∪𝔐1 ∪ …∪𝔐𝑛−1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝔐𝑑 = {𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑑}. 
In words, 𝔐𝑑  is the set of ballot profiles where individual 𝑖  gets score 𝑑 . For any 𝑑 ∈
{0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}, we define a ballot profile ℳ𝑑 = (𝑀1
𝑑, … ,𝑀𝑛
𝑑) ∈ 𝔐𝑑 as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
𝑑 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 = {𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } ∖ {𝑖 + 𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } if 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ min{𝑑, 𝑘 + 1}. 
𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } ∖ {𝑖 + 𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } if 𝑑 < 𝜇 ≤ 𝑘 + 1. 
𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 = {𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } if 𝑘 + 1 < 𝜇 ≤ 𝑑. 
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𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } ifmax{𝑑, 𝑘 + 1} < 𝜇 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. 
In words, this is a ballot profile where individuals’ approvals are shifted toward 
𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 + 𝑘 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  without changing 𝑖’s score. Note that for any 𝑑 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}, ℳ𝑑 
is uniquely determined and ℳ𝑑 ∈ 𝔐𝑑. I show that for any 𝑑 and 𝒩 ∈𝔐𝑑, we have 𝒩 ~𝑖 ℳ
𝑑. 
Showing this completes the proof because 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔐𝑑 implies 𝒩 ~𝑖 ℳ
𝑑 and 𝒩′ ~𝑖 ℳ
𝑑 , 
thus 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′.  
  Take any 𝑑 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}  and 𝒩 ∈𝔐𝑑 . With the repetition of the procedure in 
Lemma 12, we obtain 𝒩1 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
1 and only the individuals in {𝑖 + 𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ │1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤
𝑑}  approve 𝑖 . Next, 𝒩2 ∈ 𝔐𝑑  is defined as 𝑁𝑖
2 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }  and 𝑁−𝑖
2 = 𝑁−𝑖
1  . IMP 
demands 𝒩1 ~𝑖 𝒩
2. Starting from 𝒩2, we sequentially transform 𝑁𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2  to 𝑀𝑖+𝜇̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑  for each 𝜇 =
1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1 as follows: 
𝒩2 = (𝑀𝑖
𝑑, 𝑁𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 , 𝑁𝑖+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 , 𝑁𝑖+3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 … ,𝑁𝑖+𝑛−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 ). 
Next, (𝑀𝑖
𝑑, 𝑀𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 , 𝑁𝑖+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 , 𝑁𝑖+3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 … ,𝑁𝑖+𝑛−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 ). 
Next, (𝑀𝑖
𝑑, 𝑀𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 ,𝑀𝑖+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 ,𝑁𝑖+3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 … ,𝑁𝑖+𝑛−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
2 ). 
⋮ 
Finally, (𝑀𝑖
𝑑,𝑀𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 ,𝑀𝑖+2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 ,𝑀𝑖+3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 … ,𝑀𝑖+𝑛−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑑 ) = ℳ𝑑. 
Because we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑥
2 ⇔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑥
𝑑 for all 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}, the only difference between 𝑁𝑥
2 and 𝑀𝑥
2 
is on individuals other than 𝑖. Recall that Lemma 13 states that the substitution of the approval toward 
𝑖 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} with that toward 𝑖 + 𝜆̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in someone’s ballot retains 𝑖 -equivalence. Therefore, the 
above procedure from 𝑁𝑥
2 to 𝑀𝑥
𝑑 maintains 𝑖-equivalence. Hence, we have 𝒩2 ~𝑖 ℳ
𝑑. ■ 
 
Case 2: 𝕯 = 𝕹. For the proof of case 2, we provide another lemma.  
Lemma 14. Let 𝜙 ≠ 𝔛 ⊆ 𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙} and 𝜑:𝔑 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and 
AB. Fix any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑, if there is an individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? such 
that |𝑁𝑗| ≥ 2 , then, for any 𝑎 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 ∖ {𝑖} , we have that 𝒩
′ = (𝑁𝑗
′, 𝑁−𝑗
′ ) ∈ 𝔑  and 𝒩  are 𝑖 -
equivalent, where 𝑁𝑗
′ = 𝑁𝑗 ∖ {𝑎}.  
 
Proof of Lemma 14. If 𝑗 = 𝑖, the lemma is obvious by IMP. Suppose 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 and |𝑁𝑗| ≥ 2 at 𝒩 ∈
𝔑. Take 𝑎 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 ∖ {𝑖}. Let ℳ ∈ 𝔑 as 𝑀𝑖 = {𝑗} and 𝑀−𝑖 = 𝑁−𝑖. Then we have 𝑎 ∉ 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑎 ∈
𝑁𝑗 and can define ℳ
′ ∈ 𝔑 as 𝑀𝑖
′ = 𝑀𝑖 ∪ {𝜇}, 𝑀𝑗
′ = 𝑀𝑗 ∖ {𝜇}, and 𝑀𝑥
′ = 𝑀𝑥 for all 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑖, 𝑗}. Because 𝑠(ℳ) = 𝑠(ℳ′), we have ℳ ~𝑖 ℳ
′. Furthermore, let ℳ′′ ∈ 𝔑 as 𝑀𝑖
′′ = 𝑁𝑖 and 
𝑀−𝑖
′′ = 𝑀−𝑖
′ . IMP demands ℳ′ ~𝑖 ℳ
′′. Therefore, ℳ′′ satisfies the required property. ■ 
  
Proof of Case 2: 𝔇 = 𝔑. Take any 𝒩1,𝒩2 ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
2). For each of these, 
we can iterate the procedure in Lemma 14 until everyone’s ballot becomes a singleton. Let ℒ1, ℒ2 
be the final outputs of 𝒩1 and 𝒩2, respectively. Then, we have 𝒩1 ~𝑖 ℒ
1, 𝒩2 ~𝑖 ℒ
2, and 
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ℒ1, ℒ2 ∈ 𝔑1 ⊆ 𝔑. Because 𝑠(ℒ1) = 𝑠(ℒ2), case 1 shows that ℒ1~𝑖 ℒ
2. Hence, we determine that 
𝒩1 ~𝑖 𝒩
2. ■ 
 
Case 3: 𝕹 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇. 
Lemma 15. Let 𝜙 ≠ 𝔛 ⊆ 𝔓(?̅?) ∖ {𝜙} and 𝜑:𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and 
AB. For all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , if 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} exists such that 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 , then there is a ballot 
profile 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′, 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′), 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
′, and 𝑁𝑥 = 𝑁𝑥
′ for all 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑗}.  
Proof of Lemma 15. Assume 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑗  for some 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} . Take any 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} . Let ℳ =
(𝑀𝑖, 𝑀−𝑖) ∈ 𝔑
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , where 𝑀𝑖 = {𝜇}  and 𝑀−𝑖 = 𝑁−𝑖 . Then IMP demands 𝒩 ~𝑖 ℳ . Let us 
consider two cases, (a) and (b).  
 a) The case of 𝜇 ∈ 𝑀𝑗. Let ℳ
′ = (𝑀1
′ , … ,𝑀𝑛
′ ) ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that 𝑀𝑖
′ = 𝑀𝑖 ∪ {𝑗}, 𝑀𝑗
′ =
𝑀𝑗 ∖ {𝑗}, and 𝑀𝜈
′ = 𝑀𝜈 for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. Note that the assumption of 𝜇 ∈ 𝑀𝑗 guarantees that 
𝑀𝑗
′ ≠ 𝜙. By AB, we have ℳ ~𝑖 ℳ
′. Let ℳ′′ ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 because 𝑀𝑖
′′ = 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑀−𝑖
′′ = 𝑀−𝑖
′ . IMP 
demands ℳ′ ~𝑖 ℳ
′′. Clearly, this ballot profile ℳ′′ satisfies the required properties.  
b) The case of 𝜇 ∉ 𝑀𝑗. Let ℳ
′′′ = (𝑀1
′′′,… ,𝑀𝑛
′′′) ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that 𝑀𝑖
′′′ = (𝑀𝑖 ∪ {𝑗}) ∖
{𝜇}, 𝑀𝑗
′′ = (𝑀𝑗 ∪ {𝜇}) ∖ {𝑗}, and 𝑀𝜈
′′ = 𝑀𝜈 for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. AB implies ℳ ~𝑖 ℳ
′′′. Let 
ℳ′′′′ = (𝑀𝑖
′′′′,𝑀−𝑖
′′′′) ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 because 𝑀𝑖
′′′′ = 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑀−𝑖
′′′′ = 𝑀−𝑖
′′′. IMP demands 
ℳ′′′ ~𝑖 ℳ
′′′′. Clearly, this ballot profile ℳ′′′′ satisfies the required properties. ■ 
 
Proof of Case 3: 𝔇 = 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓. Take any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and ballot profiles 𝒩1,𝒩2 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such 
that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
2). The iteration of the procedure in Lemma 15 for each of 𝒩1,𝒩2 will give 
ℳ1,ℳ2 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that:  
𝑗 ∉ 𝑀𝑗
1 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑀𝑗
2 for all 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖,  
𝑠𝑖(ℳ
1) = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
2), and  
𝒩1 ~𝑖 ℳ
1 and 𝒩2 ~𝑖 ℳ
2.⋅ 
If 𝑖 ∉ 𝑀𝑖
1 and 𝑖 ∉ 𝑀𝑖
2, we have ℳ1,ℳ2 ∈ 𝔑. Then it follows from case 2 that 
ℳ1 ~𝑖 ℳ
2 and the proof is done. Therefore, without loss of generality we can focus on two cases: 
1) 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑖
1 and 𝑖 ∉ 𝑀𝑖
2, and 2) 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑖
1 ∩𝑀𝑖
2. Note that in either case it is enough to prove the 𝑖-
equivalence of ℳ1 and ℳ2.  
1) The case of 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑖
1 and 𝑖 ∉ 𝑀𝑖
2. Because 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
1) = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
2), 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} exists such 
that 𝑖 ∉ 𝑀𝑗
1. Take an individual 𝜇 ∈ 𝑀𝑗
1. Note that 𝑙 ≠ 𝑗. Let us define ℳ3 = (𝑀𝑖
3,𝑀−𝑖
3 ) ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 
as 𝑀𝑖
3 = {𝑖} and 𝑀−𝑖
3 = 𝑀−𝑖
1 . IMP demands ℳ1 ~𝑖 ℳ
3. Note that we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑖
3, 𝜇 ∉ 𝑀𝑖
3, 
𝑖 ∉ 𝑀𝑗
3, and 𝜇 ∈ 𝑀𝑗
3. We define ℳ4 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
4 = (𝑀𝑖
3 ∪ {𝜇}) ∖ {𝑖}, 
𝑀𝑗
4 = (𝑀𝑗
3 ∪ {𝑖}) ∖ {𝜇}, and 
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𝑀𝑥
4 = 𝑀𝑥
3 for all 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
AB demands ℳ3 ~𝑖 ℳ
4. Note that no one makes a self-approval at ℳ4, so we have ℳ2,ℳ4 ∈
𝔑. Furthermore, we have 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
4) = (= 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
3) = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
1) =)𝑠𝑖(ℳ
2). Case 2 shows that 
ℳ4 ~𝑖 ℳ
2, which means that ℳ1 ~𝑖 ℳ
2.  
2) The case of 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀𝑖
1 ∩𝑀𝑖
2. Let us define ballot profiles 𝒦1,𝒦2 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 as follows: 
𝐾𝑖
1 = (𝑀𝑖
1 ∪ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖},𝐾−𝑖
1 = 𝑀−𝑖
1 , and 
𝐾𝑖
2 = (𝑀𝑖
2 ∪ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖}, 𝐾−𝑖
2 = 𝑀−𝑖
2 . 
IMP demands ℳ1 ~𝑖 𝒦
1 and ℳ2 ~𝑖 𝒦
2. Note that 𝒦1,𝒦2 ∈ 𝔑. Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒦
1) =
𝑠𝑖(ℳ
1) − 1 = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ
2) − 1 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒦
2), case 2 shows 𝒦1 ~𝑖 𝒦
2, which yields ℳ1 ~𝑖 ℳ
2. ■ 
 
Case 4: 𝕹 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩. I will first provide a lemma.  
Lemma 16. Let 𝜑:𝔑𝐴𝐵 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and AB. For all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈
𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 , if 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?  exists such that 𝑁𝑗 = 𝜙 , then there is a ballot profile 𝒩
′ ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵  such that 
𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′, 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′), 𝑁𝑗
′ ≠ 𝜙, and 𝑁𝑥 = 𝑁𝑥
′ for all 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}. 
Proof of Lemma 16. The case of 𝑗 = 𝑖 is straightforward from IMP. Assume 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 and take any 
𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵. Because 𝑛 ≥ 3, 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} exists. Let us consider ℳ ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵, where 𝑀𝑖 = {𝜇, 𝑗} 
and 𝑀−𝑖 = 𝑁−𝑖. IMP implies 𝒩 ~𝑖 ℳ. Then consider a ballot profile ℳ
′ = (𝑀1
′ ,… ,𝑀𝑛
′ ) ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵 
as follows: 
𝑀𝑖
′ = 𝑀𝑖 ∖ {𝜇}, 
𝑀𝑗
′ = {𝜇}, and  
𝑀𝜈
′ = 𝑀𝜈 for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
Because 𝑠(ℳ) = 𝑠(ℳ′), AB implies ℳ ~𝑖 ℳ
′. Finally, let us define ℳ′′ = (𝑀𝑖
′′,𝑀−𝑖
′′ ) ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 
where 𝑀𝑖
′′ = 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑀−𝑖
′′ = 𝑀−𝑖
′ . IMP implies ℳ′ ~𝑖 ℳ
′′. Clearly, ℳ′′ has the required 
properties. ■ 
Proof of Case 4: 𝔑 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵. Take any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and ballot profiles 𝒩1,𝒩2 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵 such 
that 𝑑 ≔ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
2). By iterating the procedure in Lemma 16 from 𝒩1,𝒩2 until there is 
no abstention, we obtain 𝒦1,𝒦2 ⊆ 𝔑𝐴𝐵 such that 𝒩1 ~𝑖 𝒦
1, 𝒩2 ~𝑖 𝒦
2, and 𝒦1,𝒦2 ∈ 𝔑. 
Because the procedure does not change 𝑖’s score, we have 𝑠𝑖(𝒦
1) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒦
2) = 𝑑. By case 2, we 
have 𝒦1 ~𝑖 𝒦
2, which implies 𝒩1 ~𝑖 𝒩
2. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 8 
Case 1: 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 . Let 𝕋 be the right-hand side of the equality in the lemma. Because 
𝕊[𝔑𝑘] ⊆ 𝕋 is obvious, I will show 𝕋 ⊆ 𝕊[𝔑𝑘]. Take any 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ 𝕋. I show that 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑
𝑘 
exists such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠.  
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I define a class of sets of sets, called assignments, as follows. For any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, a set of sets 
𝒩𝑖 = (𝑁1
𝑖, … ,𝑁𝑛
𝑖) is called an assignment (from 1) until 𝑖 (with respect to 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛)) if and 
only if:  
𝑁𝑗
𝑖 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, 
|𝑁𝑗
𝑖| ≤ 𝑘 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, 
𝑠𝑗(𝒩
𝑖) = 𝑠𝑖  for all 𝑗 ≤ 𝑖, and 
𝑠𝑗(𝒩
𝑖) = 0 for all 𝑗 > 𝑖. 
With a slight abuse of notation, I define 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
𝑖) ≔ |{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝜇
𝑖}| and also 𝑠(𝒩𝑖) =
(𝑠1(𝒩
𝑖),… , 𝑠𝑛(𝒩
𝑖)). I denote by ℑ𝑖 the set of all assignments until 𝑖. Note that an assignment 
until 𝑖, 𝒩𝑖 ∈ ℑ𝑖, expresses a way to take 𝑠1 individuals from ?̅? ∖ {1} so that they approve 
individual 1 in their ballots, 𝑠2 individuals from ?̅? ∖ {2} so that they can approve individual 2 
in their ballots, …, and 𝑠𝑖 individuals so that they can approve individual 𝑖 in their ballots. Note 
also that if there is an assignment until 𝑛, and 𝒩𝑛 = (𝑁1
𝑛, … ,𝑁𝑛
𝑛) ∈ ℑ𝑛, then 𝒩𝑛 is an element in 
𝔑𝑘 such that 𝑠(𝒩𝑛) = 𝑠. This can be easily shown as we can see by definition the following: 
∑|𝑁𝑗
𝑛|
𝑛
𝑗=1
=∑𝑠𝜇(𝒩
𝑛)
𝑛
𝜇=1
=∑𝑠𝜇
𝑛
𝜇=1
= 𝑛𝑘. 
The last equation is given by 𝑠 ∈ 𝕋. Because |𝑁𝑗
𝑛| ≤ 𝑘 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, we have |𝑁1
𝑛| =
|𝑁2
𝑛| = ⋯ = |𝑁𝑛
𝑛| = 𝑘. Furthermore, 𝑁𝑗
𝑛 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} is also guaranteed by the definition. Therefore, 
we have 𝒩𝑛 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. It is also clear that 𝑠(𝒩𝑗) = 𝑠. Thus, the proof is completed if we show ℑ𝑛 ≠
𝜙. Indeed, I show that ℑ𝑖 ≠ 𝜙 for all 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛 by an induction on 𝑖. For any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 
𝒩𝑖 ∈ ℑ𝑖, let us denote by 𝐹(𝒩𝑖) the set of individuals who have already been fully assigned—i.e., 
𝐹(𝒩𝑖) = {𝑗 ∈ ?̅?│|𝑁𝑗
𝑖| = 𝑘}. For any 𝜇 ∈ ?̅?, I denote by 𝐹−𝜇(𝒩𝑖) the set of individuals among 
?̅? ∖ {𝜇}, that is, 𝐹−𝜇(𝒩𝑖) = {𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝜇}│|𝑁𝑗
𝑖| = 𝑘}. 
Let us begin the induction. We first check that ℑ1 ≠ 𝜙. Because 0 ≤ 𝑠1 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, we have 
2,3,… , 𝑠1 + 1 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1}. Therefore, let 𝒩
1 = (𝑁1
1,… ,𝑁𝑛
1) be such that:  
𝑁𝑗
1 = {1} if 2 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑠𝑖 + 1, and 
𝑁𝑗
1 = 𝜙 if 𝑗 = 1 or 𝑗 > 𝑠𝑖 + 1. 
Clearly, this makes an assignment until 1. So, we have ℑ1 ≠ 𝜙.  
  Now let 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} and suppose none of ℑ1, ℑ2, … , ℑ𝑖 is empty. I will show 
ℑ𝑖+1 ≠ 𝜙 with several steps. Suppose to the contrary that ℑ𝑖+1 = 𝜙. Because ℑ𝑖 ≠ 𝜙, we can take 
an assignment 𝒩𝑖 = (𝑁1
𝑖, … ,𝑁𝑛
𝑖) ∈ ℑ𝑖 that has the minimal |𝐹−(𝑖+1)( )| among ℑ𝑖, as follows: 
𝒩𝑖 ∈ argmin
ℳ𝑖∈ℑ𝑖
|𝐹−(𝑖+1)(ℳ𝑖)|. 
(1) To show that |𝑭−(𝒊+𝟏)(𝓝𝒊)| ≥ 𝒏− 𝒔𝒊+𝟏. Because we assumed that ℑ
𝑖+1 = 𝜙, we 
cannot construct an assignment until 𝑖 + 1 on the basis of 𝒩𝑖. This means that we cannot take 
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𝑠𝑖+1 distinct sets among 𝑁1
𝑖, … , 𝑁𝑖
𝑖, 𝑁𝑖+2
𝑖 ,… ,𝑁𝑛
𝑖  that have cardinality less than 𝑘. Therefore, we 
have the following: 
|(?̅? ∖ {𝑖 + 1}) ∖ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖)| < 𝑠𝑖+1. 
This is equivalent to  
|𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖)| ≥ 𝑛 − 1 − 𝑠𝑖+1 + 1 = 𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖+1. 
Because 𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖+1 > 0, the above inequality shows 𝐹
−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖) ≠ 𝜙.  
 (2) To show that |𝑵𝝁
𝒊 | ∈ {𝒌 − 𝟏, 𝒌} for all 𝝁 ∈ ?̅?. Suppose to the contrary that 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? 
exists such that |𝑁𝜈
𝑖| ≤ 𝑘 − 2. Because 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖) ≠ 𝜙, 𝜆 ∈ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩) exists (i.e., 𝜆 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑖}) such that |𝑁𝜆
𝑖| = 𝑘. Because |𝑁𝜈
𝑖| ≤ 𝑘 − 2 and |𝑁𝜆
𝑖| = 𝑘, 𝛼 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝜈, 𝜆} exists such that 𝛼 ∈
𝑁𝜆
𝑖 and 𝛼 ∉ 𝑁𝜈
𝑖. Now, we define another assignment until 𝑖, denoted by ℳ𝑖 = (𝑀1
𝑖 , … ,𝑀𝑛
𝑖 ) ∈ ℑ𝑖,  
as 𝑀𝜆
𝑖 = 𝑁𝜆
𝑖 ∖ {𝛼}, 𝑀𝜈
𝑖 = 𝑁𝜈
𝑖 ∪ {𝛼}, and 𝑀𝛾
𝑖 = 𝑁𝛾
𝑖  for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝜆, 𝜈}. It is clear that ℳ𝑖 ∈ ℑ𝑖. 
Furthermore, we have the following: 
𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖) ∖ {𝜆, 𝜈} = 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(ℳ𝑖) ∖ {𝜆, 𝜈}, 
𝜆 ∈ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖) and 𝜆 ∉ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(ℳ𝑖), and 
𝜈 ∉ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖) and 𝜈 ∉ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(ℳ𝑖). 
Therefore, we have  
|𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖)| > |𝐹−(𝑖+1)(ℳ𝑖)|. 
This is in contradiction to the way 𝒩𝑖 is defined.  
  (3) To show that |𝑵𝒊+𝟏
𝒊 | = 𝒌. Assume to the contrary that |𝑁𝑖+1
𝑖 | ≤ 𝑘 − 1. By (2), this is 
equivalent to assuming |𝑁𝑖+1
𝑖 | = 𝑘 − 1. By (1), 𝜆 ∈ 𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖) exists. Because we have 𝑖 + 1 ∉
𝑁𝜆
𝑖 (recall that the supporters of 𝑖 + 1 are not yet assigned at the assignment until 𝑖), it follows that 
𝛽 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝜆} exists such that 𝛽 ∈ 𝑁𝜆
𝑖 and 𝛽 ∉ 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑖 . Again, we define another assignment until 𝑖, 
𝒦𝑖 = (𝐾1
𝑖, … ,𝐾𝑛
𝑖 ) ∈ ℑ𝑖 as 𝐾𝜆
𝑖 = 𝑁𝜆
𝑖 ∖ {𝛽}, 𝐾𝑖+1
𝑖 = 𝑁𝑖+1
𝑖 ∪ {𝛽}, and 𝐾𝛾
𝑖 = 𝑁𝛾
𝑖 for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝜆, 𝑖 + 1}. Clearly, 𝒦𝑖 is also an assignment until 𝑖. Furthermore, because 𝛽 gets out of 
𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒦𝑖), we have the following: 
|𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒩𝑖)| > |𝐹−(𝑖+1)(𝒦𝑖)|. 
This is in contradiction to the way 𝒩𝑖 is defined.  
  (4) To complete the induction. Now, recall that we have assumed ℑ𝑖+1 = 𝜙 and 
achieved (1), (2) and (3). If we derive a contradiction from these expressions, it follows that ℑ𝑖+1 ≠
𝜙, which completes the induction. By (1), (2), and (3), we know that |𝑁𝑖+1
𝑖 | = 𝑘, at least (𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖+1) 
sets among 𝑁1
𝑖, … ,𝑁𝑖
𝑖, 𝑁𝑖+2
𝑖 , … , 𝑁𝑛
𝑖  have cardinality 𝑘, and the rest of the sets have cardinality of at 
least 𝑘 − 1. Therefore, the sum of the cardinalities satisfies the following: 
∑|𝑁𝑗
𝑖|
𝑛
𝑗=1
≥ 𝑘 + (𝑛 − 𝑠𝑖+1)𝑘 + (𝑠𝑖+1 − 1)(𝑘 − 1) = 𝑛𝑘 − 𝑠𝑖+1 + 1. 
The definition of the assignments demands that the left-hand side is 
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∑|𝑁𝑗
𝑖|
𝑛
𝑗=1
=∑𝑠𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
. 
Thus, we have 
∑𝑠𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
= 𝑛𝑘 − 𝑠𝑖+1 + 1. 
This implies  
∑𝑠𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
=∑𝑠𝑗
𝑖
𝑗=1
+ 𝑠𝑖+1 + ∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+2
 
   = 𝑛𝑘 − 𝑠𝑖+1 + 1+ 𝑠𝑖+1 + ∑ 𝑠𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=𝑖+2
 
   ≥ 𝑛𝑘 + 1. 
On the other hand, because 𝑠 ∈ 𝕋, the sum must be exactly 𝑛𝑘. This contradiction completes the 
proof. ■ 
 Case 2: 𝕯 = 𝕹 . Let 𝕋  be the right-hand side of the equality in Lemma 8. Because 
𝕊[𝔑] ⊆ 𝕋 is obvious, I show 𝕋 ⊆ 𝕊[𝔑]. First, I provide another lemma.  
 
Lemma 17.  
Let 𝕋 = {(𝑠1,… , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛│∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑛} . For any 𝑠
′ = (𝑠1
′ , … , 𝑠𝑛
′ ) ∈ 𝕊[𝔑]  and an 
individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? , if 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) defined as 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖
′ − 1 and 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗
′ for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} is in 
𝕋, then 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑].  
 
Proof of Lemma 17. Take any 𝑠′ ∈ 𝕊[𝔑] and 𝑠 ∈ 𝕋 that satisfy the given conditions. Note that 
𝑠 ∈ 𝕋 implies that 𝑠𝑖
′ ≥ 1 and ∑ 𝑠𝜇
′𝑛
𝜇=1 ≥ 𝑛 + 1. Because 𝑠
′ ∈ 𝕊[𝔑], we can take a ballot profile 
𝒩′ = (𝑁1
′,… ,𝑁𝑛
′) ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠(𝒩′) = 𝑠′. Because 𝑠𝑖
′ ≥ 1, there is an individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} 
such that 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗
′. 
 If |𝑁𝑗
′| ≥ 2 , then it follows that 𝑁𝑗
′ ∖ {𝑖} ∈ 𝔑𝑗 . Clearly, the 𝑛 -tuple (𝑁1
′,… , 𝑁𝑗−1
′ , 𝑁𝑗
′ ∖
{𝑖},𝑁𝑗+1
′ … ,𝑁𝑛
′) makes a ballot profile in 𝔑 whose score profile is 𝑠.  
Assume |𝑁𝑗
′| = 1. Because ∑ 𝑠𝜇
′𝑛
𝜇=1 ≥ 𝑛 + 1 and |𝑁𝜇
′| ≥ 1 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅?, it follows that  
𝜆 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} exists such that |𝑁𝜆
′| ≥ 2. If 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝜆
′, the 𝑛-tuple of (𝑁1
′,… ,𝑁𝜆−1
′ , 𝑁𝜆
′ ∖ {𝑖},𝑁𝜆+1
′ , … , 𝑁𝑛
′) 
makes the ballot profile in 𝔑  whose score profile is 𝑠 . Otherwise (i.e., if 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝜆
′ ) there is an 
individual 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜆} such that 𝜈 ∈ 𝑁𝜆
′ . Now we can construct a ballot profile 𝒩′′ ∈ 𝔑 as 
𝑁𝑗
′′ = 𝑁𝑗
′ ∪ {𝜈} , 𝑁𝜆
′′ = 𝑁𝜆
′ ∖ {𝜈} , and 𝑁𝛾
′′ = 𝑁𝛾
′ for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝜆} . We have |𝑁𝑗
′′| ≥ 2 . So, the 
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𝑛-tuple (𝑁1
′′, … , 𝑁𝑗−1
′′ , 𝑁𝑗
′′ ∖ {𝑖},𝑁𝑗+1
′′ , … , 𝑁𝑛
′′) makes a ballot profile in 𝔑 whose score profile is 𝑠. 
■ 
 Let me begin the proof of case 2: 𝔇 = 𝔑. Take any 𝑠 ∈ 𝕋. It follows from the definition of 
𝕋  that for any 𝑛 -tuple 𝑡 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛  such that 𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑡𝑖  for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? , we have 𝑡 ∈ 𝕋 . 
Therefore, there is a sequence 𝑡0, 𝑡1, … , 𝑡𝑚 ∈ 𝕋 such that:  
1. 𝑡𝑖
0 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?, 
2. 𝑡𝑚 = 𝑠, and 
3. for any 𝑝 ∈ {0,1,… ,𝑚 − 1}, there is one and only one individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? such that 𝑠𝑖
𝑝 =
𝑠𝑖
𝑝+1 + 1 and 𝑠𝑗
𝑝+1 = 𝑠𝑗
𝑝
 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}.  
Lemma 17 enables us to prove that 𝑡𝑚 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑] inductively along with this sequence. For 
𝑡0, we know 𝒞𝑛−1 ∈ 𝔑 and 𝑠(𝒞𝑛−1) = 𝑡0. If 𝑡𝑝 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑], we can apply Lemma 17 to obtain 𝑡𝑝+1 ∈
𝕊[𝔑], because 𝑡𝑝+1 ∈ 𝕋. ■ 
Case 3: 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇. Let 𝕋 be the right-hand side of the equality in the lemma. Because 
𝕊[𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓] ⊆ 𝕋 is obvious, I will show 𝕋 ⊆ 𝕊[𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓]. For any 𝑠 ∈ 𝕋, let 𝑀(𝑠) = #{𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖 = 𝑛} 
be the number of individuals whose score is 𝑛 at 𝑠. Take any 𝑠 ∈ 𝕋. I will show that 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓].  
If 𝑀(𝑠) = 𝜙, from case 2 we have 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑]. Because 𝕊[𝔑] ⊆ 𝕊[𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓], it follows that 𝑠 ∈
𝕊[𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓].  
If 𝑠 = (0,… ,0, 𝑛, 0, … ,0), (i.e., only one individual 𝑖 gets score 𝑛 and all the others get 
scores of zero, then a ballot profile 𝒩 = ({𝑖}, {𝑖},… , {𝑖}) corresponds with 𝑠 . Otherwise, (i.e., if 
𝑀(𝑠) ≠ 𝜙 and at least two individuals get positive scores) let 𝑠′ = (𝑠1
′ , … , 𝑠𝑛
′ ) such that:  
𝑠𝑖
′ = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝑖 ∈ 𝑀(𝑠), and 
𝑠𝑖
′ = 𝑠𝑖 for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ 𝑀(𝑠). 
Because the sum of 𝑠1
′ , … , 𝑠𝑛
′  is at least 𝑛 and each 𝑠1
′ , … , 𝑠𝑛
′  is in {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}, case 2 shows 
𝑠′ ∈ 𝕊[𝔑] . So, there is a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠′ . Let 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that 
𝑁𝑖
′ = 𝑁𝑖 ∪𝑀(𝑠) for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? . Clearly, we have 𝑠(𝒩
′) = 𝑠 and therefore, this makes a required 
ballot profile. ■  
Case 4: 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 . Let 𝕋 be the right-hand side of the equality in Lemma 8. Because 
𝕊[𝔑𝐴𝐵] ⊆ 𝕋 is obvious from the definition of the domain 𝔑𝐴𝐵, I will show 𝕋 ⊆ 𝕊[𝔑𝐴𝐵].  
Take any element 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ 𝕋 . Let us directly construct a ballot profile 𝒩 =
(𝑁1, … , 𝑁𝑛) ∈ 𝔑
𝐴𝐵 as for all 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝑎 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} , 𝑖 + 𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝑁𝑖 ⇔ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑠𝑖+𝑎̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ . In words, 
this is a ballot profile where any 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? is approved by the preceding 𝑠𝑗 individuals. Then, it is easy 
to see that 𝒩 defined in this way is actually a ballot profile in 𝒩𝐴𝐵 and its score profile is 𝑠(𝒩) =
𝑠. ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 9 
As the first step toward a proof of Lemma 9, I provide the following lemma.  
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Lemma 18. Let 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙. Let 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB and 2CN. 
For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 and for any individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, if 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1, 
then 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
 
Proof of Lemma 18. First, let us consider the case of 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 0. In this case it is clear that 
𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. Thus, it follows that 𝒩
σ ∈ 𝔇, where 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗) is the transposition over 𝑖, 𝑗. By 
2CN, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩𝜎). Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
𝜎) = 0 and 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
𝜎) =
0, Lemma 7 demands that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩𝜎) and 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩𝜎). Therefore, we 
have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). From here I focus only on the case of 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≤ 𝑀𝔇 −
1.  
Case 1: 𝕯 = 𝕹,𝕹𝑨𝑩, 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇. Take any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 and two distinct individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? such 
that 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≔ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1. Because 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1, it is easy to find a ballot 
profile 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
′, and 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) = 𝑚. Lemma 7 demands that 
𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′ and 𝒩 ~𝑗 𝒩
′. Because 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
′ and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
′, there is a transposed ballot profile 𝒩′′ =
(𝒩′)𝜎, where 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗). Because 𝑠(𝒩′) = 𝑠(𝒩′′), AB demands 𝜑(𝒩′) = 𝜑(𝒩′′), while 2CN 
demands 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′′). Therefore, we obtain 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′), and thus, 𝑖 ∈
𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
 Case 2: 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌. Take any 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≔ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) =
𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 2.  
1) The case of 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. This proof is essentially the same as for case 1.  
2) The case of 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖. Because |𝑁𝑖| = 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖, there is an 
individual 𝜂 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} such that 𝜂 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. Consider a ballot profile ℳ = (𝑀𝑖, 𝑀−𝑖) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘, where 
𝑀𝑖 = (𝑁𝑖 ∪ {𝜂}) ∖ {𝑗} and 𝑀−𝑖 = 𝑁−𝑖. Note that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(ℳ) = 𝑚, but 𝑠𝑗(ℳ) =
𝑚 − 1. Then, IMP demands that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(ℳ). Because 𝑖 ∉ ℳ𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑀𝑖, we can 
consider the transposed ballot profile ℳ𝜎, where 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗). 2CN demands that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(ℳ) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈
𝜑(ℳ𝜎). Because 𝑠𝑗(ℳ
𝜎) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑚, Lemma 7 implies that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(ℳ
𝜎) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). 
Therefore, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
3) The case of 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. This case is essentially the same as 2), above.  
4) The case of 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 where a) 𝑘 ≥ 2 and b) 𝑘 = 1. 
a) 𝑘 ≥ 2. Note that |𝑁𝜖| = 𝑘 ≥ 2. Because 1 ≤ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗, 𝜖 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑖, 𝑗} exists such that 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝜖. Therefore, 𝜆 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝜖} exists such that 𝜆 ∈ 𝑁𝜖. By the 
assumption that 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, there are at least 𝑘 individuals other than 𝑖, 𝑗. This and 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗 imply 
that 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} exists such that 𝜇 ∉ 𝑁𝑗. So, the following 𝒩
1 makes a ballot profile in 𝔑𝑘:  
𝑁𝑗
1 = (𝑁𝑗 ∪ {𝜇}) ∖ {𝑖}, 
𝑁𝜖
1 = (𝑁𝜖 ∪ {𝑖}) ∖ {𝜆}, and 
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𝑁𝜈
1 = 𝑁𝜈 for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝜖}. 
Note that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
1) = 𝑚. So, Lemma 7 shows 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
1 and 
𝒩 ~𝑗 𝒩
1. Furthermore, because 1 ≤ 𝑚 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
1) ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
1, we can apply 
the approach from 2), above, to 𝒩1 to obtain 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩1) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩1). Therefore, we have 𝑖 ∈
𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
b) 𝑘 = 1. If 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} exists such that 𝑁𝑥 ∩ {𝑖, 𝑗} = 𝜙, let 𝑁𝑥 = {𝑦} and consider a 
ballot profile 𝒩2 = (𝑁1
2, … , 𝑁𝑛
2) ∈ 𝔑1 as follows: 
𝑁𝑗
2 = {𝑦},𝑁𝑥
2 = {𝑖}, and 
𝑁𝑧
2 = 𝑁𝑧 for all 𝑧 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑥}. 
Then, we have 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
1) = 𝑚. So, Lemma 7 shows 
𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
2 and 𝒩 ~𝑗 𝒩
2. Again, we can apply the approach from 2) to obtain 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩2) ⇔
𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩2). Hence, 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). 
Suppose there is no 𝑥 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} such that 𝑁𝑥 ∩ {𝑖, 𝑗} = 𝜙. Then it follows that every 
𝜖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} casts a ballot of either 𝑁𝜖 = {𝑖} or 𝑁𝜖 = {𝑗}. Let 𝐼 = {𝜖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}│𝑁𝜖 = {𝑖}} and 
𝐽 = {𝜖 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}│𝑁𝜖 = {𝑗}}. Note that the triplet of {𝑖, 𝑗}, 𝐼, 𝐽 gives a partition of ?̅?. Because 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) and 𝑛 ≥ 3, we have |𝐼| = |𝐽| ≥ 1. Take 𝑏 ∈ 𝐽 and 𝑐 ∈ 𝐼. Let 𝒩
3 ∈ 𝔑1 be such 
that:  
𝑁𝑖
3 = {𝑐},𝑁𝑗
3 = {𝑏},𝑁𝑏
3 = {𝑖}, and 
𝑁𝜇
3 = 𝑁𝜇 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑏}. 
Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) = 𝑚, we have 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
3 according to Lemma 7. Furthermore, because 
𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
3 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
3, we can construct a transposed ballot profile 𝒩4 = (𝒩3)𝜎 ∈ 𝔑1, where 𝜎 =
(𝑖, 𝑗). Then, 2CN demands that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩3) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩4). Because 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
4) = 𝑚, 
Lemma 7 gives 𝒩 ~𝑗 𝒩
4. Therefore, we obtain 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). ■ 
 
Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇. Suppose 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) and 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑑 ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1. We will show 
that for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇, if 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) = 𝑑, then 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′). Note that the case of 𝑗 = 𝑖 is 
straightforward from Lemma 7, therefore, in this proof I assume 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. Note also that, drawing from 
Lemma 7, we can prove this statement simply by finding a ballot profile 𝒩𝑗 ∈ 𝔇 such that 
𝑠𝑗(𝒩
𝑗) = 𝑑 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩𝑗).  
1) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹,𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇, 𝕹𝑨𝑩, or [𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝟎 ≤ 𝒏𝒌− 𝟐𝒅 ≤
(𝒏− 𝟐)(𝒏 − 𝟏)]. In this case, there uniquely exists a pair of integers (𝑝, 𝑞) ∈ ℤ2 such that 
𝑛𝑘 − 2𝑑 = 𝑝(𝑛 − 1) + 𝑞, 
0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, and 
0 ≤ 𝑞 ≤ 𝑛 − 2. 
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Note that 𝑞 > 0 holds only if 𝑝 < 𝑛 − 2. Labelling the individuals other than 𝑖, 𝑗 as ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} =
{𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−2}(≠ 𝜙), I consider an 𝑛-tuple of integers 𝑠
1 = (𝑠1
1, … , 𝑠𝑛
1) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛 as 
follows: 
𝑠𝑖
1 = 𝑠𝑗
1 = 𝑑. 𝑠𝑎𝜇
1 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑝. 
𝑠𝑎𝑝+1
1  = 𝑞. 
𝑠𝑎𝜇
1 = 0 for all 𝜇 ≥ 𝑝 + 2. 
By the definition of 𝑝 and 𝑞, the sum of these integers is exactly 𝑛𝑘. Therefore, according to 
Lemma 8, 𝒩1 ∈ 𝔇(= 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘) exists such that 𝑠(𝒩1) = 𝑠1. Note that we have 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
2) = 𝑑. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 18 to obtain 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩1). 
Lemma 7 and 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑑 imply 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
1. Because we have assumed 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩), we 
obtain 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩1), where 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
1) = 𝑑0. 
2) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝒏𝒌 − 𝟐𝒅 < 𝟎 ⇔ 𝒏𝒌 < 𝟐𝒅. Because we have assumed 𝑛 >
𝑑, this case occurs only if 𝑘 < 2, which means 𝑘 = 1. Let us label the individuals as ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} =
{𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−2}. Consider an 𝑛-tuple of integers 𝑠
3 = (𝑠1
3, … , 𝑠𝑛
3) as follows: 
𝑠𝑖
3 = 𝑑 
𝑠𝑗
3 = 𝑛 − 𝑑 − 2 
𝑠𝑎1
3 = 2 
𝑠𝑎
3 = 0 for all 𝑎 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑎1} 
Note that the assumption of 𝑑 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 yields 𝑛 − 𝑑 − 2 ≥ 0. So, we can say 𝑠3 ∈
{0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛. Now, let us consider a ballot profile 𝒩3 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 as follows: 
𝑁𝑖
3 = 𝑁𝑗
3 = {𝑎1}. 
𝑁𝑎𝜇
3 = {𝑖} for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑎1, 𝑎2,… , 𝑎𝑑0}. 
𝑁𝜇
3 = {𝑗} for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑑0}. 
It is clear that 𝑠(𝒩3) = 𝑠3. Because we have 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) = 𝑑 = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) and 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩3), Lemma 7 
implies 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩3). Furthermore, because 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
3 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
3, we can consider a transposed ballot 
profile 𝒩4 = (𝒩3)𝜎, where 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗). Then, 2CN yields 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩4), because we already have 
𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩3). Because 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
4) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) = 𝑑, this completes the proof of case 2).  
3) The Case of (𝒏 − 𝟐)(𝒏 − 𝟏) < 𝒏𝒌 − 𝟐𝒅. By focusing on the constraint, we have the 
following: 
2𝑑 < 𝑛𝑘 − (𝑛 − 2)(𝑛 − 1) = −𝑛{𝑛 − (𝑘 + 3)} − 2. 
In order for the right-hand side to be positive, it is necessary that 𝑛 − (𝑘 + 3) < 0, or equivalently 
𝑛 − 2 ≤ 𝑘. Because we assumed 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, we obtain 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2. We label the individuals as ?̅? ∖
{𝑖, 𝑗} = {𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑛−2} and consider an 𝑛-tuple of integers 𝑠
5 = (𝑠1
5, … , 𝑠𝑛
5) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛 as 
follows: 
𝑠𝑎1
5 = … = 𝑠𝑎𝑛−2
5 = 𝑛 − 1. 
𝑠𝑖
5 = 𝑑, 𝑠𝑗
5 = 𝑛 − 2 − 𝑑. 
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Note that the sum of these integers is 𝑛𝑘. Therefore, according to Lemma 8, 𝒩5 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 exists such 
that 𝑠(𝒩5) = 𝑠5. Furthermore, because |𝑁𝑗
5| = |𝑁𝑖
5| = 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑠𝑎1(𝒩
5) = ⋯ =
𝑠𝑎𝑛−2(𝒩
5) = 𝑛 − 1, we have 𝑁𝑗
5 = 𝑁𝑖
5 = {𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑛−2}. This implies 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
5 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
5. 
Thus, there is a transposed ballot profile 𝒩6 = (𝒩5)𝜎, where 𝜎 = (𝑖, 𝑗). 2CN demands that 𝑖 ∈
𝜑(𝒩5) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩6). Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
5) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
0) = 𝑑, Lemma 7 demands 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩5). 
Therefore, we have 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩6), where 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
6) = 𝑑. 
 
Proof of Lemma 11 
Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩0 ∈ 𝔇. Assume 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩0) and let 𝑑0 ≔ 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
0). Let 𝛷(𝑑) be 
a proposition saying that for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇, [𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑑 ⇒ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩)]. We will show the 
propositions 𝛷(𝑑0),𝛷(𝑑0 + 1),… , 𝛷(𝑑),… , 𝛷(𝑀𝔇) with an induction on 𝑑. Note that 𝛷(𝑑0) is 
already shown in Lemma 9. Note also that, drawing from Lemma 7, we can prove 𝛷(𝑑) simply by 
finding for each 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? a ballot profile 𝒩𝑗 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑑 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
𝑗).  
Assume 𝛷(𝑑0),𝛷(𝑑0 + 1), … , 𝛷(𝑑) holds, where 𝑑0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1. Take any 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? 
and we will find 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) and 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑑 + 1. Let 𝑡 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛 be 
such that:  
𝑡𝑗 = 𝑑, 
𝑡𝜇 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝜇 = 𝑗 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 1 ≤ 𝜈 ≤ 𝑘 − 1, 
𝑡𝑗+𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑛 − 1 − 𝑑, 
𝑡𝑗+𝑘+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑘, and 
𝑡𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 = 𝑗 + 𝜈̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑘 + 2 ≤ 𝜈 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. 
Then, it is clear that ∑ 𝑡𝑖 = 𝑛𝑘𝑖 . So, according to Lemma 8, ℳ ∈ 𝔇 exists such that 𝑠(ℳ) = 𝑡. 
Because 𝑠𝑗(ℳ) = 𝑑 ≤ 𝑀𝔇 − 1, 𝜆 ∈ ?̅? exists such that 𝑗 ∉ 𝑀𝜆, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? if 𝔇 = 𝔑
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, and 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑗} otherwise. Take 𝜂 ∈ 𝑀𝜆 and consider ℳ
′ = (𝑀1
′ , … ,𝑀𝑛
′ ) ∈ 𝔇, where:  
𝑀𝜆
′ = (𝑀𝜆 ∪ {𝑗}) ∖ {𝜂}, and 
𝑀−𝜆
′ = 𝑀−𝜆. 
Then WM shows that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(ℳ′), where 𝑠𝑗(ℳ
′) = 𝑑 + 1. Because 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? was arbitrary, this 
argument shows 𝛷(𝑑 + 1). So, the induction shows 𝛷(𝑑0),𝛷(𝑑0 + 1), … ,𝛷(𝑀𝔇). ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 9 
Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑self, 𝔑𝐴𝐵,𝔑𝑘 and 𝔛 = 𝔛𝑙, ?̅?𝑙, 𝔛𝑙, where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 and 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 −
1. Suppose 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 is a nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, and PU. Take two distinct 
individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and label the others as ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} = {𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑛−2}. Let us define an 𝑛-tuple of 
integers 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) as follows: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑛 − 1, 
𝑠𝑗 = 𝑘, 
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𝑠𝑎1 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑎𝑛−1−𝑘 = 𝑘 − 1, and 
𝑠𝜇 = 𝑘 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−1−𝑘}. 
Note that 𝑛 − 1− 𝑘 ≥ 0 is derived from 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2. Clearly, the sum of these integers is 
exactly 𝑛𝑘. So, by Lemma 8, there is a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠. Because 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1 > 𝑠𝑗(𝒩), PU demands 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩). According to Lemma 7, we get 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒞
𝑘), 
while 𝒞𝑘 ∈ 𝔇. Because 𝑗 was an arbitrary individual, this implies 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = 𝜙. This contradicts 
the condition of 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 10 
Proof of Proposition 10-[1]. It is clear that the constant rule, 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?:𝔇 → 𝔛, satisfies IMP and AB. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 10-[2]. 
1) The Case of 𝕹,𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇, 𝕹𝑨𝑩. Let 𝔛 = 𝔛l, ?̅?l. Note that 𝒞n−1 ∈ 𝔇. Although |φ(𝒞n−1)| ≤ l, PU 
(or alternatively WPU) demands φ(𝒞n−1) = N̅. This contradiction proves the impossibility.  
Next, consider the case of 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙. Suppose to the contrary that 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 satisfies IMP 
and PU. Because 𝒞𝑛−2 ∈ 𝔇 and 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛 , 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? exists such that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−2) . Note that 𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉
𝐶𝑖
𝑛−2 and 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝐶𝑖
𝑛−2 . Let us consider 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 as 𝑁𝑖 = (𝐶𝑖
𝑛−2 ∪ {𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } and 𝑁−𝑖 =
𝐶−𝑖
𝑛−2. IMP demands 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩), but PU demands 𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. This is a contradiction. ■ 
2) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, 𝒌 = 𝟏 and 𝒍 = 𝟏. Suppose first that 𝑛 = 3. I will show that 
there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑1 → 𝔛1 that satisfies IMP and PU. Consider the 1 -cyclic ballot 
profile 𝒞1 ∈ 𝔑1 and take individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞1). Note that 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝐶𝑖
1 and 𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉ 𝐶𝑖
1. Consider a 
ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑1  as 𝑁𝑖
1 = {𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }  and 𝑁−𝑖 = 𝐶−𝑖
1  . IMP demands 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) , while PU 
demands 𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. This is a contradiction.  
Next, assume that 𝑛 ≥ 4 . I will show that there is a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑1 → 𝔛1 that 
satisfies IMP and PU. Take the pivotal individual 𝑖 and denote the other individuals as ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} =
{𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−1}. Let us denote the following: 
𝐵𝒩 = {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑛 − 2}. 
For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑1, let 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝐵𝒩 if 𝐵𝒩 ≠ 𝜙, and
{𝑖} otherwise.
 
I will show a) 𝜑 is a nomination rule on (𝔑1, 𝔛1), b) 𝜑 satisfies IMP, and c) 𝜑 satisfies PU.  
Proof of a). Take any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑1 . If 𝐵𝒩 = 𝜙 , it is clear that 𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖} ∈ 𝔛
1 . Suppose 
𝐵𝒩 ≠ 𝜙. I will show that 𝐵𝒩 is a singleton. Suppose to the contrary that |𝐵𝒩| ≥ 2. Then, we have  
∑𝑠𝜇(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
= |𝑁𝑖| +∑𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
 
      ≥ 1 + 2(𝑛 − 2) 
      = 𝑛 + (𝑛 − 3) > 𝑛. 
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The last inequality is given by 𝑛 ≥ 4. This contradicts Lemma 8.  
Proof of b). It is clear that 𝑖 is a dummy voter, i.e., his or her ballot has no effects on the 
nomination, under the rule. Take any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} and a ballot profile 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑗, 𝑁−𝑗) ∈ 𝔇. 
Because 𝑠𝑗( )  is determined without 𝑗 ’s ballot, we have 𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝒩 ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝒩′  for all 𝒩
′ =
(𝑁𝑗
′, 𝑁−𝑗) ∈ 𝔇. This implies 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
′).  
Proof of c). For any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?  and supposing 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1 . It follows that 
𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑛 − 2, which implies 𝑗 ∈ 𝐵𝒩. Therefore, we can derive 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). ■ 
3) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, 𝒌 ≥ 𝟐 or 𝒍 ≥ 𝟐. Suppose first that 𝑘 ≥ 2 (𝑙 is arbitrary). 
Consider two 𝑛-tuples of integers 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛), 𝑠
′ = (𝑠1
′ , … , 𝑠𝑛
′ ) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛 as follows: 
𝑠1 = 𝑠2 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑛 − 1, 
𝑠𝑘+1 = 𝑘, 
𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑘 + 2, 𝑘 + 3,… , 𝑛}, 
𝑠1
′ = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑘−1
′ = 𝑛 − 1, 
𝑠𝑘
′ = 𝑛 − 2, 
𝑠𝑘+1
′ = 𝑘(< 𝑛 − 1), 
𝑠𝑘+2
′ = 1, and 
𝑠𝜇
′ = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1,2,… , 𝑘 + 2}. 
According to Lemma 8, 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔑𝑘 exist such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠 and 𝑠(𝒩′) = 𝑠′. The codomain 𝔛𝑙 
demands |𝜑(𝒩)| = |𝜑(𝒩′)| = 𝑙 . However, PU demands 𝜑(𝒩) = {1,… , 𝑘}  and 𝜑(𝒩′) =
{1,… , 𝑘 − 1}. Whether 𝑘 = 𝑙 or 𝑘 ≠ 𝑙, this ends with a contradiction.  
Finally, consider the case of 𝑘 = 1 and 𝑙 ≥ 2. Then the score profile 𝑠 defined above is 
also well-defined. PU demands 𝜑(𝒩) = {1}  and 𝑙 ≥ 2  implies {1} ∉ 𝔛𝑙 . This is also a 
contradiction. ■ 
4) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍. I will show two things here. 
a) If 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2 or 𝑙 ≥ 2, there is no nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies IMP and PU.  
b) If 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 3 and 𝑙 = 1, a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 exists that satisfies IMP and PU.  
Proof of a). The impossibility for the case of 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2 is shown as a). Let us assume that 
𝑙 ≥ 2. I will first show the following inequality: 
0 < 𝑛𝑘 − (𝑛 − 1) ≤ (𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2) ⋅⋅⋅ (⋆). 
For the left-hand side, we have  
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑛 − 1) = 𝑛(𝑘 − 1) + 1 > 0. 
This inequality is given by 𝑘 ≥ 1. For the right-hand side, we have 
(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2) − {𝑛𝑘 − (𝑛 − 1)} 
= 𝑛(𝑛 − 2 − 𝑘) − 𝑛 + 2 + 𝑛 − 1 > 0. 
The inequality is given by 𝑛 ≥ 𝑘 + 2. Thus, we know that (⋆) holds. Therefore, there exist a pair of 
integers (𝑝, 𝑞) ∈ ℤ2 such that: 
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𝑛𝑘 − (𝑛 − 1) = 𝑝(𝑛 − 2) + 𝑞, and 
0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑞 < 𝑛 − 2. 
Note that 𝑞 > 0 can hold only if 𝑝 < 𝑛 − 1 . With these integers, we can consider 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 as 
follows: 
𝑠1 = 𝑛 − 1, 
𝑠𝜇 = 𝑛 − 2 for all 2 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑝 + 1, 
𝑠𝑝+2 = 𝑞, and 
𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝑝 + 3 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑛. 
Then, it follows that the sum of 𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛 is (𝑛 − 1) + 𝑝(𝑛 − 2) + 𝑞 = 𝑛𝑘 (this holds whether 𝑞 >
0  or 𝑞 = 0 ). So, according to Lemma 8, 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘  exists such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠 . PU demands 
𝜑(𝒩) = {1} and 𝑙 ≥ 2 implies {1} ∉ 𝔛𝑙. This contradiction proves the proposition. ■ 
 Proof of b). Suppose 𝑘 ≥ 𝑛 − 3 and 𝑙 = 1 . We construct a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 →
?̅?(= ?̅?1) that satisfies IMP and PU. Let us define 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅? as follows:  
For all 𝒩 ∈ ?̅?,  
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝐹𝒩 if 𝑠𝐹𝒩 = 𝑛 − 1,
{𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│(𝐹𝒩 ∖ {𝑖}) ⊆ 𝑁𝑖} if 𝑠𝐹𝒩 = 𝑛 − 2
?̅?.
, and 
Recall that 𝐹𝒩 is the set of individuals who have the largest scores at 𝒩, and 𝑠𝐹𝒩  denotes the score 
of the individuals in 𝐹𝒩. I will show the following:  
1. 𝜑 is a nomination rule on the setting (𝔑𝑘, ?̅?), and 
2. 𝜑 satisfies PU and IMP.  
1. 𝜑 is a nomination rule on the setting (𝔑𝑘, ?̅?). To show this, we need only to prove that 
𝜑(𝒩) ≠ 𝜙 for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. Take 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. If 𝑠𝐹𝒩 ≠ 𝑛 − 2, it is obvious that 𝜑(𝒩) ≠ 𝜙. Suppose 
𝑠𝐹𝒩 = 𝑛 − 2. Let 𝑊𝒩 ≔ {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│(𝐹𝒩 ∖ {𝑖}) ⊆ 𝑁𝑖}. If |𝐹𝒩| = 1, its element clearly also belongs to 
𝑊𝒩. So, we can focus on the case of |𝐹𝒩| ≥ 2. Indeed, we can also say that |𝐹𝒩| ≤ 𝑛 − 1 as follows. 
If |𝐹𝒩| = 𝑛, the sum of individuals’ scores would be 𝑛(𝑛 − 2) > 𝑛(𝑛 − 3) ≥ 𝑛𝑘, which contradicts 
Lemma 8. So, we can conclude that 2 ≤ |𝐹𝒩| ≤ 𝑛 − 1. Let us label them as 𝐹𝒩 = {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑝}, where 
2 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. Take an individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ 𝐹𝒩. Now, assume that 𝑊𝒩 ∩ 𝐹𝒩 = 𝜙. I will show that 
𝑗 ∈ 𝑊𝒩 . Because 𝑊𝒩 ∩ 𝐹𝒩 = 𝜙 , for any individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩 , there is an individual 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩 ∖ {𝑖} 
such that 𝑎𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑖 . If 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖′  for some distinct 𝑖, 𝑖
′ ∈ {𝑖1,… , 𝑖𝑝} , it follows that 𝑠𝑎𝑖(𝒩)(=
𝑠𝑎𝑖′
(𝒩)) ≤ ?̅? ∖ {𝑎𝑖, 𝑖, 𝑖
′} ≤ 𝑛 − 3 , which contradicts 𝑎𝑖(= 𝑎𝑖′) ∈ 𝐹𝒩 . Thus, we have that 
{𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑝} = {𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑝}. In other words, for any individual 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩, there is an individual 𝑖 ∈ 𝐹𝒩 
such that 𝑎𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑖 . Because 𝑠𝐹𝒩 = 𝑛 − 2 , it follows that everyone in ?̅? ∖ 𝐹𝒩 approves the whole 
𝐹𝒩. Therefore, we have 𝐹𝒩 ⊆ 𝑁𝑗, which means 𝑗 ∈ 𝑊𝒩.  
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2. 𝜑 satisfies PU and IMP. This rule clearly satisfies PU, and I show that it also satisfies IMP. 
The basic idea of the proof is similar to that of 𝜑𝑃 in Proposition 5. Note that one’s ballot does not 
impact one’s own score.  
Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? , 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 and 𝒩′ = (𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘 . If 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1 , then it is clear 
that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) and 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) = 𝑛 − 1. Thus, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′). If 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩), 
then it follows that 𝐹𝒩 ∖ {𝑖} ⊆ 𝑁𝑖. Therefore, we have 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≤ 𝑛 − 2 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}, where 
the equality holds only if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖. Because 𝑖’s score does not change, 𝐹𝒩′ is the set of individuals 
who obtain the score of 𝑛 − 2. Thus, we have 𝐹𝒩′ ∖ {𝑖} ⊆ 𝑁𝑖
′. This implies 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′).  
If 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩) , it follows that 𝐹𝒩 ∖ 𝑁𝑖 ≠ 𝜙 . If 𝑁𝑖
′ ∩ (𝐹𝒩 ∖ 𝑁𝑖) ≠ 𝜙 , 
then there is an individual who obtains a score of 𝑛 − 1 at the new ballot profile 𝒩′, which implies 
𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′). Suppose 𝑁𝑖
′ ∩ (𝐹𝒩 ∖ 𝑁𝑖) = 𝜙. Then it is clear that no one can obtain a score of 𝑛 − 1 at 
the new ballot profile 𝒩′. Furthermore, for some individual 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝒩 ∖ 𝑁𝑖, we have 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) = 𝑛 − 2. 
These facts show that 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝒩′ ∖ 𝑁𝑖
′. Therefore, we obtain 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′).  
If 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 3 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩), then it follows that 𝑠𝐹𝒩 ≤ 𝑛 − 2. Furthermore, we have 
{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2} ⊆ 𝑁𝑖 (whether or not the left-hand side is empty, this expression and the 
following proof hold). Therefore, we have 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′) ≤ 𝑛 − 2 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}, where the equality 
can hold only if 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖
′. This implies that we have one of the following: 
{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩
′) ≥ 𝑛 − 2} = 𝜙, or  
𝜙 ≠ {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩
′) ≥ 𝑛 − 2} = {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩
′) = 𝑛 − 2} ⊆ 𝑁𝑖
′. 
In either case, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′).  
  If 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 3 and 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩
′), we have one of the following: 
𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} exists such that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1, or 
𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} exists such that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. 
In either case, we also have one of the following:  
𝑝 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} exists such that 𝑠𝑝(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1, or 
𝑝 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} exists = 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖. 
In either case, we have 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′). ■ 
5) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌  and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍 , 𝒌 > 𝒍 . It is sufficient to find a ballot profile where 𝑘 
individuals have score 𝑛 − 1 . Let 𝑠 = (𝑠1,… , 𝑠𝑛) be such that 𝑠1 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑛 − 1 , 𝑠𝑘+1 = 𝑘 , 
and 𝑠𝑘+2 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑛 = 0. Because the sum of them is clearly 𝑛𝑘, Lemma 8 says that 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑
𝑘]. This 
completes the proof. ■ 
6) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, 𝒌 = 𝒏 − 𝟐. This proof is the same as for case 1). ■ 
7) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, 𝒌 = 𝟏. The rule we referred to in case 2) can be regarded as 
the nomination rule on the setting (𝔑1, 𝔛𝑙) for any 𝑙 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛. ■ 
Proof of Proposition 10-[3]. 
1) The Case of 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍. The reason that each of the conditions 𝑘 ≥ 2 or 𝑙 ≥ 2 yields the 
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impossibility is the same as in 3) of [2]. I will show the existence of the required nomination rule when 
𝑘 = 𝑙 = 1. Let 𝐹𝒩 be the individual in 𝐹𝒩 with the minimum index and define 𝜓𝐴𝑉:𝔑
1 → 𝔛1 as 
follows: 
𝜓𝐴𝑉(𝒩) = {
𝐹𝒩 if it is a singleton, and
{𝐹𝒩}  otherwise.
 
It is clear that 𝜓𝐴𝑉 satisfies AB. To see PU, we only need to check that the set {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 −
1} is a singleton or an empty set for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑1. This is shown in Lemma 8. ■ 
2) The Case of 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍. Recall that we have constructed a score profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈
𝕊[𝔑𝑘] such that 𝑠1 = 𝑛 − 1 > 𝑠𝑗 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1} in 4) of [2]. At the correspondent ballot profile 
𝒩, PU demands that 𝜑(𝒩) be {1}, which contradicts ?̅?𝑙, where 𝑙 ≥ 2. So, the rest of the proof is 
to show the possibility when 𝑙 = 1. However, the Approval Voting 𝜑𝐴𝑉:𝔑
1 → ?̅?1 surely satisfies 
both axioms. ■ 
3) The Case of 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍 . Note that the 𝑛 -tuple of integers 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) , where 𝑠1 =
⋯ = 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑛 − 1 , 𝑠𝑘+1 = 𝑘 , and 𝑠𝑘+1 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑛 = 0  makes a score profile in 𝔑
𝑘 . Because a 
nomination rule that satisfies PU must choose {1,2,… , 𝑘} at the correspondent ballot profile, it is 
necessary that 𝑘 ≤ 𝑙. Indeed, if 𝑘 ≤ 𝑙 holds, we can design a nomination rule that satisfies AB and 
PU simply by modifying the rule in 1). For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, I define 𝜑(𝒩) as follows: 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝐹𝒩 if 𝑠𝐹𝒩 = 𝑛 − 1, and
{𝐹𝒩}  otherwise.
 
It is obvious that this rule satisfies PU and AB. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 11 
1) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹,𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇, 𝕹𝑨𝑩. It is clear that 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝐶: 𝔇 → 𝔛
𝑙 for any 𝐶 ∈ 𝔛𝑙 satisfies IMP and 
AB. Let 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and AB. We show that this rule 𝜑 is the 
constant rule. Let us label the individuals as 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑙} = 𝐴  and ?̅? ∖ {𝒞
𝑛−1} =
{𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑛−𝑙} = 𝐵. Because we assumed 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, each of 𝐴 and 𝐵 is not empty. Suppose to 
the contrary that 𝜑 is not constant. Then, 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇 exists such that 𝜑(𝒩) ≠ 𝐴. Because |𝜑(𝒩)| =
𝑙, this implies that 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 ∩ 𝜑(𝒩) exists. Let 𝑑 ≔ 𝑠𝑏(𝒩). Let us consider an 𝑛-tuple of integers 
𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) as 𝑠𝑏 = 𝑑 and 𝑠𝑐 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝑐 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑏}. It follows that  
∑𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
= 𝑑 + (𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 1) 
    ≥ (𝑛 − 1)2 = (𝑛 −
3
2
)
2
−
5
4
+ 𝑛 
     ≥ 1 + 𝑛. 
The final inequality is given by 𝑛 ≥ 3. Therefore, according to Lemma 8, 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 exists such that 
𝑠(𝒩′) = 𝑠 . Because 𝑠𝑏(𝒩
′) = 𝑠𝑏(𝒩) and 𝑠𝑎(𝒩
′) = 𝑠𝑎(𝒞
𝑛−1) for all 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 , Lemma 7 shows 
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{𝑏} ∪ 𝐴 ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩′), which means 1 + 𝑙 ≤ |𝜑(𝒩′)|. This is in contradiction with the codomain 𝔛𝑙. ■ 
2) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌. Let 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛𝑙 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and AB—I will 
prove this by dividing it into two distinct cases. The proof for the first case, if 𝑙 = 1 , is a direct 
extension of that of Holzman and Moulin's (2013) Theorem 3. However, it does not apply generally if 
𝑙 ≥ 2. So, I will tackle it in a different way. Because we have 𝒞𝑘 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, we can label the individuals 
as 𝐴 ≔ 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑙} and 𝐵 ≔ ?̅? ∖ 𝜑(𝒞
𝑘) = {𝑏1,… , 𝑏𝑛−𝑙} . Note that 𝐴 ≠ 𝜙 and 𝐵 ≠ 𝜙 
by the assumption of 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. 
a) 𝑙 = 1. Suppose to the contrary that 𝜑 is not constant. Then there is an individual 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 
and a ballot profile 𝒩1 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑏 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩1) . Let 𝑑 ≔ 𝑠𝑏(𝒩) . Consider a special class of 
score profiles 𝑆 ⊆ 𝕊[𝔑𝑘] as follows: 
𝑆 = {(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ 𝕊[𝔑
𝑘]│𝑠1 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑙 = 𝑘 and 𝑠𝑏 = 𝑑}. 
Considering how we can assign the scores for the rest of the individual (i.e., 𝐵 ∖ {𝑏}), it follows that 
𝑆 is not empty if and only if the following inequality holds: 
0 ≤ 𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙𝑘 + 𝑑) ≤ (𝑛 − 𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1). 
This is equivalent to 
(𝑛 − 𝑙)𝑘 − (𝑛 − 𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1) ≤ 𝑑 ≤ (𝑛 − 𝑙)𝑘 ⋅⋅⋅ (⋆). 
Suppose (⋆) holds. Then, according to Lemma 8, we can find a ballot profile 𝒩2 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 
𝑠1(𝒩
2) = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑙(𝒩
2) = 𝑘 (= 𝑠1(𝒞
𝑘) = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑙(𝒞
𝑘)) 
𝑠𝑏(𝒩
2) = 𝑑 = 𝑠𝑏(𝒩
1). 
According to Lemma 7 and given that 𝐴 ⊆ 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) and 𝑏 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩1), we have 𝐴 ∪ {𝑏} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩2). 
However, this contradicts |𝜑(𝒩2)| = 𝑙.  
Therefore, we complete the proof if the parameters 𝑙 and 𝑘 satisfy (⋆) for any value of 
𝑑 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1} . The reader can easily check that if 𝑙 = 1 , (⋆)  holds for any 𝑛 ≥ 3 , 𝑘 ∈
{1,… , 𝑛 − 1} , and 𝑑 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1} . However, this argument does not always succeed. For 
example, if 𝑛 = 10, 𝑙 = 9, 𝑘 = 1, and 𝑑 = 2, it follows that 𝑑 = 2 > (𝑛 − 𝑙)𝑘 = (10 − 9) ⋅ 1 =
1.  
 b) 𝑙 ≥ 2. Let us introduce several notations. For any integers 𝑛1, 𝑛2 ∈ ℤ such that 𝑛1 ≤
𝑛2 , we write ⟦𝑛1, 𝑛2⟧ = {𝑛1, 𝑛1 + 1,… , 𝑛2} . With a slight abuse of terms, I write ⟦𝑛1, 𝑛2⟧  to 
represent an interval (from 𝑛1 to 𝑛2). Let 𝐼 = ⟦𝑛1, 𝑛2⟧ ⊆ ⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧ be an interval, and define two 
propositions 𝛷𝐴(𝐼) and 𝛷𝐵(𝐼) as follows: 
𝛷𝐴(𝐼) ⇔ For any 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 and for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑
𝑘, [𝑠𝑎(𝒩) ∈ 𝐼 ⇒ 𝑎 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩)] 
𝛷𝐵(𝐼) ⇔ For any 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 and for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑
𝑘, [𝑠𝑏(𝒩) ∈ 𝐼 ⇒ 𝑏 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩)] 
With this notation, I can state that my goal is to show 𝛷𝐴(⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧) and 𝛷𝐵(⟦0,𝑛 − 1⟧). Note that 
𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = 𝐴  implies 𝛷𝐴(⟦𝑘, 𝑘⟧)  and 𝛷𝐵(⟦𝑘, 𝑘⟧) . I will first show 𝛷𝐴(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧)  and 
𝛷𝐵(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧). I will subsequently prove it for the other intervals.  
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Step 1: To show 𝛷𝐴(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧) and 𝛷𝐵(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧) . Because 𝑙 ≥ 2 , we can 
take any two distinct individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐴. I will show that there is a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 
{𝑠𝑖(𝒩), 𝑠𝑗(𝒩)} = {𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1} and {𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩). Because 𝑖 and 𝑗 are arbitrary elements in 𝐴, 
to find such an 𝒩 is enough to show 𝛷𝐴(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧).   
b-1) If 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘  and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 . If 𝑘 = 1 , 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘  and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘  imply 𝑖 = 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  and 𝑗 =
𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This contradicts 𝑛 ≥ 3, and so we can assume 𝑘 ≥ 2. Now, I will show 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. Suppose to 
the contrary that 𝑖 = 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ . This is equivalent to 𝑖 = 𝑗 − (𝑛 − 1)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . However, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 implies 𝑖 ∈
{𝑗 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑗 − 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,… , 𝑗 − 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅}. These expressions indicate that 𝑛 − 1 ≤ 𝑘, which contradicts the assumption 
of 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2. Therefore, we can conclude that 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. Let us now focus on the individual 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
According to the definition, 𝐶𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘 = {𝑗 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑗 + 3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, … , 𝑗 + 1 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } . Because 1 + 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 , we have 
𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘 . On the other hand, 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘 and 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  imply 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘 ∖ {𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} = {𝑗 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, … , 𝑗 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} =
𝐶𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘 ∖ {𝑗 + 1 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } . Therefore, we can conclude that 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘  . In sum, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘  and 𝑗 ∉
𝐶𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
𝑘 .  
Let 𝜇 = 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ and consider a ballot profile 𝒩3 = (𝑁1
3,… ,𝑁𝑛
3) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that:  
𝑁𝜇
3 = (𝐶𝜇
𝑘 ∪ {𝑗}) ∖ {𝑖}, and 
𝑁−𝜇
3 = 𝐶−𝜇
𝑘 . 
Clearly, 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) = 𝑘 − 1 , 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
3) = 𝑘 + 1 , and 𝑠𝜈(𝒩
3) = 𝑠𝜈(𝒞
𝑘)  for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} . 
Therefore, by Lemma 7, we have 𝜑(𝒞3) ∩ (?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}) = 𝜑(𝒩3) ∩ (?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}) . So, we have 
|𝜑(𝒩3) ∩ {𝑖, 𝑗}| = |𝜑(𝒞1) ∩ {𝑖, 𝑗}| = 2, which implies {𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩3).  
b-2) If 𝑖 ∉ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘. Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒞
𝑘) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒞
𝑘), 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} exists such that 𝑖 ∈
𝐶𝜇
𝑘 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝜇
𝑘. Therefore, we can consider a ballot profile 𝒩4 = (𝑁1
4, … , 𝑁𝑛
4) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that:  
𝑁𝜇
4 = (𝐶𝜇
𝑘 ∪ {𝑗}) ∖ {𝑖}, and 
𝑁−𝜇
4 = 𝐶−𝜇
𝑘 . 
Clearly, 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
4) = 𝑘 − 1 , 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
4) = 𝑘 + 1 , and 𝑠𝜈(𝒩
4) = 𝑠𝜈(𝒞
𝑘)  for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗} . 
Therefore, by Lemma 7, we have 𝜑(𝒞4) ∩ (?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}) = 𝜑(𝒩4) ∩ (?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}) . So, we have 
|𝜑(𝒩3) ∩ {𝑖, 𝑗}| = |𝜑(𝒞1) ∩ {𝑖, 𝑗}| = 2, which implies {𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩4). 
b-3) If 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 . In this case, for the reversed 𝑘 -cyclic ballot profile ℛ𝑘 =
(𝑅1
𝑘, … , 𝑅𝑛
𝑘) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 , we have 𝑖 ∉ 𝑅𝑗
𝑘  and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑖
𝑘 . Therefore, an argument similar to that in b-2) 
ensures that there is a ballot profile 𝒩5 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
5) = 𝑘 + 1 , 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
5) = 𝑘 − 1 , and 
{𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩5).  
b-4) If 𝑖 ∉ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘. Let us consider the individual 𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Note that 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘  and 
𝑖 ∉ 𝐶𝑗
𝑘 imply 𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉ {𝑖, 𝑗}. I will show 𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 . Because 𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑖
𝑘 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, we can say 
𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 ⊆ (𝐶𝑖
𝑘 ∪ {𝑖}). Therefore, we can say that 𝑗 ∉ 𝐶𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘  and 𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
𝑘 .  
Let 𝜇 = 𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . Then, just as in b-1), we can get a ballot profile 𝒩6 ∈ 𝔑𝑘  such that 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩
6) = 𝑘 − 1, 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
6) = 𝑘 + 1, and {𝑖, 𝑗} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩6).  
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The arguments in b-1) to b-4) show that we have the required ballot profile for any possible 
case. Because 𝑖 and 𝑗 were arbitrary elements in 𝐴 , we have 𝛷𝐴(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧) by Lemma 7. 
Then, it is easy to show 𝛷𝐵(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧). Take any individual 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵. By Lemma 7, it is sufficient 
to find two ballot profiles 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔑𝑘 where 𝑠𝑏(𝒩) = 𝑘 − 1, 𝑠𝑏(𝒩
′) = 𝑘 + 1, and 𝑏 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩) 
and 𝑏 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′). These ballot profiles are constructed in similar ways, and so we will construct only 
𝒩. Take an element 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 and consider an 𝑛-tuple of integers 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛 
as follows: 
𝑠𝑎 = 𝑘 + 1, 
𝑠𝑏 = 𝑘 − 1, and 
𝑠𝑐 = 𝑘 for all 𝑐 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑎, 𝑏}. 
Then, with Lemma 7, we obtain 𝜑(𝒩) ∩ (?̅? ∖ {𝑏}) = 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) . Because |𝜑(𝒩)| = |𝜑(𝒞𝑘)| , it 
follows that 𝑏 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩). With a similar argument on 𝒩′, we can conclude 𝛷𝐵(⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧).  
Step 2: 𝛷𝐴(⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧) and 𝛷𝐵(⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧) . Take any 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝑑 ∈ ⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧ ∖ ⟦𝑘 −
1, 𝑘 + 1⟧, and label the other individuals as 𝐶 ≔ ?̅? ∖ {𝑎} = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐𝑛−1}. Consider an 𝑛-tuple of 
integers 𝑠7 = (𝑠1
7, … , 𝑠𝑛
7) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛 as follows: 
𝑠𝑎
7 = 𝑑, 
𝑠𝜇
7 = 𝑘 − sgn(𝑑 − 𝑘) for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑐1, 𝑐2, … , 𝑐|𝑑−𝑘|}
34, and 
𝑠𝜇
7 = 𝑘 for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑐|𝑑−𝑘|+1, 𝑐|𝑑−𝑘|+2, … , 𝑐𝑛−1}. 
Then, we can calculate the sum as follows: 
∑𝑠𝜇
𝑛
𝜇=1
= 𝑑 + |𝑑 − 𝑘| ⋅ {𝑘 − sgn(𝑑 − 𝑘)} + (𝑛 − 1 − |𝑑 − 𝑘|)𝑘 = 𝑛𝑘 
Therefore, by Lemma 8, 𝒩7 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 exists such that 𝑠(𝒩7) = 𝑠7. With Lemma 7 and step 1, we have 
𝐶 ∩ 𝐴 ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩7)  and (𝐶 ∩ 𝐵) ∩ 𝜑(𝒩7) = 𝜙 . By |𝜑(𝒩7)| = 𝑙 = |𝐶 ∩ 𝐴| + 1 , we have 𝑎 ∈
𝜑(𝒩7) . Because 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝑑 ∈ ⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧ ∖ ⟦𝑘 − 1, 𝑘 + 1⟧ were arbitrary, we have 𝛷𝐴(⟦0, 𝑛 −
1⟧). A similar argument for 𝑏 ∈ 𝐵 instead of 𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 derives 𝛷𝐵(⟦0, 𝑛 − 1⟧). ■ 
 
Notes on Proposition 11. I will show the necessity of each axiom in the statement.  
1) Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘. A nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 exists that satisfies IMP but is not the 
constant rule.  
The proof. Let us define a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 as follows:  
For all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇,  
𝜑(𝒩) = {
{1,2,… , 𝑙} if 𝑙 ∈ 𝑁1, and
{1,2,… , 𝑙 − 1, 𝑙 + 1} otherwise
 
                                                         
34 For any integer 𝑧 ∈ ℤ, we write the following:  
sgn(𝑧) = {
+1 if 𝑧 > 0
0 if 𝑧 = 0
−1 if 𝑧 < 0
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Clearly, this rule is impartial but not constant. ■ 
2) Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘. A nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 exists that satisfies AB but is not 
constant. 
The proof. Let us define 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 as follows:  
For all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔇,  
𝜑(𝒩) = {
{1,2,… , 𝑙} if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) is the largest among {𝑠𝑗(𝒩)}𝑗∈?̅?, and
{𝑛, 𝑛 − 1, … , 𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1} otherwise
 
Note that 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 implies 𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1 > 1. So, this rule satisfies AB but is not constant. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 12 
1) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇. IMP and AB⇔constant. For any 𝑋 ∈ ?̅?𝑙, it is clear that 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋:𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 →
?̅?𝑙 satisfies IMP and AB. Let 𝜑:𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 → ?̅?𝑙 be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP and AB. Take 
any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. I will show the following:  
For any 𝑑 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1} , there is a pair of ballot profiles 𝒩,𝒩′ ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑑, 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′) = 𝑑 + 1, and 𝒩 ~𝑖 𝒩
′.  
If this statement is shown, Lemma 7 guarantees that 𝜑 is nothing but the constant rule, because 𝑖 ∈
?̅? was arbitrary. I first show the statement for the case of 𝑑 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}. In this case, we have 
𝒞𝑑 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓. Let us consider a ballot profile 𝒩1 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 such that: 
𝑁𝑖
1 = 𝐶𝑖
𝑑 ∪ {𝑖}, and  
𝑁−𝑖
1 = 𝐶−𝑖
𝑑 . 
Then, IMP demands 𝒞𝑑 ~i 𝒩
1, where 𝑠𝑖(𝒞
𝑑) = 𝑑 and 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
1) = 𝑑 + 1.  
  Next, we consider the case of 𝑑 = 0. Consider a ballot profile 𝒩2 ∈ 𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 as 𝑁𝜇
2 = {𝜇} 
for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? . Then, let 𝒩3 ∈ 𝔑3  be such that 𝑁𝑖
3 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }  and 𝑁−𝑖 
3 = 𝑁−𝑖
2  . IMP demands 
𝒩3 ~𝑖 𝒩
2, while 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) = 𝑑 and 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
2) = 𝑑 + 1.  
2) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩. 
a) Let 𝒍 ≥ 𝟐. NU⇒Impossible. Let us consider a ballot profile 𝒩4 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵 as 𝑁1
4 = {2} 
and 𝑁−1
4 = 𝜙. Then, 𝑙 ≥ 2 implies that there are at least two winners. However, only individual 1 
obtains a positive score. This contradicts NU. ■ 
b) Let 𝒍 = 𝟏. IMP, AB, and NU⇔𝝋𝟏. It is clear that 𝜑1:𝔑𝐴𝐵 → ?̅?1 satisfies all the three 
axioms.35 Take a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛 that satisfies the three axioms and take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. For 
NU, it is enough to show the following: for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵, if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) > 0, then 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). By Lemma 
7, we must only find, for each integer 𝑑 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} , a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵 such that 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑑 and 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
For 𝑑 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, let us consider 𝒞𝑑 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵. Because 𝜙 ∉ ?̅?1, we have 𝜇 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞𝑑), while 
𝑠𝜇(𝒞
𝑑) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒞
𝑑). With Lemma 9, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞𝑑). Finally, consider the case of 𝑑 = 𝑛 − 1. Let 
                                                         
35 It is also easy to see that 𝜑1 is surely a well-defined nomination rule on this setting.  
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𝒩5 ∈ 𝔑 as follows: 
𝑁𝑖
5 = 𝜙, and 
𝑁𝑗
5 = {𝑖} for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}. 
Because everyone except 𝑖 obtains a score of zero, NU implies (?̅? ∖ {𝑖}) ∩ 𝜑(𝒩5) = 𝜙 . So, we 
have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩5), where 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1. ■ 
 
3) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝒍 ≥ 𝟑. NU⇒Impossible. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and let 𝒩7 ∈ 𝔑 as 𝑁𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
7 =
{𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }  and 𝑁𝜈
7 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } for all 𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } . Because |𝜑(𝒩7)| ≥ 3 , 𝜇 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩7)  exists 
such that 𝑠𝜇(𝒩
7) = 0, contradicting NU. ■ 
4) The case of 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝒍 = 𝟐: IMP, AB, NU⇔𝝋𝟏.This proof can be carried out in the same 
way as b) in 2). ■ 
5) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝒍 = 𝟏. It is clear that 𝜑1 satisfies the five axioms. Let 𝜑:𝔑 → ?̅?1 be 
a nomination rule that satisfies the five axioms. By Lemma 10, we have 𝜑(𝒞1) = ⋯ = 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) =
?̅?. With Lemma 7, this shows that any individual wins the election once they obtain positive scores. 
■ 
6) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝒍 ≥ 𝒌 + 𝟐. 
Let 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛 be such that: 
𝑠1 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑛 − 1, 
𝑠𝑘+1 = 𝑛𝑘 − (𝑛 − 1)𝑘 = 𝑘, and 
𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1,… , 𝑘 + 1}. 
Because the sum of each set of 𝑠𝑖’s is clearly 𝑛𝑘, we have from Lemma 8 that 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑
𝑘]. Because 
|𝜑(𝑠)| ≥ 𝑙 ≥ 𝑘 + 2, 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {1,… , 𝑘 + 1} exists such that 𝜇 ∈ 𝜑(𝑠). This contradicts NU. ■  
7) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. From Lemma 11, it is obvious that a nomination rule 
satisfies the five axioms only if it is a threshold rule. Thus, to show the following is enough to prove 
the proposition.  
a) For any integer 𝑥 ∈ {1,2,… , ⌈
𝑛𝑘−(𝑙−1)(𝑛−1)
𝑛−𝑙+1
⌉}, the threshold-𝑥 rule 𝜑𝑥 is well defined 
as a function from 𝔑𝑘 to ?̅?𝑙, and it satisfies the five axioms.  
b) For any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≥ ⌈
𝑛𝑘−(𝑙−1)(𝑛−1)
𝑛−𝑙+1
⌉ then 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
Let  
𝑑 ≔ ⌈
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ , and 
𝜖 ≔ 𝑑 −
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
. 
Note that we have 0 ≤ 𝜖 < 1.  
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a) Take any integer 𝑥 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑑} and take any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. Suppose to the 
contrary that {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑥} ≤ 𝑙 − 1. Then, it follows that at least 𝑛 − (𝑙 − 1) individuals 
have a score strictly less than 𝑥. Note that 𝑥 ≤ 𝑑 implies the following: 
𝑥 ≤ ⌈
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ 
⇔ 𝑥 − 1 ≤ ⌈
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
⌉ − 1. 
Because 𝑥 − 1 ∈ ℕ ∪ {0}, it follows that 
0 ≤ 𝑥 − 1 <
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
. 
Therefore, the sum of individuals’ scores can be bounded above as follows: 
∑𝑠𝑖(𝒩)
𝑛
𝑖=1
≤ (𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1)(𝑥 − 1) + (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1) 
     < (𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1)
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
+ (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1) = 𝑛𝑘. 
This clearly contradicts Lemma 8. Thus, we determine 𝜑𝑥 is actually a function from 𝔑𝑘 to ?̅?𝑙.  
b) I will find a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 and an individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑑 and 
𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). According to Lemma 11, this is enough to prove the proposition.  
If 𝑙 = 1, it follows that: 
𝑑 = ⌈
𝑛𝑘 − (1 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 1 + 1
⌉ = ⌈𝑘⌉ = 𝑘. 
Therefore, 𝒞𝑘 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 has the required property. Assume 𝑙 ≥ 2. Let us consider 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) as 
follows:  
𝑠𝜇 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅?, 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑙 − 2, 
𝑠𝑙−1 = 𝑛 − 1 − 𝜖(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1), and 
𝑠𝜇 = 𝑑 for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑙, 𝑙 + 1, … , 𝑛}. 
Indeed, I am going to check that 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ 𝕊[𝔑
𝑘] . To check that 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈
{0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛, it is sufficient to check that 𝑠𝑙−1 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1} because the others are clearly in 
the interval.  
𝑠𝑙−1 = 𝑛 − 1 − 𝜖(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) = 𝑛 − 1 − (𝑑 −
𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1)
𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1
) (𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) 
    = 𝑛 − 1 − 𝑑(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) + 𝑛𝑘 − (𝑙 − 1)(𝑛 − 1). 
So, we have 𝑠𝑙−1 ∈ ℤ. Because 0 ≤ 𝜖 < 1 and 𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1 > 0, we also have the following: 
𝑛 − 1 ≥ 𝑠𝑙−1 = 𝑛 − 1 − 𝜖(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) ≥ 𝑛 − 1− (𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) = 𝑙 − 2 ≥ 0. 
Therefore, we have 𝑠𝑙−1 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}.  
In addition, the sum of their scores can be calculated as follows: 
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∑𝑠𝜇
𝑛
𝜇=1
= (𝑛 − 1)(𝑙 − 2) + {𝑛 − 1 − 𝜖(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1)} + 𝑑(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) 
    = 𝑛𝑙 − 𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1 − 𝑘 + (𝑑 − 𝜖)(𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) = 𝑛𝑘. 
The last equation is given by 𝜖 = 𝑑 −
𝑛𝑘−(𝑙−1)(𝑛−1)
𝑛−𝑙+1
. Therefore, Lemma 8 guarantees 𝑠 =
(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ 𝕊[𝔑
𝑘]. Because |𝜑(𝑠)| ≥ 𝑙, 𝑖 ∈ {𝑙, 𝑙 + 1,… , 𝑛} exists such that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝑠), while 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑑. ■ 
 
Notes on Proposition 12 
I will show the logical independence of each axiom in each proposition by giving examples. Because 
in many cases it is quite easy to determine that the proposed nomination rule satisfies the axioms, I 
introduce most of the examples without proof, while I give some comments for complicated ones.  
1) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍. IMP but not AB. Take a pivotal individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and let 
𝜑:𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 → ?̅?𝑙 be a nomination rule such that: 
𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖,̅ 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑙 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} ∪ (𝑁𝑖 ∩ {𝑖 + 𝑙̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑛 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }). 
2) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍. AB but not IMP. Let 𝜑:𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 → ?̅?𝑙 be a nomination rule such 
that:  
𝜑(𝒩) = {1,2,… , 𝑙 − 1} ∪ {𝑖 ∈ {𝑙, 𝑙 + 1, … , 𝑛}│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) for all 𝑗 ∈ {𝑙, 𝑙 + 1,… , 𝑛 − 1}} 
Note that because 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, we have |{𝑙, 𝑙 + 1, … , 𝑛}| ≥ 2. Hence, this nomination rule is not the 
constant rule.  
3) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟏. IMP, AB, but not NU. 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?:𝔑
𝐴𝐵 → ?̅?1 clearly satisfies 
IMP and AB, but not NU. ■ 
4) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟏. IMP, NU, but not AB. Let 𝜑𝑃
1(𝒩):𝔑AB → ?̅?𝑙 be defined 
as 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝜑𝑃(𝒩) if 𝑠𝐹𝒩 ≥ 2, and 
𝜑1(𝒩) otherwise
 
The fact that the rule satisfies NU but not AB is obvious. I will show that it also satisfies IMP. Take 
any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵. If there is an individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? such that 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) ≥ 2, 
then we can show that 𝜑(𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖) = 𝜑𝑃(𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖) for all 𝑁𝑖
′ ∈ 𝔑𝑖
𝐴𝐵. Thus, 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑖 ∈
𝜑(𝑁𝑖
′, 𝑁−𝑖). Suppose there is no such 𝑗. Then we have either 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖
−𝑖(𝒩) = {1,0}. If 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 0, there is no way for 𝑖 to win. Suppose 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 1. Then, 𝑖 wins, no matter what ballot 
he or she casts. ■ 
5) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟏. AB, NU, but not IMP. The Approval Voting rule 𝜑𝐴𝑉 
satisfies AB and NU but not IMP. ■ 
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6) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 ≤ 𝟐. NU.  The threshold-1 rule 𝜑1:𝔑 → ?̅?𝑙 is well-defined and 
satisfies NU. ■ 
7) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟐. IMP, AB, but not NU: The constant rule 𝑐𝑜𝑛?̅?.  
8) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟐. IMP, NU, but not AB: The rule in 10) has these properties. 
9) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟐. AB, NU, but not IMP. 
𝜑(𝒩) = 𝐹𝒩 ∪ {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│∃𝑗 ∈ 𝐹𝒩 s. t.  𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑗} 
10) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 = 𝟏: See 4.2.2.  
11) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. IMP, AB, 2CN, NU but not WM. Take 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. If 𝑙 ≤
𝑘, the nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅?𝑙 defined as follows has the required properties:  
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝜑1(𝒩) ∖ {𝑖} if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1, and
𝜑1(𝒩) otherwise
 
  If 𝑙 = 𝑘 + 1, the existence of a required nomination rule depends on 𝑛 and 𝑘. It is 
obvious that every individual wins once they obtain score of at least 𝑘 (by considering a score 
profile where the first 𝑘 − 1 individuals obtain 𝑛 − 1, the 𝑘𝑡ℎ obtains 𝑚 ∈ {𝑘, 𝑘 + 1, … , 𝑛 − 1}, 
the (𝑘 + 1)𝑡ℎ obtains score 𝑛 − 1−𝑚, and the others obtain a score of zero). Thus, if 𝑘 = 1, a 
nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅?𝑙 satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, and NU if and only if it is the threshold-1 
rule 𝜑1. On the other hand, if 𝑛 = 10 and 𝑘 = 8, for example, it is easy to see that the following 
nomination rule has the required properties:  
𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≠ 2,0}. 
12) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. IMP, AB, 2CN, WM, but not NU: The constant rule 
conN̅.  
13) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. IMP, AB, NU, WM, but not 2CN. It depends. If 𝑘 ≥
2, then let 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅?𝑙 be such that 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝜑1(𝒩) ∖ {𝑖} if 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 1, and
𝜑1(𝒩) otherwise
 
14) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. IMP, 2CN, NU, WM, but not AB. Let 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅?𝑙 be 
such that 
𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑁𝑖 ∪ {𝑗 ∈ ?̅?│𝑗 ∈ ⋃ 𝑁𝜇
𝜇∈𝑁𝑖
}. 
Clearly, this has the necessary properties.  
15) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = ?̅?𝒍, 𝒍 ≤ 𝒌 + 𝟏. AB, 2CN, NU, WM, but not IMP: Let us denote by 
𝑊(𝒩) the set of individuals who have the smallest score at a ballot profile 𝒩 (i.e., 𝑊(𝒩) =
{𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?}). Let us define a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑
𝐴𝐵 → ?̅?𝑙 as follows: 
For any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵,  
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𝜑(𝒩) = {
?̅? ∖ 𝑊(𝒩) if |𝑊(𝒩)| = 1, and
?̅? otherwise.
 
 
Proof of Proposition 13 
1) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇. IMP and AB⇔Constant. This proof is the same as that of 𝔛 = ?̅?𝑙.  
2) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩. 
a) WPU ⇒ Impossibility. WPU demands 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) = ?̅? , while ?̅? ∉ 𝔛𝑙 . Thus, no 
nomination rule satisfies WPU.  
b) IMP, AB, and NU⇒Impossibility. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝐴𝐵 → 𝔛𝑙 exists that 
satisfies IMP, AB, and NU. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and consider a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝐴𝐵 as 𝑁𝑖−1 = {𝑖} 
and 𝑁𝑗 = 𝜙 for all 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?. Then, by NU, we have (?̅? ∖ {𝑖}) ∩ 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝜙. Because 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛
𝑙, we have 
𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩), while 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 1. Note that 𝑖 was an arbitrary individual in ?̅?. Therefore, with Lemma 
7, we have 𝜑(𝒩) = ?̅?. This contradicts the codomain of 𝔛𝑙 (𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1). ■ 
3) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹. 
a) WPU⇒Impossibility. Because 𝒞𝑛−1 ∈ 𝔑, WPU demands 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) = ?̅? and ?̅? ∉ 𝔛𝑙. 
■ 
b) Let 𝒍 ≤ 𝒏 − 𝟐. IMP, AB, and NU⇒Impossibility. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑 →
𝔛𝑙 exists that satisfies IMP, AB, and NU. Because 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, there are two distinct individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈
?̅? such that {𝑖, 𝑗} ∩ 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) = 𝜙. However, Lemma 8 says that 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ 𝕊[𝔑] such that 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑛 − 1 and 𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. With Lemma 7, we have 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝑠) and 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝑠). 
With NU, we determine that (?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}) ∩ 𝜑(𝑠) = 𝜙. Therefore, it follows that 𝜑(𝑠) = 𝜙, which 
contradicts 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛𝑙. ■ 
c) Let 𝒍 = 𝒏 − 𝟏. IMP, AB, and NU⇔𝝋−𝒊
𝟏 .It is clear that 𝜑−𝑖
1  satisfies the three axioms. 
Let 𝜑:𝔑 → 𝔛𝑙 (𝑙 = 𝑛 − 1) be a nomination rule that satisfies IMP, AB, and NU. I will show that 𝜑 
is identical to 𝜑−𝑖
1  for some 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?.  
Step 1: To show that 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) = ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} for some 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. I now show that |𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1)| ≥
𝑛 − 1 . Suppose to the contrary that there are two distinct individuals 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? such that {𝑖, 𝑗} ∩
𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1) = 𝜙. Then, the same argument as in b) leads to a contradiction. Therefore, we have that 
|𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1)| ≥ 𝑛 − 1. Because the codomain is 𝔛𝑙, it follows that |𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1)| = 𝑛 − 1. Let us denote 
as {𝑖} = ?̅? ∖ 𝜑(𝒞𝑛−1). This completes step 1.  
Next I am going to show that 𝜑 is identical to 𝜑−𝑖
1  for the individual 𝑖. To show this, I 
need to show the following: (e1) is shown in step 2 and (e2) will be shown in step 3. 
(e1). For any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} and for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑, 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) ≥ 1 ⇔ 𝑗 ∈
𝜑(𝒩). 
(e2). For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑, 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩). 
Step 2: To show that 𝜑1(𝒩) ∖ {𝑖} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩) . The “if” part of (e1) is obvious from NU. 
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Therefore, I will show the “only if” part. According to Lemma 7, I need only find, for each 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑖} and 𝑑 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} , a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑑 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) . Take 
any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}  and 𝑑 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1} . Consider a score profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈
{0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}𝑛 as 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑛 − 1, 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑑, and 𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. Because 𝑠𝑖 + 𝑠𝑗 = 𝑑 +
𝑛 − 1 ≥ 𝑛, it is certain that 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑] by Lemma 8. Based on step 1 and Lemma 7, we obtain 𝑖 ∉
𝜑(𝑠). NU demands that (?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}) ∩ 𝜑(𝑠) = 𝜙. Because 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛𝑙, we have 𝜑(𝑠) = {𝑗}, while 𝑠𝑗 =
𝑑.  
Step 3: To show that 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩) for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 . I show (e2) here. By Lemma 7, it is 
sufficient to find, for each 𝑑 = {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}, a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑑 and 
𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩). The case of 𝑑 = 0 is straightforward from NU. Suppose 𝑑 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑛 − 1}—we then 
have 𝒞𝑑 ∈ 𝔑. Furthermore, step 2 and Lemma 7 together show that (?̅? ∖ {𝑖}) ⊆ 𝜑(𝒞𝑑). Because the 
codomain is 𝔛𝑙 and 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1, we have 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒞𝑑). ■ 
4) The Case of 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌. 
a) Let 𝒍 < 𝒌 . WPU⇒Impossibility. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑 → 𝔛𝑙  exists that 
satisfies WPU. Let 𝑠 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) be such that 𝑠𝜇 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝜇 ∈ {1,2,… , 𝑘} , 𝑠𝑘 = 𝑘 , and 
𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑘 + 1, 𝑘 + 2,… , 𝑛} . Because the sum of these is exactly 𝑛𝑘 , Lemma 8 
guarantees that 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 exists such that 𝑠(𝒩) = 𝑠. WPU demands {1,2,… , 𝑘} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩). However, 
𝑙 < 𝑘 implies {1,2,… , 𝑘} ∉ 𝔛𝑙. This is a contradiction. ■ 
b) Let 𝒍 = 𝒌 and 𝒏 = 𝟑. IMP and WPU⇒Impossibility. This case happens only if 𝑘 =
𝑙 = 1 (because we assumed 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 ). Suppose 𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = 𝜑(𝒞1) = {𝑖} . Consider 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 
as 𝑁𝑖 = {𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } and 𝑁𝜇 = 𝐶𝜇
1 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}. IMP demands 𝒞1 ~𝑖 𝒩, so we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). 
WPU demands 𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) . Therefore, it follows {𝑖, 𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩) , which contradicts the 
codomain of 𝔛𝑙 = 𝔛1. ■ 
c) Let 𝒍 = 𝒌 and 𝒏 ≥ 𝟒. IMP and WPU.  I introduce two examples. The former is for 
𝑘 = 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 3, while the latter is for 𝑘 = 𝑙 = 𝑛 − 2.  
c1) The case of 𝑘 = 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 3. Take a pivotal individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈
𝔑𝑘 , we define 𝑈𝒩 = {𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝜇 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}}  as the set of individuals who 
obtain the maximum approvals from the individuals in ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}. Therefore, we can also express 𝑈𝒩 
as follows: 
𝑈𝒩 = {𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2}. 
Now, let us define a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛𝑙 as follows:  
For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘,  
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝑈𝒩 ∪ {𝑖} if |𝑈𝒩| < 𝑙, and
𝑈𝒩 otherwise.
 
Note that this rule is shown to satisfy WPU but it does not take into account all of the pivotal individual 
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𝑖’s ballots.  
To show that for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, 𝜑(𝒩) ∈ 𝔛𝑙. Take any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. 
It is clear that 𝜑(𝒩) ≠ 𝜙. It is also clear that |𝜑(𝒩)| = |𝑈𝒩| + 1 ≤ 𝑙 holds whenever |𝑈𝒩| < 𝑙. 
Thus, we show that |𝜑(𝒩)| ≤ 𝑙 holds even if |𝑈𝒩| ≥ 𝑙. This is equivalent to showing that |𝑈𝒩| ≤
𝑙 for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. Suppose to the contrary that |𝑈𝒩| ≥ 𝑙 + 1. Then, we have the following: 
∑ 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
≥ (𝑛 − 2)(𝑙 + 1). 
At the same time, the left-hand side is bounded above as follows: 
∑ 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
= ∑ |𝑁𝑗 ∖ {𝑖}|
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
≤ ∑ 𝑘
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
= (𝑛 − 1)𝑘. 
Therefore, it must be that: 
(𝑛 − 2)(𝑙 + 1) ≤ ∑ 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
≤ (𝑛 − 1)𝑘. 
However, the comparison of the right-hand side and the left-hand side gives the following: 
(𝑛 − 1)𝑘 − (𝑛 − 2)(𝑙 + 1) = −(𝑛 − 𝑙 − 2) < 0. 
The last inequality is given by 𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 3 ⇔ 𝑛 − 𝑙 − 3 ≥ 0. This contradiction proves that |𝑈𝒩| ≤ 𝑙.  
To show that 𝜑 satisfies IMP. Take any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? and 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑗, 𝑁−𝑗) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘 . I 
show that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝑁𝑗
′,𝑁−𝑗) for all 𝑁𝑗
′ ∈ 𝔑𝑘. If 𝑗 = 𝑖, this is obvious. So, I assume that 
𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}. Take any of 𝑗’s ballots, 𝑁𝑗
′ ∈ 𝔑𝑗 , and consider a ballot profile 𝒩
′ = (𝑁𝑗
′, 𝑁−𝑗) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘. 
Note that 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩′). So, we have 𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝒩 ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝒩′. According to the definition, whether 
𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} wins under the rule or not is entirely determined by whether 𝑗 belongs to 𝑈𝒩. Hence, 
we determine that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′).  
To show that 𝜑 satisfies WPU. Take any non-pivotal individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} and any ballot 
profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘. If 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1, then we have 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2, which implies 𝑗 ∈ 𝑈𝒩. So, we 
can say that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩).  
Let me show WPU on the pivotal individual 𝑖. Take any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 −
1 . Suppose to the contrary that 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩) . It follows that |𝑈𝒩| = 𝑙  (recall that |𝑈𝒩| ≤ 𝑙 − 1 
implies 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩)). Therefore, we can calculate the sum of individuals’ scores as follows: 
∑𝑠𝜇(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
= 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) + ∑ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩)
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
 
= 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) + |𝑁𝑖| + ∑ 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑗∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
 
≥ 𝑛 − 1 + 𝑘 + (𝑛 − 2)𝑙 
= 𝑛𝑘 + 𝑛 − 𝑘 − 1 > 𝑛𝑘. 
This contradicts Lemma 8. Therefore, we obtain |𝑈𝒩| ≤ 𝑙 − 1 whenever 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1 , which 
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means 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩). ■ 
c2) The case of 𝑘 = 𝑙 = 𝑛 − 2. I take a pivotal individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? through this proof. I say 
that a ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 satisfies condition (⋆) if and only if:  
𝑠𝑖(𝒩)(= 𝑠𝑖
−𝑖(𝒩)) = 𝑛 − 2, and there is one (and only one) individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} such 
that 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑠𝑙
−𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 3 for all 𝑙 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
With this notation, let us define a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛𝑙 as for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 as follows: 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1} ∪ {𝑖} if 𝒩 satisfies condition (⋆)
{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1}.
 
I will show that this rule is well-defined and that it satisfies both IMP and WPU.  
To show that for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, 𝜑(𝒩) ≠ 𝜙. Take any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 and suppose 
𝜑(𝒩) = 𝜙. This can occur only if both the following hold: 
{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1} = 𝜙, and 
𝒩 fails to satisfy condition (⋆). 
Now I will derive a contradiction from these statements. From the first one, it follows that:  
|{𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 3}| ≥ 𝑘. 
(Otherwise, we cannot assign 𝑖’s ballot to ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} without making someone’s score reach 𝑛 − 1.) 
Indeed, we can further say that the value of the left-hand side is exactly 𝑘. Suppose to the contrary 
that |{𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 3}| = 𝑘 + 1(= 𝑛 − 1). Then, it follows that:  
∑𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
= 𝑠𝑖
−𝑖(𝒩) + ∑ 𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝜇∈?̅?∖{𝑖}
 
≤ 𝑛 − 2+ (𝑛 − 3)(𝑘 + 1) 
= 𝑘(𝑛 − 1) + 2(𝑛 − 𝑘) − 5 
< 𝑘(𝑛 − 1) − 1 < 𝑘(𝑛 − 1). 
However, we have also that: 
∑𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
= (∑𝑠𝜇(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
)− |𝑁𝑖| = 𝑛𝑘 − 𝑘 = 𝑘(𝑛 − 1). 
Clearly, this contradicts the inequality above. Thus, we can say that:  
|{𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 3}| = 𝑘. 
Let us denote {𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 3} = {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑘}  and {𝑗} = ?̅? ∖
{𝑖, 𝑎1, 𝑎2,… , 𝑎𝑘} . Because 𝒩  does not satisfy the condition (⋆) , we can say that 
(𝑠𝑖
−𝑖(𝒩), 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩)) ≠ (𝑛 − 2, 𝑛 − 2). Furthermore, because no one obtains the score of 𝑛 − 1 at the 
ballot profile 𝒩, it follows that:  
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𝑠𝑥
−𝑖(𝒩) ≤ 𝑛 − 2 for all 𝑥 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑗}, and 
𝑠𝑥
−𝑖(𝒩) < 𝑛 − 2 for some 𝑥 ∈ {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
So, we can take the sum of individuals’ scores as follows: 
∑𝑠𝜇(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
= |𝑁𝑖| + 𝑠𝑖
−𝑖(𝒩) + 𝑠𝑗
−𝑖(𝒩) +∑𝑠𝑎𝑥
−𝑖(𝒩)
𝑘
𝑥=1
 
< 𝑘 + 2(𝑛 − 2) + 𝑘(𝑛 − 3) = 𝑛𝑘. 
This contradicts Lemma 8.  
To show that for any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, |𝜑(𝒩)| ≤ 𝑙. Take any 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 and suppose 
|𝜑(𝒩)| ≥ 𝑙 + 1. I will consider two distinct cases here.  
The first case is {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1} ≥ 𝑙 + 1. The sum of the scores is calculated as 
follows: 
∑𝑠𝜇(𝒩)
𝑛
𝜇=1
≥ (𝑛 − 1)(𝑙 + 1) 
     = 𝑛𝑘 + (𝑛 − 𝑙 + 1) > 𝑛𝑘. 
The last inequality is given by the assumption of 𝑘 = 𝑙 = 𝑛 − 2. This result contradicts Lemma 8.  
The second case is {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1} = 𝑙  and 𝒩  satisfies condition (⋆) . 
However, it is clear from the condition (⋆) that there is at most one individual who obtains the 
unanimous score of 𝑛 − 1. Therefore, it follows that 𝑙 = 1. With 𝑙 = 𝑛 − 2, we have 𝑛 = 3, which 
contradicts our assumption of 𝑛 ≥ 4.  
To show that 𝜑 satisfies IMP. Take any 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? and ballot profiles 𝒩 = (𝑁𝜇 ,𝑁−𝜇),𝒩
′ =
(𝑁𝜇
′ , 𝑁−𝜇) ∈ 𝔑
𝑘 . If 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} , it is easy to see that 𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝜇
−𝑖(𝒩′) , which implies 𝜇 ∈
𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝜇 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′). Suppose 𝜇 = 𝑖. Note that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) if and only if:  
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1, or 
𝒩 satisfies condition (⋆). 
Now, it is clear that 𝑖’s choice of 𝑁𝑖 or 𝑁𝑖
′ does not affect these statements: 
𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
′), and 
𝒩 satisfies condition (⋆) ⇔ 𝒩′ satisfies condition (⋆). 
Therefore, we have 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) ⇔ 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩′).  
To show that 𝜑 satisfies WPU. Because {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1} ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩) for all 𝒩 ∈
𝔑𝑘, the nomination rule 𝜑 satisfies WPU. ■ 
 d) Let 𝒍 = 𝒌. IMP, AB, and WPU⇒Impossibility. Suppose a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔑𝑘 → 𝔛𝑙 
exists that satisfies the three axioms. Take any individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and consider an 𝑛-tuple of integers 
𝑠 = (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛 as follows: 
𝑠𝑖 = 𝑘, 
𝑠𝜇 = 𝑛 − 1 for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, and 
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𝑠𝜇 = 0 for all 𝜇 ∈ {𝑖 + 𝑘 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑛 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
Note that Lemma 8 assures us that 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑𝑘] . Because 𝜑  satisfies WPU, it follows that 
{𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } ⊆ 𝜑(𝑠) . Because |𝜑(𝑠)| ≤ 𝑙 = 𝑘 , we can further say that 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝑠) =
{𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , … , 𝑖 + 𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. With Lemma 7, we can say that 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒞𝑘). Because 𝑖 was arbitrary, it follows that 
𝜑(𝒞𝑘) = 𝜙, which contradicts 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛𝑙. ■ 
 e) Let 𝒍 > 𝒌. IMP, AB, and WPU. Take a pivotal individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. Let 𝜑:𝔑k → 𝔛𝑙 as 
follows. For any ballot profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘,  
𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖} ∪ {𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1}. 
Because we have (𝑛 − 1)𝑘 < 𝑛𝑘 < (𝑛 − 1)(𝑘 + 1), Lemma 8 shows that there is no 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 such 
that |{𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1}| ≥ 𝑘 + 1 . Therefore, for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑
𝑘 , we have 1 ≤ |{𝑖} ∪ {𝜇 ∈
?̅?│𝑠𝜇(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1}| ≤ 𝑘 + 1 ≤ 𝑙. This shows that the rule is well-defined on the setting (𝔑
𝑘, 𝔛𝑙). 
Furthermore, we can easily determine if this rule satisfies IMP, AB, and WPU. Note that this rule fails 
to satisfy NU. ■ 
 
Notes on Proposition 13 
1) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍. IMP but not AB.  
𝜑(𝒩) = {
𝑁1 ∩ {2} if it is nonempty, and
{3} otherwise.
  
2) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒔𝒆𝒍𝒇 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍. AB but not IMP. Let 𝜑 be the nomination rule that chooses those 
who get the highest scores among {1,2,… , 𝑙}.  
3) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍. IMP, AB, but not NU: The constant rule 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋(𝑋 ∈ 𝔛
𝑙).  
4) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍. IMP, NU, but not AB: The bilateral edge scan mechanism.  
5) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍. AB, NU, but not IMP.  
𝜑(𝒩)
= {
𝜑1(𝒩) if its cardinality is at most 𝑙
those who have the minimum index among 𝜑1(𝒩) otherwise
 
6) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝑨𝑩 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝟏. IMP but not AB. Take a pivotal individual 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? 
and define 𝜑:𝔑𝐴𝐵 → 𝔛𝑙 as follows: 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
{𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }   if 𝑁𝑖 ≠ 𝜙, and
{𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } otherwise.
 
7) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 ≤ 𝒏 − 𝟐. IMP and AB: The constant rule 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋  (𝑋 ∈ 𝔛
𝑙).  
8) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 ≤ 𝒏 − 𝟐. AB and NU: Let 𝜑 be the nomination rule that 
chooses the individual with the minimum index among 𝐹𝒩.  
9) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 ≤ 𝒏 − 𝟐. NU and IMP: Let 𝜑 be the nomination rule that 
chooses the individual with the minimum index among 𝑁1.  
10) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒏 − 𝟏. IMP and AB, but not NU: The rule in 7).  
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11) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒏 − 𝟏. IMP and NU, but not AB: The rule in 9).  
12) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒏 − 𝟏. AB and NU, but not IMP: The rule in 8).  
13) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒌 and 𝒏 = 𝟑. IMP: The constant rule 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋 (𝑋 ∈ 𝔛
𝑙).  
14) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒌 and 𝒏 = 𝟑. WPU. Note that the condition imply 
𝑙 = 𝑘 = 1. Clearly, it follows that there is at most one individual that has a score of 𝑛 − 1 = 2. 
Thus, let 
𝜑(𝒩) = {
{𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 2} if it is nonempty, and 
{1} otherwise.
 
15) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒌 and 𝒏 ≥ 𝟒. IMP and AB: The constant rule 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑋 (𝑋 ∈ 𝔛
𝑙).  
16) Let 𝕯 = 𝕹𝒌 and 𝖃 = 𝖃𝒍, where 𝒍 = 𝒌 and 𝒏 ≥ 𝟒. AB and WPU. Because there are at 
most 𝑘 individuals who have the maximum score 𝑛 − 1 at any score profile, we can assign 𝜑(𝑠) 
for each score profile 𝑠 ∈ 𝕊[𝔑𝑘] so that 1 ≤ |𝜑(𝑠)| ≤ 𝑙 and {𝑖 ∈ ?̅?│𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1} ⊆ 𝜑(𝑠). 
Therefore, a nomination rule meeting the requirements can be constructed.  
 
Proof of Proposition 14 
Proof of [1]. Let 𝔇 = 𝔑,𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓, 𝔑𝐴𝐵, 𝔑𝑘 (2 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 3) and 𝔛 = ?̅?. Suppose a nomination rule 
𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅? exists that satisfies IMP, AB, ND, and weak 2CP. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. According to ND, 
there exist 𝒩 = (𝑁𝑖, 𝑁−𝑖),𝒩
′ = (𝑁𝑖
′,𝑁−𝑖) ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? such that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) and 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩
′). 
Note that IMP demands 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖. In addition, considering Lemma 7, there are only two possible cases: 
(1) 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
′, and (2) 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑖
′, because otherwise it follows that 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) =
𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′), which implies 𝒩 ~𝑗 𝒩
′ by Lemma 7. Then by ND and IMP, there is also ℳ =
(𝑀𝑗,𝑀−𝑗),ℳ
′ = (𝑀𝑗
′,𝑀−𝑗) ∈ 𝔇 and 𝑙 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} such that 𝑙 ∈ 𝜑(ℳ) and 𝑙 ∉ 𝜑(ℳ
′). here we 
also have only two possible cases: (a) 𝑙 ∈ 𝑀𝑗 and 𝑙 ∉ 𝑀𝑗
′, and (b) 𝑙 ∉ 𝑀𝑗 and 𝑙 ∈ 𝑀𝑗
′.  
Now there are four possibilities: (1)&(a), (1)&(b), (2)&(a), and (2)&(b). The proof is 
completed if a contradiction is derived from each of the four. I show this only for (2) and (b), 
because the other three cases can be demonstrated in a similar way. Let 𝑑𝑗 + 1 ≔ 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
′)(=
𝑠𝑗(𝒩) + 1) and 𝑑𝑙 + 1 ≔ 𝑠𝑙(ℳ
′)(= 𝑠𝑙(ℳ) + 1). Then, we have 1 ≤ 𝑑𝑗 + 1 ≤ 𝑛 − 1 and 1 ≤
𝑑𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. I label the other individuals as ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑙} = {𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑛−2}. Because 𝑛 ≥ 4, this set ?̅? ∖
{𝑗, 𝑙} has at least two elements 𝑎1, 𝑎2.  
  For any 𝜇 ∈ {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−2}, there exist three subsets 𝐴𝜇
𝑘−2, 𝐴𝜇
𝑘−1, 𝐴𝜇
𝑘 ⊆ {𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑛−2} such 
that: 
𝜇 ∉ 𝐴𝜇
𝑥 and |𝐴𝜇
𝑥| = 𝑥 (𝑥 = 𝑘 − 2, 𝑘 − 1, 𝑘). 
This is because 2 ≤ 𝑘 implies 𝑥 ≥ 0 and 𝑘 ≤ 𝑛 − 2 implies |{𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−2}| = 𝑛 − 2 ≥ 𝑘 + 1 >
𝑘. Because 𝑑𝑗, 𝑑𝑙 ≤ 𝑛 − 2, we can also take two subsets 𝐽, 𝐿 ⊆ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑙} such that |𝐽| = 𝑑𝑗 and 
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|𝐿| = 𝑑𝑙. With these subsets, we can define 𝒩
1 = (𝑁1
1, … ,𝑁𝑛
1) ∈ 𝔑𝑘 ⊆ 𝔑 = 𝔑𝐴𝐵 ∩𝔑𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 as 
follows: 
𝑁𝑗
1 = {𝑙} ∪ {𝑎𝜇: 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑘 − 1}, 
𝑁𝑙
1 = {𝑗} ∪ {𝑎𝜇: 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑘 − 1}, 
𝑁𝜇
1 = {𝑗, 𝑙} ∪ 𝐴𝜇
𝑘−2 for all 𝜇 ∈ 𝐽 ∩ 𝐿, 
𝑁𝜇
1 = {𝑗} ∪ 𝐴𝜇
𝑘−1 for all 𝜇 ∈ 𝐽 ∖ 𝐿, 
𝑁𝜇
1 = {𝑙} ∪ 𝐴𝜇
𝑘−1 for all 𝜇 ∈ 𝐿 ∖ 𝐽, and 
𝑁𝜇
1 = 𝐴𝜇
𝑘 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ (𝐽 ∪ 𝐿 ∪ {𝑗, 𝑙}).  
It is clear that |𝑁𝜇
1| = 𝑘 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅?. Thus, 𝒩1 is a ballot profile. Note that 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑙
1 and 𝑙 ∈
𝑁𝑗
1. With Lemma 7, 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩′) and 𝑙 ∉ 𝜑(ℳ′), we have 𝑗 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩1) and 𝑙 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩1). Because 
𝑎𝑘 ∈ {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛−2} ∖ (𝑁𝑗
1 ∪ 𝑁𝑙
1), we can define a ballot profile 𝒩2 = (𝑁1
2, … ,𝑁𝑛
2) ∈ 𝔇 as follows: 
𝑁𝑗
2 = (𝑁𝑗
1 ∪ {𝑎𝑘}) ∖ {𝑙}, 
𝑁𝑙
2 = (𝑁𝑙
1 ∪ {𝑎𝑘}) ∖ {𝑗}, and 
𝑁𝜇
2 = 𝑁𝜇
1 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑙}. 
Because we have 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
2) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩), 𝑠𝑙(𝒩
2) = 𝑠𝑙(ℳ), and Lemma 7, it follows that 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
2) 
and 𝑙 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩2). The comparison between 𝒩1 and 𝒩2 contradicts weak 2CP. ■ 
Proof of [2]. Note that if 𝑛 = 3, we have 𝑘 = 1 ⇔ 𝑛 − 2 = 𝑘. So, the case of 𝑛 = 3 is a special 
case of [3] (below).  
a) IMP, AB, ND, and weak 2CP.  First, I propose a nomination rule that satisfies the four 
axioms. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅? and let:  
𝜑(𝒩) = {𝑖} ∪ {𝑗 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖}│𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 𝑛 − 1}. 
Clearly this rule has the necessary properties. Furthermore, it satisfies WPU. ■ 
b) IMP, AB, NU, and weak 2CP⇒Impossibility. 
b1) The case of |𝜑(𝒞1)| ≥ 2. Let 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒞1) be two distinct winners at 𝒞1. Because 
𝑛 ≥ 4, there are distinct individuals 𝛼, 𝛽 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. Let us consider a score profile 𝑠 =
(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}
𝑛 as 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠𝑗 = 0, 𝑠𝛼 = 𝑠𝛽 = 2, and 𝑠𝛾 = 1 for all 𝛾 ∈ ?̅? ∖
{𝑖, 𝑗, 𝛼, 𝛽}. With Lemma 8, 𝒩3 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 exists such that 𝑠(𝒩3) = 𝑠. Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
3) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
3) =
0, NU demands that {𝑖, 𝑗} ∩ 𝜑(𝒩3) = 𝜙. Furthermore, 𝑖 ∉ 𝑁𝑗
3 and 𝑗 ∉ 𝑁𝑖
3. Let 𝑁𝑖
3 = {𝑢} and 
𝑁𝑗
3 = {𝑣}. Let 𝒩4 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 be such that:  
𝑁𝑖
4 = (𝑁𝑖
3 ∪ {𝑗}) ∖ {𝑢}, 
𝑁𝑗
4 = (𝑁𝑗
3 ∪ {𝑖}) ∖ {𝑣}, and 
𝑁𝜇
4 = 𝑁𝜇
3 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑗}. 
Then, because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
4) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒞
1) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩
4) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒞
1) = 1, Lemma 7 implies that 𝑖 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩4) and 
𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩4). This contradicts weak 2CP.  
b2) The case of |𝜑(𝒞1)| = 1. Let 𝜑(𝒞1) = {𝑖}. Consider a ballot profile 𝒩5 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 as: 
𝑁𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
5 = (𝐶𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
1 ∪ {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }) ∖ {𝑖}, and 
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𝑁𝜇
5 = 𝐶𝜇
1 for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. 
Because 𝑠𝜇(𝒞
1) = 𝑠𝜇(𝒩
5) for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, Lemma 7 and 𝜑(𝒞1) = {𝑖} show that 
𝜑(𝒩5) ⊆ {𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. Because NU demands 𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩5), we have 𝜑(𝒩5) = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }. With Lemma 7, 
we can see that 𝑖 loses at score 0 and wins at score 1, while 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  wins at score 0 but loses at 
score 1.  
Let us consider 𝒩6 ∈ 𝔑𝑘, where 𝑁𝑖−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
6 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, 𝑁𝑖
6 = {𝑖 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, and 𝑁𝜇
6 = 𝐶𝜇
1 for all 
𝜇 ≠ 𝑖 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , 𝑖. Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
6) = 0 and 𝑠𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝒩
6) = 𝑠𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝒞
1) = 1, NU and Lemma 7 show that 
𝑖 ∉ 𝜑(𝒩6) and 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ∉ 𝜑(𝒩6). Next, let 𝒩7 ∈ 𝔑𝑘 be such that 𝑁𝑖
7 = {𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, 𝑁𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
7 = {𝑖}, and 
𝑁𝜇
7 = 𝑁𝜇
6 for all 𝜇 ≠ 𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Because 𝑠𝑖(𝒩
7) = 𝑠𝑖(𝒞
1) = 1 and 𝑠𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝒩
7) = 𝑠𝑖+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅(𝒩
5) = 2, 
Lemma 7 shows that {𝑖, 𝑖 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ } ⊆ 𝜑(𝒩7). The comparison between 𝒩6 and 𝒩7 contradicts weak 
2CP. ■ 
Proof of [3]. It is clear that 𝜑1:𝔑𝑘 → ?̅? satisfies IMP, AB, 2CN, NU, and WPU. I will show this 
for the other axioms.  
a) ND. Take any 𝑖 ∈ ?̅?. Let 𝑠𝑖 = ⋯ = 𝑠𝑖+𝑛−3̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝑛 − 1, 𝑠𝑖+𝑛−2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝑘(= 𝑛 − 2), and 
𝑠𝑖+𝑛−1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 0. Clearly, this makes a score profile in 𝔑
𝑘, where 𝑘 = 𝑛 − 2. The individual 𝑖 can 
change the result by approving 𝑖 + 𝑛 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  instead of someone else. ■ 
b) Weak 2CP. Take a distinct 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?. The proof is complete if we can show that there is 
no 𝒩 ∈ 𝔑𝑛−2 such that 𝑠𝑖(𝒩) = 𝑠𝑗(𝒩) = 0. From the score profile 𝑠 defined above in a), this 
fact is obvious. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 15 
Let us assume to the contrary that there exists an impartial nomination rule, denoted 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 of 
rank 𝑛 − 1. I first show the case of 𝑙 = 1, and then I will show the other case of 𝑙 ≥ 2.  
 
Proof of Proposition 15 when 𝒍 = 𝟏. 
The proof will be done with three steps. The first step is to define a special class of ballot profiles, 
denoted by 𝑉𝑚
𝑗 ⊆ 𝔇, where 𝑉𝑛−1
𝑗 ⊂ 𝑉𝑛−2
𝑗 ⊂ ⋯ ⊂ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗 ⊂ ⋯ ⊂ 𝑉1
𝑗 ⊂ 𝑉0
𝑗
. In the second step, I will 
show that if there exists a nomination rule of rank 𝑛 − 1, then 𝑗 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩) holds for any ballot 
profile 𝒩 ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
, through a downward induction on 𝑚. Finally, I will derive a contradiction in the 
third step. |𝜑(⋅)| = 1, and so I often write 𝜑(⋅) = 𝑖 instead of 𝜑(⋅) = {𝑖} within this proof.  
 
Step 1: Define the Class of Ballot Profiles 𝑽𝒎
𝒋
⊂ 𝕯 for any 𝒎 ∈ {𝟎,𝟏,… , 𝒏 − 𝟏} and 𝒋 ∈ ?̅? 
First, I introduce some new notation. For any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, I call a permutation over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} an 
(𝑛 − 1)-tuple  
𝒾 = (𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛−1) 
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of individuals in ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}, if {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛−1} = ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}. When an integer 𝑚 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1} and a 
permutation 𝒾 over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} are given, I write  
𝒜 = (𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑇) 
as a partition of ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚} if there exist 𝑎𝑡 , 𝑏𝑡 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚} (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇) such that:  
𝑎𝑡 ≤ 𝑏𝑡 (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇), 
𝑎𝑡+1 = 𝑏𝑡 + 1 (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 − 1), and 
𝐴𝑡 = {𝑖𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}│𝑎𝑡 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑏𝑡} (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇). 
I denote this 𝑎𝑡 and 𝑏𝑡 as the maximum index and minimum index of the set 𝐴𝑡, respectively. If 
𝑚 = 𝑛 − 1, I define 𝒜 = (𝜙) as the unique partition over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}. Please note that I use 
the term “partition” with a slightly restricted meaning within this proof.  
To make this notation familiar to the reader, I will show an example. Suppose 𝑛 = 6, or ?̅? =
{1,2,3,4,5,6}, and 𝑗 = 3. Then a permutation 𝒾 over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} is the way we array the individuals in 
?̅? ∖ {𝑗} = {1,2,4,5,6}. For instance, 𝒾 = (𝑖1, 𝑖2, … , 𝑖𝑛−1) = (𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖3, 𝑖4, 𝑖5) defined as: 
𝑖1 = 2, 𝑖2 = 4, 𝑖3 = 5, 𝑖4 = 1, and 𝑖5 = 6 
makes a permutation over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}. For this permutation and 𝑚 = 2, a partition over ?̅? ∖
{𝑗, 𝑖1,… , 𝑖𝑚} = ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, 𝑖2} = {𝑖3, 𝑖4, 𝑖5} is how we divide the set {𝑖3, 𝑖4, 𝑖5} into pieces without 
breaking the index order. For example, the following are both partitions over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}: 
𝒜 = (𝐴1, 𝐴2, 𝐴3) = ({𝑖3}, {𝑖4}, {𝑖5}) 
𝒜′ = (𝐴1, 𝐴2) = ({𝑖3}, {𝑖4, 𝑖5}). 
However,  
𝒜′′ = (𝐴1, 𝐴2) = ({𝑖3, 𝑖5}, {𝑖4}) 
is NOT a partition over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚}. The reason this is not a partition (in our meaning) is that 
𝑖4 is skipped in 𝐴1. So, incorporating 𝑖4 into 𝐴1 we get  
𝒜′′′ = (𝐴1) = ({𝑖3, 𝑖4, 𝑖5}) 
that is actually a partition.  
For the second partition given above, 𝒜′, the maximum and minimum indices are: 
𝑎1
′ (= the minimum index of 𝐴1
′ ) = 3, 𝑏1
′(= the maximum index of 𝐴1
′ ) = 3 
𝑎2
′ (= the minimum index of 𝐴2
′ ) = 4, 𝑏2
′(= the minimum index of 𝐴2
′ ) = 5. 
Take any individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, a permutation 𝒾 = (𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛−1) over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}, and a partition 𝒜 =
(𝐴1,… , 𝐴𝑇) of ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚} for 𝑚 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}. Now, we define a ballot profile 
𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜] ∈ 𝔇. Note that this ballot profile 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜] is made up of (𝑚 + 𝑡) “rings”. For the first 
𝑚 individuals 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚, each of them and 𝑗 approves each other. For the rest of the individuals, 
each subset 𝐴𝑡 with 𝑗 makes a 1-cyclic ballot sub-profile: 𝑗 approves 𝑖𝑎𝑡, 𝑖𝑎𝑡 approves 𝑖𝑎𝑡+1, 
…, 𝑖𝑏𝑠−1 approves 𝑖𝑏𝑠, and 𝑖𝑏𝑠 approves 𝑗. Formally stated, the ballot profile 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜] =
(𝑁1, … , 𝑁𝑛) is defined as follows: 
𝑁𝑗 = {𝑖𝜇│1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑚} ∪ {𝑖𝑎1, … , 𝑖𝑎𝑇}, 
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𝑁𝑖𝜇 = {𝑗} if 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑚, 
𝑁𝑏𝑡 = {𝑗} for all 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, and 
𝑁𝑖𝜇 = {𝑖𝜇+1} for all 𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ ({𝑗, 𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑡} ∪ {𝜇│1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑚}). 
Then we define 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾] as: 
𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾] ≔ {𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜]│𝒜 is a partition of {𝑖𝜇 ∈ ?̅?│𝑚 + 1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑛}}. 
Furthermore, we define 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 as: 
𝑉𝑚
𝑗 ≔⋃{𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾]│𝒾 is a permutation of ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}}. 
 
 
Step 2: Induction on 𝒎 
I select an arbitrary individual, fixed as 𝑗 ∈ ?̅? till the end of this step. I am going to show that 𝑗 is 
the winner in all of the ballot profiles in 𝑉0
𝑗
 by an induction on 𝑚 in a descending order. Thus, this 
step is made up of two parts: the first is to show the case of 𝑚 = 𝑛 − 1, and the second is to 
construct the induction.  
 
[1] The Case of 𝒎 = 𝒏− 𝟏 
I show that 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑗 for all ballot profiles 𝒩 ∈ 𝑉𝑛−1
𝑗
. Note that there is only one ballot profile 
𝑉𝑛−1
𝑗 [𝒾] =: (𝑁1,… ,𝑁𝑛) = 𝒩 because the partition 𝒜 is uniquely (𝜙). Suppose to the contrary that 
𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. Consider a ballot profile 𝒩′ ∈ 𝔇 as 𝑁𝑖
′ = ?̅? ∖ {𝑖} and 𝑁−𝑖
′ = 𝑁−𝑖. Then, IMP 
demands 𝜑(𝒩′) = 𝑖. However, 𝑖′s score ranking at 𝒩′ can be found as 𝑟𝑖(𝒩
′) = 𝑛. 
Contradiction. So, we can conclude that 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑗.  
 
[2] Induction Part 
Take any 𝑚 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 2}. Assume that 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑗 for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝑉𝑚+1
𝑗 (⊆ 𝑉𝑚+2
𝑗 ⊆ ⋯ ⊆ 𝑉𝑛−1
𝑗 ). 
Then I will show that 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑗 for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 by negating the other possibilities. Take any 
permutation 𝒾 = (𝑖1,… , 𝑖𝑛−1) of ?̅? ∖ {𝑗} and partition 𝒜 = (𝐴1,… , 𝐴𝑇) of {𝑖𝜇 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}│𝑚+
1 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑛}, where 𝐴𝑡 = {𝑖𝜇│𝑎𝑡 ≤ 𝜇 ≤ 𝑏𝑡} (1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇). 𝑚 < 𝑛 − 1, and so we have 𝑇 ≥ 1. Let 
𝒩1 = (𝑁1, … ,𝑁𝑛) ≔ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜]. If there exists 𝑡∗ ∈ {1,… , 𝑇} such that |𝐴𝑡∗| = 1, we can regard 
𝒩1 as an element in 𝑉𝑚+1
𝑗
 because 𝒩1 = 𝑉𝑚+1
𝑗 [𝒾1;𝒜1], where: 
𝒾1 = (𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚, 𝑖𝑎𝑡∗ , 𝑖𝑚+1, … , 𝑖𝑎𝑡∗−1, 𝑖𝑎𝑡∗+1,… , 𝑖𝑛−1), and 
𝒜1 = (𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑡∗−1, 𝐴𝑡∗+1, … , 𝐴𝑇). 
So, 𝜑(𝒩𝑗) = 𝑗 is given by the assumption of the induction. Hereafter, I suppose |𝐴𝑡| = 1 for all 
𝑡 ∈ {1,…𝑇}.  
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(1) 𝒊𝟏, … , 𝒊𝒎, 𝒊𝒃𝟏 ,… , 𝒊𝒃𝒕 are not the winners at 𝓝.  
Take any 𝑖𝜇 ∈ {𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚 , 𝑖𝑏1 , … , 𝑖𝑏𝑡} and suppose that 𝜑(𝒩
1) = 𝑖𝜇. Then consider another ballot 
profile 𝒩2 = (𝑁𝑖𝜇
2 , 𝑁−𝑖𝜇
2 ) ∈ 𝔑 as 𝑁𝑖𝜇
2 ≔ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖𝜇} and 𝑁−𝑖𝜇
2 = 𝑁−𝑖𝜇
1 . IMP demands 𝜑(𝒩2) = 𝑖𝜇. 
On the other hand, the score profile is given as 𝑠𝑖𝜇(𝒩
2) = 1 < 𝑠𝑖𝜈(𝒩) for all 𝑖𝜈 ∈ ?̅? ∖ {𝑖𝜇}. So, 
we have 𝑟𝑖𝜇(𝒩
2) = 𝑛. This contradicts the assumption that 𝜑 has rank 𝑛 − 1. We can conclude 
that 𝜑(𝒩1) ∉ {𝑖1,… , 𝑖𝑚, 𝑖𝑏1 , … , 𝑖𝑏𝑡}.  
 
(2) 𝒊𝒂𝟏 , … , 𝒊𝒂𝑻 are not the winners, either.  
Assume that 𝜑(𝒩1) = 𝑖𝑎𝑡 for some 𝑡 ∈ {1,… , 𝑇}. I will derive a contradiction. Let 𝒩
3 ∈ 𝔇, as 
𝑁𝑖𝑡
3 = (𝑁𝑖𝑎𝑡
1 ∪ {𝑗}) ∖ {𝑖𝑎𝑡+1} and 𝑁−𝑖𝑎𝑡
3 = 𝑁−𝑖𝑎𝑡
1 . IMP demands 𝑖𝑎𝑡 = 𝜑(𝒩
3), which also means 
𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(𝒩3). Next, let us consider 𝒩4 ∈ 𝔇 such that 𝑁𝑗
4 = 𝑁𝑗
3 ∪ {𝑖𝑎𝑡} and 𝑁−𝑗
4 = 𝑁−𝑗
3 . Here, IMP 
demands 𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(𝒩4). However, we can find 𝒩4 in 𝑉𝑚+1
𝑗
. Indeed, we can check that 𝒩4 =
𝑉𝑚+1
𝑗 [𝒾4;𝒜4], where: 
𝒾4 = (𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚 , 𝑖𝑎𝑠, 𝑖𝑚+1, … , 𝑖𝑎𝑠−1, 𝑖𝑎𝑠+1, … , 𝑖𝑛), and 
𝒜4 = (𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑡 ∖ {𝑖𝑎𝑡}(=:𝐴𝑡
′),… , 𝐴𝑇). 
By the assumption of the induction, we already know that 𝜑(𝑉𝑚+1
𝑗 [𝒾4;𝒜4]) = 𝑗. This contradicts 
𝜑(𝒩4) ≠ 𝑗. 𝑎𝑡 ∈ {𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑇} was arbitrary, and so it follows that 𝜑(𝒩
1) ∉ {𝑖𝑎1, 𝑖𝑎2, … , 𝑖𝑎𝑇}.  
 
(3) If 𝒋 is not the winner at 𝓜∈ 𝑽𝒎
𝒋
, there exists another ballot profile 𝓜′ = 𝑽𝒎
𝒋 [𝓲′;𝓐′] 
such that 𝓐′ has strictly smaller width of division and 𝒋 is not the winner.  
Let us denote an individual in ?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚, 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑇, 𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑇} as a middle term. I will show 
that no middle term wins at 𝒩1 by constructing a sequence of ballot profiles in 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 that satisfy a 
certain condition. For a partition 𝒜 = (𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑇), let 𝛥(𝒜) be the width of the partition defined 
as:  
𝛥(𝒜) ≔∑|𝐴𝑡 ∖ {𝑎𝑡 , 𝑏𝑡}|
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
    = |?̅? ∖ {𝑗, 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑚, 𝑎1,… , 𝑎𝑇, 𝑏1, … , 𝑏𝑇}|. 
So, the width simply counts the number of middle terms for a given partition 𝒜 of ?̅? ∖
{𝑗, 𝑖1,… , 𝑖𝑚}.  
 Now, take any ballot profile 𝒩5 ≔ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾5;𝒜5] ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
. I will show that if some middle term 
wins at 𝒩5, then there exists a ballot profile ℳ ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 such that 𝛥(ℳ) < 𝛥(𝒩5) and 𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(ℳ). 
Suppose a middle term 𝑖𝜆 ∈ 𝐴𝑡 ∖ {𝑎𝑡, 𝑏𝑡}(1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇) wins at 𝒩
5, viz. 𝜑(𝒩5) = 𝑖𝜆. Consider a 
ballot profile 𝒩6 ∈ 𝔇 as 𝑁𝑖𝜆
6 = {𝑗} and 𝑁−𝑖𝜆
6 = 𝑁−𝑖𝜆
5 . IMP demands 𝜑(𝒩6) = 𝑖𝜆. Thus, we have 
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𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(𝒩6). Consider a ballot profile 𝒩7 ∈ 𝔇 as 𝑁𝑗
7 = 𝑁𝑗
6 ∪ {𝑖𝜆+1} and 𝑁−𝑗
7 = 𝑁−𝑗
6 . In this case, 
IMP demands 𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(𝒩7). Furthermore, we can regard it as 𝒩7 = 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾5;𝒜7], where:  
𝒜7 = (𝐴1, … , 𝐴𝑡−1, {𝑖𝑎𝑡, 𝑖𝑎𝑡+1 , … , 𝑖𝜆}, {𝑖𝜆+1,… , 𝑖𝑏𝑡},𝐴𝑡+1, … , 𝐴𝑇). 
𝐴𝑡 is divided into two parts: {𝑖𝑎𝑡 , 𝑖𝑎𝑡+1 , … , 𝑖𝜆} and {𝑖𝜆+1,… , 𝑖𝑏𝑡}, and so we have 𝛥(𝒜
5) > 𝛥(𝒜7). 
This is because 𝑖𝜆 is no longer a middle term in the new partition, while the other individuals keep 
the same status.  
 When a ballot profile ℳ1(= 𝒩5) ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 is given, the argument above shows how we can 
get a new ballot profile ℳ2(= 𝒩7) ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 where the new partition has strictly less width than the 
original and where 𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(ℳ2). Furthermore, according to (1) and (2), individuals with the 
maximum and minimum indices in the new partition cannot win at ℳ2. Thus, it follows that 
𝜑(ℳ2) is also a middle term (in the new partition). So, we can iterate the argument again to get 
ℳ3,ℳ4, …, all of which are in 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
. Let us start this iteration with ℳ1 = 𝒩1. 𝛥(𝒜1) is finite, and 
so there exists a terminating level 𝑥 and ballot profile ℳ𝑥 = 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾𝑥;𝒜𝑥] such that 𝛥(ℳ𝑥) = 0. 
The width is 0, and so there is no middle term in 𝒜𝑥. I have already shown that 𝑗 ≠ 𝜑(ℳ𝑥). By 
(1) and (2), the other individuals also lose at ℳ𝑥. This contradicts 𝜙 ∉ 𝔛. Thus, we can conclude 
that 𝜑(𝒩1) is not a middle term. This completes (3).  
 
 
The arguments in (1), (2), and (3) show that no individual other than 𝑗 wins at 𝒩1. Thus, we have 
𝜑(𝒩1) = 𝑗. The permutation 𝒾1 and the partition 𝒜1 were arbitrary, and so this shows that we 
have 𝜑(𝒩) = 𝑗 for all 𝒩 ∈ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
.  
 
Step 3: Proof of the Proposition 
We know from the last step that for all 𝑚 ∈ {0,1,… , 𝑛 − 1}, permutation 𝒾 and partition 𝒜, 
𝜑(𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜]) = 𝑗. 𝑗 was an arbitrary individual in ?̅? selected at the beginning of the proof and 
carried throughout, and so the previous sentence holds for any 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?. Now, take two adjacent 
individuals, say 𝑗, 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ ∈ ?̅?. We know from the above that for ballot profiles 𝒩8,𝒩9 ∈ 𝔑 such 
that:  
𝒩8 ≔ 𝑉0
𝑗[(𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑗 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅,… , 𝑗 + 𝑛 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ); (?̅? ∖ {𝑗})], and  
𝒩9 ≔ 𝑉0
𝑗+1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ [(𝑗 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, 𝑗 + 2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, … , 𝑗 + 𝑛̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅); (?̅? ∖ {𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅})], 
we obtain 𝑗 = 𝜑(𝒩8) and 𝑗 + 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝜑(𝒩9). However, we can easily check that 𝒩8 = 𝒩9 = 𝒞1, 
which directly yields a contradiction. Therefore, our first assumption that there is a nomination rule 
𝜑:𝔇 → ?̅? of rank (𝑛 − 1) is false. This completes the proof of 𝑙 = 1. ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 15 when 𝒍 ≥ 𝟐. 
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Let us assume that there exists a nomination rule 𝜑:𝔇 → 𝔛𝑙 that has rank 𝑛 − 1. Take any 
individual 𝑗 ∈ ?̅?, permutation 𝒾 = (𝑖1,… , 𝑖𝑛−1) over ?̅? ∖ {𝑗}, and a partition 𝒜 = (?̅? ∖ {𝑗}). Let 
𝒩10 ≔ 𝑉𝑚
𝑗[𝒾;𝒜]. 𝜑(𝒩10) contains at least two individuals, and so there exists an individual 𝑖𝜇 ∈
?̅? ∖ {𝑗} such that 𝑖𝜇 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
10). Let us consider a ballot profile 𝒩11 ∈ 𝔇 as 𝑁𝑖𝜇
11 = ?̅? ∖ {𝑖𝜇} and 
𝑁−𝑖𝜇
11 = 𝑁−𝑖𝜇
10 . IMP demands 𝑖𝜇 ∈ 𝜑(𝒩
11). But 𝑖𝜇 has rank 𝑟𝑖𝜇(𝒩
11) = 𝑛, in contradiction to the 
rank of 𝜑. ■ 
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